

THE
PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

No. XXIX.

ART. I.—JOHN STERLING.

1. *Sterling's Essays and Tales*, with a Memoir of his Life.
By Archdeacon Hare. J. W. Parker, 1848.
2. *The Life of John Sterling*. By Thomas Carlyle. Chapman and Hall, 1851.

It is not our intention to present our readers with any abstract of the contents of these volumes. Archdeacon Hare's *Life of Sterling* has, we believe, been extensively read; and Mr. Carlyle's is likely to meet a still wider circulation: perhaps, then, we may rather assume that our readers are acquainted with both these works. Indeed, we may congratulate the public on the favourable turn which so powerful a writer as Mr. Carlyle is taking. We would hope that some young David has been exorcizing the evil spirit, and that we shall no longer have to turn away in sorrow from moody querulousness and despairing panegyrics on every form of despotism. Carlyle now shows a sunnier front, and has produced not only an exceedingly agreeable but a truly beautiful book. His portraiture of Coleridge and of Edward Sterling the father, will be to many as interesting as that of John Sterling, especially since the great compactness of the narrative gives the impression of the others more speedily. Although we by no means subscribe to all the sentiments of this pleasant volume, we gratefully acknowledge not only its more genial and sounder morality, but its disposition to speak more distinctly, instead of affecting an oracular and evasive

tone, which was very inconsistent with the denunciation of shams and hypocrisy.

It is, however, certainly a curious thing that two lives should thus have professedly been published, of a man whose principal works are scarcely known. Archdeacon Hare has, indeed, re-published Sterling's prose writings, some of them rather juvenile, and such as Sterling himself might have wished to be forgotten: many valuable and interesting extracts from his letters are also given by both his biographers. On the other hand it is to Poetry that Sterling deliberately dedicated his maturest intellect, and it is in his Theological change of mind that the public would feel chief curiosity; yet neither biographer has done what might have been hoped as to the one or the other subject. What would have seemed to us most desirable, is, that the memoir of his life should either have exhibited fully the grounds and process of his theological development, with the results in which he finally rested; or else, that the memoir should have been purely a literary one, and printed uniformly with Sterling's poems, with a common title page for all the little volumes, and an additional similar volume for his last and hitherto unpublished poem, *Cœur de Lion*. Neither of these courses has been pursued, and his biographers,—*both* with the best intentions,—appear to us *both* to have done him some injustice.

The Archdeacon's reason for writing any memoir at all is not distinctly explained. We know not whether we ought to believe the rumour, that his real object was, to hinder Carlyle from undertaking the task, whom he expected to spoil it by omitting entirely the religious side of Sterling's character. There is plausibility in this. If true, it is singular, that it should so nearly have brought about the thing feared: at least, Carlyle declares that he should *not* have written this life, had it not been already done unsatisfactorily by Hare. Between the two, the reader of both biographies does gain a considerable insight into Sterling's mind, though in neither is there any consecutive attempt to develop the progress of his theological opinions; and indeed it would seem that the authors are alike incapacitated to write on the subject:—Mr. Carlyle, because he despised it, as he pretty plainly tells us; Archdeacon Hare, because he is not only an orthodox believer,

but a clergyman. In consequence, so much obscurity is left on the state of Sterling's judgment, that people are enabled to make very erroneous representations. In a recent number of the *Eclectic Review*,—(a publication which deserves honour as remarkably liberal and candid, considering its orthodoxy,)—it is imagined that Sterling was drawn away from Coleridge's philosophy by Carlyle, and, as a result of this, lost his faith in Christianity: moreover, it is added on authority, that at the last, Sterling ceased to be a Carlylist, and died a Christian. It is certainly unfortunate that such topics, if at all dealt with by biographers, should be left in any uncertainty: but the *Eclectic Review* is beyond a doubt in error. Even from Archdeacon Hare it may be clearly enough learnt, that it was from German Theologians that the impulse came to the unloosening of Sterling's belief in Christianity: and the crisis of his mind seems to have been in reading Ullmann "On the Sinlessness of Jesus;" (Hare, p. cliii.) of which Sterling writes:—

"One of the deepest, bitterest and most lasting disappointments of my life, was, what I think, Ullmann's failure in that Essay. I shall never forget, but, I hope, never again experience, the dismay with which I reviewed his inquiry, and was compelled to say he had not made good his point."

It is, we think, thus quite manifest, that whatever secondary effect Carlyle may have had, the great shock to Sterling's creed came from writers whom Carlyle neglects, and from lines of thought on which Carlyle wholly refused discussion. On the other hand, it is certain that Sterling's attachment to Coleridge's philosophy outlasted his Christian creed; and that to the last, even when he had learned to see Coleridge's personal weaknesses, he felt deeply grateful for the influence which his conversations had exerted. When, indeed, much is made of the statement that Sterling "died a Christian," we need to ask what it means. If it means, that he died a believer in the miracles or in the sinlessness or in the authority of Jesus, we can from personal knowledge give it the most pointed and total contradiction.

The conclusion to which he had long come, was, that nothing from *without* can suffice for founding a philosophy

within; that all science and all duty has its roots in the inner man; that God is not and cannot be revealed to us from without; and that the English idea of "A Revelation" is essentially a hopeless absurdity. In this conclusion he was so rooted, that he believed the whole structure of his mind would need to be rebuilt before he could doubt of it; and it is most certain that this to the last made it impossible for him to see any "authority" in the words of Christ or of Isaiah. But it is equally certain, that there was no time at which he did not feel great reverence and admiration for those words. If the fact of his sending for the Bible and reading it in his last days proves him to have been a Christian, then a devout and fervent Christian he always was. In fact, sentiments of his letters quoted in Hare and Carlyle, are not only beautiful and noble, but are in a tone so Christian, that ordinary readers might infer that he believed in miracles,—which is so oddly imagined to be the source of all religious knowledge.

While thus vindicating Sterling's practical religion from the fancy of the evangelical, who supposes him at one time "an infidel" and at a later time a Christian—totally mistaking him on both occasions, and wrongly supposing there was any change in him;—we yet are disposed to concede much to a remark of Mr. Carlyle on this subject:—

"Yet it may be questioned," says he, p. 340, "whether piety,—what we call devotion or worship, was the principle deepest in him. In spite of his Coleridge-discipleship, and his once headlong operations following thereon, I used to judge that his piety was prompt and pure, rather than great or intense; that on the whole, religious devotion was not the deepest element of it. His reverence was ardent and just, ever ready for the thing or man that deserved reverencing or seemed to deserve it; but he was of too joyful, light and hoping a nature to go to the depths of that feeling, much more to dwell perennially in it. He had no fear in his composition: terror and awe did not blend with his respect of anything. In no scene or epoch could he have been a Church Saint, a fanatic enthusiast, or have worn out his life in passive martyrdom. . . . In sorrow he would not dwell: all sorrow he swiftly subdued, and shook away from him. How could you have made an Indian Faker of the Greek Apollo, 'whose bright eye lends brightness and never yet saw a shadow?' I should say, not religious reverence, but artistic admiration, was the essential character of him."

Perhaps substantially the same thing may be differently expressed as follows:—"Intellect and admiration of Art, were developed *earlier* in Sterling than Reverence and Awe." We cannot doubt that his youth was defective in the element of Reverence; hence also his early morality was rather utilitarian than spiritual, and his best qualities, as a young man, those of half-regulated noble impulse. Now we presume that to make the Fakeer and the Fanatic, it is essential that the understanding be *less* developed than the religious element of man; which is the reverse of Sterling's case. But we do not think that the later growths are necessarily superficial, or less pervading to a character. Undoubtedly the great obligation which Sterling felt to Coleridge, turned upon the remedying of his early defect. No topic was more congenial, we have understood, to Coleridge, than to expose the hollowness of the Epicurean *Nil admirari*; and to enforce that Wonder, Admiration and Reverence, are as essential to human perfection as Love; and are alike superior to logic. When Sterling first learnt fundamentally, how vain was all reasoning to implant or to supersede these primitive instincts; when in consequence he more carefully cultivated these instincts, and entered consciously into a religious life;—his intellect was already in the ascendant, and to dark superstition or vain terrors he was inaccessible. But his heart was deep enough for any love, and his power of self-devotion equal to any sacrifice. If his intellect had not rebelled against Biblical Infallibility, we can see nothing to hinder his having advanced into *such* a Church Saint as alone can be admired among Protestants: but it soon appeared to him how little could be done for the religious improvement of England until certain intellectual delusions were swept away: hence his mind was carried into other lines of action as more profitable from him than any direct religious teaching.

It is the closing disaster to Sterling, that the form of mental effort which he especially selected as his own,—namely, Poetry,—has been frowned on by the two friends whom he most trusted, as well as neglected by the public. The reader will say:—"Is it not then the presumption, that the decision is right, and that Sterling's poetry is worthless?"—We do not admit the inference. In the

present day, nothing is harder than to gain attention to a small volume of poetry, from an unknown name; and if a man's own biographers assure the public that he has published nothing worth reading, we think he has not fair play, unless indeed nobody at all is to be found of an opposite judgment.

Archdeacon Hare tells us, that "his poems were mostly rather the imaginative expression of pre-determined moral and philosophical truths, than the spontaneous utterance of a poetical mind;" p. lxxvi.: and thus effectually represses all desire on the reader's part to inquire further. We must complain of this as very hard. Undoubtedly, the reflective faculties were too much cultivated in Sterling, to allow of his writing like a Homer; nor was he either a Byron or a Walter Scott. But compare him,—we will not say with Wordsworth or Tennyson,—but with Southey, Milman, Rogers, Shelley, or with nine poets out of ten who have lived in the days of philosophy, and we believe it will be found that there is no undue prominence in his poetry of the "pre-determined" over the spontaneous element. We almost suspect that Archdeacon Hare's dislike of the particular philosophy which Sterling's best poems suggest, gave rise to this very unjust complaint; which seems to be all that he has to say about them. Mr. Carlyle by his own account always dissuaded and disparaged Sterling's poetical efforts, for which he makes a partial apology by his present commendation of the very spirited little poem, "The Election," p. 280; which has, indeed, obvious faults in the plan, but is admirable in the execution, and in every page (as we think), except the first, refutes the complaint that there is a lack of spontaneity.

But let us hear Mr. Carlyle's general argument, p. 252:—

"My own advice was, as it had always been, steady against poetry. . . . Had he not already gained superior excellence, in delivering by way of *speech* or prose what thoughts were in him, which is the grand and only intrinsic function of a writing man—? Why *sing* your bits of thoughts, if you *can* contrive to speak them? By your thought, not by your mode of delivering it, you must live or die."

Surely this is an argument against all poetry whatsoever, and almost against prose *style*. As we are not at

leisure to enter into that question, it may suffice to say, that Mr. Carlyle totally neutralizes his own authority in the matter, if he presses the argument. But we must add, that Sterling's prose composition was often wordy and ambitious, and far too like his speech,—in which his fluent rapidity and happy selection of words made diffuseness an advantage; but his poetry is terse and chaste. As regards the individual, therefore, we differ from Mr. Carlyle. But he continues:—

“Besides, I had to observe, that there was in Sterling intrinsically no depth of *tune*; which surely is the real test of a Poet or Singer, as distinguished from a Speaker. In music proper he had not the slightest ear. All music was mere impertinent noise to him; nothing in it perceptible but the mere march of time. Nor in his way of conception of utterance, in the verses he wrote, was there any contradiction, but a constant confirmation to me, of that fatal prognostic:—as indeed the whole man, in ear and heart and tongue, is one; and he whose soul does not sing, need not try to do it with his throat. *Sterling's verses had a monotonous rub-a-dub, instead of tune*; no trace of music, deeper than that of a well-beaten drum; to which limited range of excellence the substance also corresponded; being intrinsically always a rhymed, and slightly rhythmical speech, not a song.”

We read this with much surprise,—and with no small sympathy with poor Sterling, that he should have such hostile biographers. Assuredly, such a passage from Mr. Carlyle will be accepted by the thousands who read his prose, as finally settling that no one ought to lose time in reading Sterling's poetry. But, as for ourselves, there are many reasons why we cannot receive this dictum. First, we totally deny the metrical theory here propounded. In written poetry, there neither is nor can be, any other metrical melody but that of *time*. The want of an ear for *tune* is no disqualification,—the possession of such an ear is no aid,—to the composing of melodious poetry. It is false, and absurd, to say that poetry ought to be “a song.” Ancient lyric poetry was sung; so may modern poetry be: but the tune has nothing to do with the intrinsic melody of the verse as written by the poet. Secondly, we are so far from admitting that there is any lack of melody in Sterling's verses, that we should have assented to a critic who commended them for their peculiar melody. Thirdly,

we suspect that Mr. Carlyle has given us the clue to his prejudice, by telling us that he did not like Sterling's way of reading out his own verses. Probably with good reason. Elocution is so little taught among us, that many persons of fine feeling mouth poetry shockingly, and give the effect of monotony to verses intrinsically excellent. Moreover, from the time of Horace downward, few people can bear to listen to poets reading their own verses.

Besides this, it is probable that Mr. Carlyle dislikes the ballad measures, in which the first small volume of poems was principally written; and demands from them "rich and complicated forms of melody" (p. 321), which are scarcely to be found but in the five-foot line with its various pauses. We may add, that the *Sexton's Daughter*, which is the first and longest poem in the volume, possibly is only to be admired by the lovers of Wordsworth. If there is no adequate interest in the story, if its metre is too unvaried,—as the metre of that elegant little piece, the *Aphrodite*,—still, we are surprised that any one (who is not as a deaf adder to all poetry) can read even that first volume, and deny that the writer has an ear for melody, or complain that he writes by pre-determined mechanism. Only short poems can be quoted with advantage by us: we therefore extract the following, and ask the reader whether it is a mere "rub-a-dub,"—or, on the other hand, too philosophical.

THE SEA MAID.

A Maiden came gliding over the sea,
In a boat as light as boat can be,
And she sang in tones so sweet and free,—
"O where is the youth that will follow me?"

Her forehead was white as the pearly shell,
And in flickering waves her ringlets fell;
Her bosom heav'd with a gentle swell,
And her voice was a distant vesper bell.

And still she sang, while the western light
Fell on her figure so soft and bright;—
"O where shall I find the brave young sprite
That will follow the track of my skiff to-night?"

To the strand the youths of the village run,
When the witching song has scarce begun;
And ere the set of that evening sun,
Fifteen bold lovers the maid has won.

They hoisted the sail and they plied the oar,
And away they went from their native shore,
While the damsel's pinnace flew fast before;
But never, O never, we saw them more.

The following metre we conjecture to be the offensive one,—barely because it is *too smooth* :—

Thy birth, O goddess, kind and smooth,
Was from the sunny sea :
The crystal blue and milky foam
In brightness cradled thee.
From thee all fairest things have light,
Which they to men impart :
Then whence arise the pangs and storms
That rend the lover's heart ?

Is there neither melody nor spontaneity in the “ Song of Eve to Cain,” with the suppressed tragedy in its tenderness ?

O rest, my baby, rest !
The day
Is glowing down the west.
Now tir'd of sunny play,
Upon thy mother's breast
O rest, my darling, rest !

Thou first-born child of man !
In thee
New joy for us began,
Which dead all seem'd to be,
When that so needful ban
From Eden exil'd man.

&c. &c.

Or is there neither variety nor free imagination in the song to The Dearest ?

Oh that from far away mountains
Over the restless waves,
Where bubble enchanted fountains
Rising from jewell'd caves,
I could call a fairy bird,

&c. &c.

Or, if energetic verse is needed, will Mr. Carlyle deny that quality to the lines on Charles I. imprisoned in Carisbrook Castle?

Mid these fall'n stones and weeds luxuriant, stood
The narrow prison of a man of blood.
Would that till now the dungeon had remain'd
To mark the fate for sceptred crime ordain'd!
When those strong spirits, from whose loins we spring,
Gave guilt its meed, nor spar'd a felon king;
Blot to his age, and traitor to the land
That own'd his sway; cold heart and ruthless hand;
Who fed his pride on priestcraft's fawning breath,
While glorious Elliot pin'd away to death:
Who pray'd, while those his mandate tortur'd, sigh'd;
And call'd on heav'n to witness, when—he lied! &c. &c.

This has more oratory than poetry in it, but, after the other passages, it shows Sterling's variety. One blank verse specimen we will venture to extract, in which the reader will judge whether "rich and complicated melody" was a thing for which, as Mr. Carlyle tells us, Sterling's want of a musical ear incapacitated him.—Vane (in the Strafford) argues thus in favour of *Religious*, as well as Civil, Reformation:—

But, were all this amended, still were need
Of purer good than any thus design'd.
We should outbid the market of the world,
And seek a holier than a common prize,
And by the unworthy lever of To-day
Ope the strange portals of a better Morn.
Build we on this poor earth eternally
That, which to hold, it rose at first from chaos,—
A perfect polity of Christian men,
Free in their souls,—where only Freedom is,—
And owning no subjection, save to pow'rs
Which prompt self-government in all they rule.
Therefore, I say, resist unto the death.
Begin to-day; nor end till evil sink
In its due grave: and if at once we may not
Declare the greatness of the work we plan,
*Be sure, at least, that ever in our eyes
It stand complete before us, as a dome
Of light beyond this gloom;—a house of stars
Encompassing these dusky tents;—a thing*

*Absolute, close to all, though seldom seen,
Near as our hearts, and perfect as the heavens.
Be this our aim and model, and our hands
Shall not wax faint, until the work is done.*

To pass from this to the Election, is rather startling;—
we will confine ourselves to eight lines, from the opening
of Book V. :—

In doleful dumps as e'er on worst surprize
Made Rome's great Senate doubt their destinies,
When Hannibal's fierce cloud was seen to roll
Flames from Mount Alban o'er the Capitol,
Now sat the Red Divan; and mid them Spark
With tenfold wrath and gloom was lowering dark.
—Spark long was silent; but at length the rage
Within him beastlike broke its iron cage: &c.

Again, from the opening of *Cœur de Lion*, as printed in
Frazer's Magazine, we take a stanza or two, which will
show another phase of Sterling :—

The lion-hearted was a Christian man,
And, therefore, lov'd the Saracens to throttle;
A boon-companion, too, and partizan
Of all whose watchword was, "Sirloin and Bottle;"
And chose as comrade of his dish and can
No two-legg'd book that worms and cobwebs mottle;
But firm he trod this earth so rich and real,
And only from its fields would reap the ideal.

A warrior good, as ever struck with unction
And smash'd a dozen craniums at a blow;
And who conceiv'd it his peculiar function
To send all unbelieving souls below,
Where they might scorch and learn how much compunction
They ought to have been feeling long ago.
For Richard, glorious by his blows and knocks,
Deserv'd most fame as strictly orthodox.

It is in truth much pleasanter to see
Some such,—a burly, fierce, and laughing fellow,
Eager with life and resonant with glee,
Now stormlike furious and now tipsy mellow,
Bold-brain'd, clear-ey'd, and as the ocean free,
Than your mild fop, or scholar faint and yellow,
A web of crazy mist and affectation,
And loving beef and ale with reservation.

In a different tone presently occurs the following:—

The morn was fair, and bright the summer sky,
 When the tall grandson of Plantagenet,
 Bold heir of prudent Henry,—coasting by
 Sicilia's hills with all his canvas set,—
 Before his fleet in his great argosy
 Sail'd towards Messina: triumph such as yet,—
 Though Rome and Carthage there had urg'd their galleys,—
 Ne'er blaz'd on those old shores and vine-clad valleys.

A hundred banner'd vessels built for fight,
 And dromonds huge, deep-weighed with plenteousness,
 With their broad shadows buffet ocean's light,
 And with high prows the roaring flood oppress.
 Grey rocks and ruins brown, and cities white,
 And snow-capt Etna, far from man's access,
 Behold them pass; till that armada sweeping
 Breaks into where Messina's waves lie sleeping.

It is not our intention to hold up Sterling as a finished poet; for it seems to us clear that his powers were far greater than his performance. His first volume contains numerous smaller poems, among which the *Aphrodite* is, perhaps, the most perfect; *Alfred the Harper* the most spirited; *Joan of Arc* (with special faults) the most indicative of a rich poetic mind. The *Election* displayed satirical powers which no one could have suspected from his former writings; his *Strafford* (which has shared the neglect of most modern tragedies) shows Sterling to be master of a racy Shakspearian dialect, which is amazing to one who comes fresh from his too Latinized prose. But finally, his *Cœur de Lion* exhibits a command of various styles, which, we confess (strong as the comparison may be thought), no English poet since Byron appears to us to have attained. Yet Carlyle says that the substance of Sterling's poetry was on a par with the monotony which he could not avoid; and Hare assures us, that it is only philosophy elaborated into the form of poetry. Why, on the contrary, the great fault of his (posthumous and unfinished) poem on *Cœur de Lion*, is, its purposeless digressions,—its "overfruitful diffuseness" (to use the phrase of a friendly poet who criticised the MS.)—in consequence of which, the editor of *Frazer's Magazine* refused to con-

tinue the printing of it, fearing it would be thought tedious. We do think that it was the part of friendly biographers, to endeavour to gain for Sterling's poetry that moderate degree of attention from the public, which is given to many poetical productions that no one calls first-rate; and although the lamented author has been taken away prematurely, and has by no means produced any complete work fully worthy of his genius, we cannot but believe that the unbiassed public would presently recognise a real poetical genius in him, if only a tranquil reading could be obtained. But, however we may estimate the ability of professional "tasters" to judge of romances, novels, or books of information, we cannot admit that their decision against poems ought to be final. The poetry which pleases us when we are in one mood, has no charms for us at another time; and we suspect that one who is forced to be a man-of-all-work in literature, is apt to have as little heart for poetry as we understand Mr. Carlyle to profess for himself. But we must in justice to him give his criticism on the first part of *Cœur de Lion*, in which the reader will be amused with the closing words:—
(p. 321.)—

"This time I felt glad to answer in another tone;—that here was real felicity and ingenuity, on the prescribed conditions; a decisively rhythmic quality in this composition; thought and phraseology actually *dancing*,—after a sort. What the plan and scope of the work might be, he had not said, and I could not judge; but here was a light opulence of airy fancy, picturesque conception, vigorous delineation, all marching on as with cheerful drum and fife, if without more rich and complicated forms of melody: if a man *would* write in metre, this, sure enough, was the way to try doing it."

We believe, all that Carlyle here praises was burnt by Sterling, who re-wrote nearly all the poem.

Here is a man whom each of his biographers and friends regard as having possessed great abilities;—who spent his strength on two main subjects, on which, at different periods, he desired to appear before the public,—the Theological and the Poetical. His first biographer, in the opinion of his second, damages him theologically;—so, to remedy this, the second damages him poetically; and destroys, perhaps, the last chance of getting a fair reading

of his works. No decision of the public against them has been given. They have not been read. If our memory does not deceive us, we heard that *five* copies only were sold of the *Election*, which Mr. Carlyle calls Sterling's best production, and which was highly commended in the *Examiner* newspaper at the time. However, we have said enough on this whole topic.

It would be very imprudent in us to try to mediate between Carlyle and Sterling on questions of philosophy or speculation; but we are a little disposed to complain of the patronizing tone assumed by the former; which is interpreted by not a few readers, as though he claimed Sterling as a young disciple, who, though with many struggles for independence, is at length inevitably dragged in the track of his master. Altogether, we fear the impression is given to the reader, that Sterling was a rather feminine character,—impulsive but unsteady; quick, but superficial; susceptible, ardent, but incapable of permanently resisting in anything the great masculine mind of Thomas Carlyle. We know that it *is* so interpreted. We hardly think Mr. Carlyle meant it, and we believe it to be quite erroneous. Sterling undoubtedly knew how to give full honour to the talents of his friend, and was open to learn from him; but he always preserved his own independence, and he by no means always at length followed Carlyle's judgments. That he wanted steadiness, is a false inference from the changes necessitated by his ill health. Carlyle justly marks it as extraordinary perseverance, that when he had health so feeble, when the friends whose judgment he most esteemed gave so little approbation to his poetry, and the public simply ignored it, he continued to labour at poem after poem, because he had concluded this to be his true vocation. That Sterling was anything but a superficial man; that he penetrated to the fundamental principles of whatever he took in hand, and in comparison despised all secondary questions; is, we think, clear even by the extracts from his letters in the two biographies. But because neither health allowed, nor professional necessity called him, to be elaborately *learned* in anything, the critics, who hate his theological conclusions, assume the right to call him superficial.

Mr. Carlyle comments with due decision on the grand

error of Sterling's life,—his having become ordained in the Church of England. When a young man at the usual age passes by routine into this position, without having ever gained independence of judgment, we may often regret it, but can never be surprised. But Sterling was already beyond the crisis at which such a step is ordinary; and in him it was an act so eminently voluntary and personal, that it ought not to have been done without very grave and full deliberation. Sterling himself afterwards compared his state of mind at the time, to that of a nun who takes the veil, in order to get rid of the wicked world. It is certain that he would have justified everything that his friend says against the folly of the proceeding; but we think it does not at all warrant Mr. Carlyle's remark—that "few gifted living men had less stubbornness of perseverance" than Sterling. This might imply that it would have been admirable to persist in a calling for which (theologically, still more than physically) he soon found himself unsuited. He had too great love of truth to persevere in any form of error. There was, indeed, a fault; *not* that of wanting perseverance, but that of having rushed into action too precipitately, when strong religion was first awakened in him;—a phenomenon, no doubt, common enough. Still, we cannot but wonder that so active a mind seems temporarily to have forgotten the necessity of investigating and establishing the 39 Articles and all that goes along with them, and to have overlooked that they were likely to prove an unbearable yoke.

In conclusion, we strongly recommend any of our readers, who have not yet read Mr. Carlyle's very interesting book, to secure for themselves that pleasure. It has been our business chiefly to find fault; but the book itself will abundantly set that right, and put them in good humour with the author and his subject.

ART. II.—POPULAR EDUCATION :—THE MEANS
OF OBTAINING IT.

1. *Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education.* 1850-51.
2. *Plan for the establishment of a general system of Secular Education in the County of Lancaster.* 1847.
3. *Bill to promote the Secular Education of the people in England and Wales.* Brought in by Mr. Fox, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed. 1850.
4. *Scheme of General Education for the two Boroughs of Manchester and Salford.* 1851.
5. *The School in its relations to the State, the Church, and the Congregation.* 1847.
6. *Apology for a Churchman's support of the Manchester and Salford Education Bill.* By W. Entwisle. 1851.
7. *Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Manchester.* By James Prince, Bishop of Manchester. 1851.

WE have not thought it necessary to occupy valuable space by placing in long array at the head of this paper the titles of the numerous pamphlets which have been poured forth from the press during the last few years on the topic of Popular Education. Their name is "Legion:" a mere list of them would form a not inconsiderable catalogue. Their multitude sufficiently demonstrates the deep interest attached to the inquiry, and would alone afford an ample apology for an article on the subject; if indeed an apology were necessary in a Periodical, which, as its name and motto import, especially professes to look forward into the future, tracing the tendencies of present movements, and endeavouring to give them a right direction; and on the eve of a session when it is more than probable that it will be brought in a practical shape before the Legislature and form the topic of many an animated debate. Happy indeed should we be, if any observations of ours could in the slightest degree contribute to elicit principles which might safely and justly form the basis of a general enactment, and to guide the mind of the public to their adoption.

At the first view, indeed, this task might seem to be almost hopeless; so great is the variety of conflicting schemes and opinions, and with so much earnestness, not to say warmth and animosity, is each supported. But on a closer inspection we shall be disposed to indulge in more cheerful anticipations. We think that we perceive signs, that the mists which have so long obscured the prospect are beginning somewhat to clear away and in their dispersion to give promise that we may yet behold a brighter day. Let us give a very brief glance at the question historically, for the purpose of ascertaining whether we have made any real advance at all—and if we have, how much; that so we may determine our actual position, and by measuring the way we have already made good, determine the chances of our future progress.

To do this we need hardly go back to the Catholic times of our history. Though the democratic tendencies of the Roman Catholic Church offered not inconsiderable facilities and encouragement to men of humble origin to enter into its ranks, its spirit was opposed to the general diffusion of knowledge amongst the laity, and we find not a single trace, we believe, of any system of education intended to provide for the mass of the people. With the Reformation something of the kind might not unnaturally have been expected to be done. Those who opened by a translation the Bible to the people and continually appealed to it as the sole standard of faith and practice, would, it might be presumed, have also established the means of learning to read it. In Scotland this was actually the case. The parochial schools there, which have unquestionably had a very beneficial influence on the character of the nation, are coeval with the first preachings of the reformers. We need not dwell on the causes which prevented the English reformers from following the same course. It is sufficient at present to notice the fact, that in our own country no similar system of popular instruction was adopted. Free schools indeed were founded in considerable numbers, and on a sufficiently liberal basis, according to the views and supposed requirements of the times; but these were for the most part grammar or classical-schools, and were hardly intended to meet the wants of the lower classes of the community. From this period the means of educating

the people appear to have been almost utterly neglected and to have rapidly declined ; till towards the close of the last century very few, if any, of the higher classes seem to have had a thought about the matter ; and it may be asserted we believe, almost without fear of contradiction, that any proposition for educating the labouring portion of the population would not only have been universally derided as visionary, but placed in the class of revolutionary ideas.

But a brighter day was at hand ; and it is pleasing and important to remark, that the first symptom of interest on the subject is contemporaneous with the revival of the religious feeling after a similar period of religious apathy. A benevolent individual drew public attention to the duty of giving to the children of the poor at all events religious instruction. The Sunday School was established, and powerfully seized upon the public mind, aided as it was by the rivalry of the various sects, who were not unwilling to make use of it as an instrument of proselytism to their several opinions. Valuable, however, as, in the absence of all other means of popular instruction, this system has been, and destined we firmly believe to be infinitely more so, it is questionable whether its adoption may not to a certain extent have really impeded the progress of the question, by satisfying the public, that they had now done all that was needful. This feeling was subsequently slightly modified and a further trifling advance was made. About the beginning of the present century persons were found who thought that a little arithmetic and writing would not be injurious to the working-man ; and that these with the elements of reading would be more fitly taught in Day-schools than in the Sunday-school. Thus arose the rival schemes of Bell and Lancaster :—rivals, not in the quantity or quality of the instruction which was to be given, but chiefly in the mode of imparting it. And now all had been achieved that the most zealous friends of popular education deemed necessary, and for more than a quarter of a century longer, little or nothing more was attempted. At last thinking men began to perceive, that as in every human mind exist the same natural capacities, so there might be positive injustice in not affording the opportunities for their full development. Thoughtful observers too did

not fail to remark, that as population increased, and with it the physical strength of the multitude, and as the relations of society became more complex, there might be danger as well as injustice in delaying the diffusion of correct social principles. Circumstances occurred from time to time to shew, that the apprehension was not without foundation. A sense of fear was added to a sense of right. The apostles of general education found auditors and converts. The impulse was largely accelerated by the influence of continental example—especially in Germany, with whose system we became acquainted at the close of the war. The friends and advocates of popular instruction rapidly multiplied; and at present we think we may fearlessly assert, that throughout the length and breadth of the land no intelligent man is to be found, who really doubts the propriety of extending and improving as far as possible the means of communicating to every individual of the community all the knowledge that can assist his moral and social advancement. If there be any who from prejudice or want of consideration are still opposed to the doctrine, their voices are now seldom heard, and never above a whisper.

If the conclusion at which we are arrived in this short retrospect, as to the present position of the question, is correct, we may spare our readers much tedious discussion. We need not inflict upon them a dull statistical investigation in order to prove, what a dense cloud of ignorance still over-shadows our land. Nor need we enter into any serious argument to shew the claim of the humblest individual to all the advantages which education can give him, or the duty of society to satisfy that claim. We may assume we think unreservedly, that on these points public opinion is formed, and has declared itself. We have only now to inquire—"How, and by whom the duty is to be performed."

At the first view we should naturally suppose, that where all are agreed as to the desirableness of an object, the means of attaining it would readily be discovered. This, however, is not always the case; and in the present instance is the grand difficulty of which we have to seek the solution. We are divided into so many sects and parties; so many principles—and fancied principles—are

put forth and arrayed against one another ; so many feelings, passions and prejudices are called out in their vindication ; in so many different aspects do the same objects present themselves according to the point of view from which they are contemplated ; that few men can look at the question in its simple reality with a single eye and an unbiassed judgment. And the difficulty is increased fourfold by the circumstance, that religious and political opinions run into one another : so that those whom religious sympathies would naturally draw together, are repelled by political ones, and *vice versâ*. Thus are introduced so many modifications of principles, that it becomes almost impossible to define with exactness the principles themselves, or describe accurately the parties who hold them. Yet some analysis of this kind seems almost essential to any successful effort to resolve the problem. For we hold that every principle which has sufficient power to summon to its defence any considerable number of intelligent persons, possesses within itself a germ of truth which only becomes error by pushing it too far, or mingling it up with others which do not necessarily belong to it. The only course, therefore, which promises to lead to any practical result is, we think, to ascertain as nearly as we are able the actual state of parties, to examine the principle which forms their bond of union—to disentangle it from all that is merely accessory—to compare the principle of one party with that of the rest—to see whether they are irreconcilable with one another—and, if they really appear to be so, to consider whether some comprehensive scheme cannot possibly be devised, which will allow them to work together in harmonious co-operation—leaving to each its own free action, and securing the like freedom to every other. No one can feel more sensibly than we do, the difficulty—the delicacy—of this task, but we think it quite needful to attempt it, in order to pave the way to any satisfactory conclusion. Neglecting minor distinctions and the slighter modifications we may, sufficiently accurately, perhaps, for this purpose, distribute the parties to this question into the following general classes.

We will first speak of that party which may be designated the Voluntaries. Their principle appears to be this : that all action to be truly fruitful of good must be spontaneous. That for every want and evil of society a remedy

will always be found in the ready sympathy, benevolence and liberality of its members. That all schemes of improvement enforced by external authority and unaccompanied by internal conviction will probably fail to produce much real benefit to the agent or the object. That education is no exception to the rule. That, when its necessity is perceived, its means will be provided; and that its progress will be the more steady, the more gradually it advances. We acknowledge at once, that there is much not only of generous feeling but of truth in this sentiment. We know well of what noble efforts the voluntary principle has been proved capable, when some great principle is at stake or when some grand design has to be carried out, in favour of which public opinion is strongly excited. But we doubt, whether it is altogether fitted for quiet everyday work. We think, that it is not in all cases to be fully depended upon for the efficient maintenance of those very institutions to which its energy first gave birth. On this very subject of education we have complaints from all quarters, that schools already established want due support, and our reports are filled with accounts of failing funds and languishing attention to their management. And we think that public opinion is on our side; and that those who espouse the voluntary principle to its full extent are gradually becoming fewer; whilst many who once held it have either considerably qualified their doctrine, or have been insensibly merged in other parties. Those who still adhere to it in its integrity are, if we mistake not, chiefly to be found in one not inconsiderable section of the great Congregational denomination, and a certain number of Political Economists who seem disposed, rather loosely as we think, to apply the principles of Free Trade in commercial matters to other subjects—education amongst the rest—which have really little analogy with it. But supposing the voluntary principle to be abstractedly the right one, we fear that in the present condition of the country it lies open to a substantial objection. It would be brought into play in all probability, only in places where there were large proprietors or wealthy inhabitants. In those which are poor and neglected, and in which the population most needs instruction, the assistance would, almost to a certainty, not be forthcoming. The voluntaries would probably say

—"Be it so : till the people themselves are sensible of the want and are willing to make the exertion to supply it, the education will do them no good." The country, however, is of a different opinion ; and, right or wrong, its cry, we imagine, cannot be resisted.

We come next to the great party of the Church of England : taken singly—indubitably the strongest, we suppose, in numbers and property and consequent influence ; strong too in their centralization, and, on this point at least, their unanimity. Their principle is a broad and intelligible one :—to have their own schools, and to found and conduct them strictly in accordance with the doctrine and discipline of their own church. So exclusively in most instances we believe do they do this, that they not only insist upon it in the case of the children of their own members, but in very numerous instances are much disposed to exclude altogether from their schools all who will not submit to it. In their system the religious element of instruction reigns paramount :—very properly, indeed, if it did not too frequently we fear consist in the mere repetition of creeds and articles and the inculcation of dogma ; and if it were not too often accompanied with an inclination to undervalue and neglect at the same time sound secular instruction. We are aware that a very great change is taking place in this latter respect. We acknowledge with pleasure that many clergymen are labouring assiduously to raise the tone of education in their schools. We do not forget amongst others the excellent model-school of Mr. Dawes—the present Dean of Hereford—his noble example, and his writings on the subject, so rich in suggestive hints and practical illustrations. Still when we recall the apathy—not to say the hostility—of the clergy, till within a very late period, to a large and liberal system of popular education, and, how recent is their conversion ; when we peruse attentively the correspondence of the National Society with the Council on Education, and observe what anxiety is there manifested to secure a clerical influence over the schools, to limit as far as can be done with any decency the interference of laymen, and to banish almost entirely every popular element in their management ; and when we remark the narrow views upon the question which still

prevail amongst we fear too large a number of clergymen ; we must frankly and honestly confess our opinion, that we should consider it a great national calamity, if the formation of the whole public mind of England were delivered over unreservedly into their keeping. This pretension indeed they no longer explicitly maintain ; but we cannot but see that they still occasionally look towards it, as men look upon a possession which has passed into the hands of others, but to which they cannot help thinking that they have a rightful claim. The claim, however, in the present state of parties will never be made good. If it were not in opposition to public sentiment from a sense of its injustice, it would be effectually resisted by the dissenters, who, from jealousy of any interference with their religious teaching, though divided upon almost every other point, are on this united. Whilst we are upon this part of our subject we cannot help remarking, that laymen of the Church of England—very many of whom we know to entertain sensible and enlarged ideas on the question of Popular Education—appear to us to commit a great moral wrong, when through unwillingness to interfere with their clergymen, or the want of moral courage, they neglect to exercise their proper influence on the conducting of the schools with which they are connected, and hand them over unreservedly to clerical management.

We hardly know whether to speak of those as a party still existing, who once advocated a systematic scheme of national education, sanctioned and supported by the State. Certainly there was a time, when upon many a platform at educational meetings such a call was often heard and warmly responded to. There was a time too, when such a measure was rather looked for from the reform-government. What would have been its fate is very problematical. If a sound and comprehensive plan had been brought forward by the government, providing a better secular education, and securing for the religious instruction to be given perfect equality and liberty of conscience, it is possible that the public mind might have fixed upon and grappled with it, and, as in the case of the Reform-Bill, moulded it into a practical shape, so as to suit the wants and feelings of the country. But the opportunity, if it ever existed, was suffered to pass by. A great jealousy of the interference

of the State in public education has sprung up :—very unreasonably we think, through not considering how different its action must necessarily be under a free representative constitution from what it is, or may become, in the hands of a despotic government. Partly from this cause, and partly from others which we may have to allude to hereafter, those who were favourable to a State-education are we suspect as a party dwindled away, or merged in others : though there still remain many who have no objection to receive assistance from the state to their own plans on their own terms or under certain conditions. What the State has itself done for the education of the people we shall defer till we come to discuss the several schemes which have been brought before the public in a tangible form.

A principle which has found more favour with the public and far more supporters is that of providing for public schools by local rates under local control and management. Two influential parties have already embodied themselves in distinct societies upon this principle :—carrying it out, however, with very different details in their respective schemes, and combining it with other principles which place them in direct collision. The first of these is the Public School Association for Secular Education, which at first took its name from Lancashire, to which county it originally proposed to confine its operations, but has since assumed the title of National, and has extended its views to the whole country. It is composed of men of all classes and denominations, who, as its name imports, strongly impressed with the conviction that more and better secular instruction is imperiously needed for the people, and despairing of obtaining it in connection with religious instruction, on account of the mutual jealousy and hostility of the several religious sects, boldly cut the gordian knot by entirely severing the one from the other, limiting the sphere of the schools to the communication of moral and general knowledge, and altogether prohibiting the introduction of doctrinal teaching. The other firmly maintains the necessity of preserving the religious instruction intact, giving it the predominance and making it the basis of all other instruction. The first numbers amongst its partizans a great many individuals of great intelligence, wealth, activity, and influence. The second known under the title

of the Manchester and Salford Boroughs' plan, has beyond all doubt in its favour the sensibilities and sympathies of the religious denominations. As both these parties have formed themselves into associations, have assumed a distinct position, and have embodied their several principles in definite plans which are likely to be the subject of discussion in the next session of Parliament, we shall have in the sequel to examine them with some minuteness. But before we do this we wish to make a few preliminary observations which may perhaps be introduced here more conveniently than elsewhere.

In the first place, if we are at all correct in our sketch of the state of parties, we must perceive, that, without attempting to define their numerous modifications and interminglings, we have discordant elements enow to spoil any good general measure :—unless those who are really anxious for the improvement of popular education come to the consideration of the question with calm minds and a disposition to dismiss from it all unessential points of difference, and prepared to meet in a spirit of mutual concession. For each party, without being strong enough to carry its own particular scheme, is sufficiently so to injure—if not altogether to prevent—those of the others. Principles, indeed, we would ask no man to give up, or in the slightest to compromise ; but then every man should be very sure that what he contends for, really deserves the name. Men not seldom contend less about things than about words and forms. And it is very observable that oftentimes, the nearer the approximation, the keener is the conflict.

In the second place : if the jarring atoms are ever to be composed into harmony, parties as well as individuals must learn to look at a question from their adversary's point of view as well as from their own ; to judge his principle fairly, and not to make objections to it, or charge consequences upon it, to which it is not justly liable. When the cry is raised of "a Godless education" against those who wish to separate secular from religious instruction, it is raised against individuals, great numbers of whom are quite as religious—perhaps very often more so—than those who raise it. To hear these men talk one would suppose that on the same day on which a Bill was introduced into

Parliament for improving the secular instruction in our schools, another was to be brought in and advanced through it "*pari passu*" for abolishing at the same time all the existing means of religious instruction :—the fact being, that all these would not only remain precisely as before, but remain with superadded power. Who that has taught in a Sunday-school has not often had occasion to regret that those few and precious hours should have to be wasted in giving the mere elements of education ; and that the efforts of the teacher to communicate the knowledge which is the proper business of the time and place should be impeded by that dulness of capacity which is the usual character of a mind uninformed and unquickened by some intellectual training ? Many too are of opinion that, besides the difficulty and the delicacy of the task in a mixed congregation of children with due regard to the rights of conscience, little of vital and practical religion can be really taught in the somewhat bustling routine and activity of the daily school life. They would therefore leave it in what they consider to be its proper sphere :—in the hands of their parents, their guardians, and their respective pastors. Such views may be erroneous, but they are not godless. It is some proof of the groundlessness of such imputations, that essentially these principles have been espoused and advocated in a very remarkable pamphlet by the eminent Dr. Hooke of Leeds, a clergyman who avowedly attaches himself to the High Church party, and who will hardly be supposed to be indifferent to the religious instruction of the people.

But we must be allowed to say a few words more upon this point of our subject ; because the kind of religious instruction to be given, and the manner in which it is to be imparted, constitute, as every one must feel who has attended however cursorily to the question, the real difficulty of every general scheme of popular education—the great practical barrier which has to be surmounted. We must honestly and frankly confess our own opinion, that there is a great deal of talk about religious education by many who have never felt much real concern about it ; and that of those whose interest about it is deep and unaffected, numbers have very vague notions as to what it really consists in, and how it is to be communicated. In

many schools, we fear, the object is believed to be accomplished, when the children have committed to memory and can glibly repeat a certain quantity of creeds, catechisms, and formularies; though little anxiety may be manifested to ascertain to what degree, or whether at all, its spirit has penetrated their minds or influences their daily conduct. A few may be found—and we trust their number is increasing—in which it is better understood what ought to be done; and in which the attempt is made to give a religious tone to every lesson, to every thing that is said and done, to every act of school-life. We fear, however, they are as yet not many. Still it cannot be denied, that men have often intuitive glimpses of a truth which they reason from falsely and apply wrongly. And some are inclined to believe it to be in the present instance. If indeed the religious sentiment be—as we believe it to be—an instinctive feeling of our nature, every system of education which does not provide for the full and free development of so important a faculty, must of necessity, in the judgment of all men, be defective:—for a perfect system must of course note and include every faculty of the human mind, and be prepared to unfold and cultivate each one of them in the order of their relative importance, with due subordination of the lower to the higher, and in the harmonious combination of all with one another. We do not wonder, therefore, that any scheme which proposes to dissociate the religious from the secular instruction is met with any thing but general acceptance, or that a strong apprehension should be manifested that in the dissociation the religious portion might soon come to be neglected altogether. Neither on the other hand are we to be surprised, when we consider the variety of religious opinions and with what tenacity all must cling to them who have any deep convictions of their truth and value, that men who unite willingly as a party to oppose those who advocate the abandonment of direct religious instruction in the day-school, should themselves be much divided as to the manner of giving it. We, indeed, can conceive the possibility of communicating a great deal of religious instruction in the highest sense of the term—and we fully recognize the difference between religious and merely moral instruction—without the introduction of special

theological doctrine, more properly left to parents and to friends, or to the matured judgment of the pupil himself in after-life, when the teacher himself is penetrated with its spirit, and thoroughly understands its object and its means. This he will do by awakening in the youthful mind the religious sentiment—by rousing the tender and devotional feelings—by quickening the religious sensibilities—and by connecting every action with religious motives, and founding it upon religious sanctions. With a foundation thus solidly laid in early religious tastes and convictions, the pupil could not go materially wrong. All this we think might be done: Dr. Arnold declares in the most emphatic terms that it can be done. "I am perfectly ready," he says, "to examine to-morrow in any Unitarian school in England, in presence of parents and masters. I will not put a question that should offend, and yet I will give such an examination, as should bring out and prove the absence of what you and I should agree to be Christian knowledge of the highest value. I speak as one who has been used to examine young men in the Scriptures for twenty years nearly, and I pledge myself to the perfect easiness of doing this."—*Letter cxxxix.—Life.*

This is perhaps all that ought to be done. But to do *only* this, we are hardly we fear prepared. It finds no echo in the general voice. It would hardly suit our denominational objects. We must own that we see no way out of the difficulty but by leaving the religious instruction of its own members to the choice and direction of each separate denomination. Yet we have hopes of better things. We read with much pleasure the following paragraph from the Report of the Rev. J. P. Norris, Inspector of Church of England Schools.

"I rejoice also to be able to add, that I have observed a general abandonment of another most mischievous notion, viz., that the religious or irreligious character of a school depends on the greater or less amount of religious instruction given in it. Those engaged in education have begun at length to find out that it depends *much more* on the spirit in which the school is governed, and in which *all* the lessons are given."—*Minutes of Council for 1850-51*, p. 630.

Indeed we recommend to our readers the perusal of

the whole of the able Report from which the above extract is made, as very interesting from its suggesting and expounding *Principles*.

As to the best mode of maintaining our schools, if our readers pass in review the following considerations, we do not suppose that it will be necessary to say many words. The languishing condition of so many public and private schools from the want of due support :—the apparent inadequacy of voluntary contributions to redeem them from their depression :—the general unwillingness to rely upon so precarious a resource :—the indisposition of government—perhaps its powerlessness—to bring forward any large and comprehensive measure :—the increasing disinclination to look to the State for any thing but money, accompanied by a determination on the part of several bodies to repel or limit its interference in the appropriation of it :—the natural leaning to the principle of self-government in such matters—a principle so congenial to the spirit of our people :—the fact that two influential parties have already embodied it in their respective schemes, advocating the plan of local rates and local management :—all these considerations, we repeat, put together and fairly weighed, tend to the conclusion, that any proposition which is to meet all the exigencies of the case and secure any thing like general sympathy and support, must keep in view the last-mentioned principle.

We are disposed then ourselves to believe, that any measure which is to secure the approbation of the country, must satisfy the following conditions :

1st. It must recognize the necessity of a more liberal plan of secular instruction than has been hitherto common in our elementary schools ; one, namely, which shall provide for our youthful population instruction in every branch of general knowledge which is suited to their social position, and which may tend to raise, improve, or adorn the circumstances of their future lives.

2nd. It must not exclude the religious element : and not only not exclude, but allow of its full development and free action.

3rd. It must admit all religious parties, with the recognition of their perfect equality, and with guarantees that there be no compulsion in matters of conscience.

4th. It must provide for the maintenance and efficiency of schools from certain and permanent resources.

5th. It must leave these to be provided, under certain general regulations, by local authority, and submit them to local control.

Let us examine whether any measure yet proposed to the public, in some definite shape, fulfils these conditions, or is capable of being moulded into such a form as to admit of their fulfilment.

It was an omen of the change about to take place in the national feeling on this question, when in the year 1833, Parliament made a grant of £20,000 in aid of private subscriptions for the building of school-houses. Paltry as this pittance appears, even when voted annually, and raised as it soon after was we believe to £100,000, it still showed, that the State at length began to number amongst its duties some attention to the education of the people. It was to put in the end of the wedge which might enlarge the opening hereafter to any desirable extent. A still more significant mark of the progress of public opinion was given when in the year 1839 to certain members of the government was confided the special office of watching and assisting all educational efforts. The organization of the Committee of Council for Education and the machinery by which it proposes to do its work have been so fully canvassed and are so well understood, that it would be almost an impertinence to dwell upon them in detail. It will suffice to observe here, that it establishes no educational system of its own, but limits its action to stimulating and furthering the exertions of societies and individuals under certain conditions; one of the most important of which is, that every school which asks for and obtains money from the national purse shall submit to inspection, and that its managers, though exempt from any dictation as to what they teach or how they teach it, shall render back to the nation an account of the manner in which they employ it. We think that the good effects of this requirement in exciting the energies of all connected with the school—committees, masters, and pupils—can hardly be over-estimated. Give no power over a school but that of bringing it to the bar of public opinion, and we venture to affirm, that it will immediately commence a course of

improvement. Other valuable provisions are:—the substitution for ever-changing and therefore unteachable monitors of paid apprenticed pupil-teachers trained and secured to the school for five years; the stimulus given by yearly examinations; the encouragement afforded to masters by premiums, diplomas of merit, and augmentations of salary; and the insisting in the composition of committees on an infusion of lay influence. The objections which were raised to the Minutes of Council by some religious denominations—or perhaps we should more properly say by certain portions of them—on the ground of supposed interference with their religious teaching, we hope have been in great measure removed by modifications and alterations suited to meet their conscientious scruples. We hardly think, that even a prejudiced observer can visit a school into which the new system has been introduced under favourable circumstances and with a proper conception of its spirit, and candidly compare it with one still under the old system, without feeling its marked superiority. One defect we must allow appertains to the Council:—proceeding upon the principle of giving assistance only in aid of local and voluntary efforts, it leaves the poor, ignorant and neglected parts of the country—those in fact most needing assistance—almost totally unprovided for. Still we think that on the whole the Council has worked most beneficially for the cause of education, and that even if a more generally efficient system be ever introduced, its superintending care and controlling power may be still advantageously employed—perhaps be absolutely necessary. We must remark in passing that the country owes a deep debt of gratitude to the late secretary of the Council—the present Sir James Shuttleworth—to whom we suppose we may safely assign the principal merit of most of these provisions, for the energetic, laborious and enlightened manner in which he has ably advocated and warmly promoted the instruction of the people.

Passing over the vain endeavours of the Reform Government to do any thing effective on a large scale in favour of popular education, and the abortive attempt of Lord John Russell to obtain the consent of Parliament to the establishment, on comprehensive principles, of a Normal School for the education of schoolmasters, and of a Model-

school, which might afterwards have been modified and improved, and, in process of time, become general, we must notice the measure introduced into the educational clauses of the Factory Bill, which was brought into the House of Commons by Sir James Graham in 1843, during the administration of Sir Robert Peel, and which roused all the dissenters in mass against it. It proposed that the management of the schools, to be established under the act, which were partly to be supported from the poor's rate, and partly by voluntary donations, should be vested in the clergyman of the parish, with a double vote in case of equal division, two churchwardens selected by the clergyman, and four other individuals, who were to be chosen annually by the justices of the peace. These provisions seemed to the dissenters to be utterly subversive of all religious equality, and to hand over the control of the schools entirely to the established church. The ferment which ensued was very memorable, and will not soon be forgotten. The Bill was withdrawn for reconsideration, and was reintroduced with considerable amendments. The clergyman was still to be a perpetual trustee, but was to nominate only one trustee himself; one was to be elected by subscribers to the school of a certain amount; and four others were to be chosen by the ratepayers instead of the justices of the peace. These alterations, though evident improvements, were still deemed not satisfactory. The ferment continued unabated, and the Bill was finally withdrawn. We thought at the time—and we think now—that the propriety of the course which the opponents of the bill took was very questionable. Undoubtedly, even as amended, it contained provisions which were not only not admissible, but almost insulting. Of this nature was the clause which provided that all doctrinal instruction should be banished from the general school-room and should be given in a separate room to be annexed to the school for that especial purpose; but gave the exclusive possession of that room to the minister of the Church of England, prohibiting the use of it to the minister of any other denomination, leaving him to find, if he chose, a place elsewhere for the religious education of the children of his own persuasion. Still the amended edition of the Bill recognised some principles of considerable value, which we believe might have formed

the groundwork of a good and practical measure, if its opponents had brought their combined influence to bear upon the government for the purpose of rendering it just and reasonable instead of conspiring for its total overthrow. It acknowledged the obligation of providing for the efficient support of the school in part out of the local rates:—the right of the rate-payer to supervise the application of the money:—the propriety of separating the mere doctrinal from the general religious instruction of the children:—and the duty of leaving the former in the hands of their respective religious teachers. We have since learned from a semi-official pamphlet, that the Government was not indisposed to have listened with the utmost attention to all suggestions for its modification. It was an additional motive for making the attempt, that the plan, if it could have been so improved as to meet the views of all parties, though limited in its immediate application to Factories, might, if it had worked well, have been extended afterwards with such alterations as experience would have supplied, to other schools, and become general without exciting prejudiced opposition. The course, however, which appears to us to have been the preferable one, was not taken, and the Dissenters thus placed themselves in a false position. For years from the platform of every educational meeting voices had been heard calling upon the Government to do something for national education. The measure came; and instead of endeavouring to make it what it ought to have been, the denominational bodies summarily dismissed it. It will be said perhaps that if they had not done this, others would have done it. It may be so, but it would have made all the difference in the world to the character of the Dissenters, who would thus have assumed the dignified attitude of a party simply contending for rightful principles, whilst to their opponents would have been left the disgrace of defeating them. We hope, that if any similar case should occur again, the Dissenters will be disposed to employ the strength which they undoubtedly possess in giving a wise direction to measures originated by other parties, when substantially just, rather than in the ungracious task of entirely demolishing them. Meanwhile we may gather from this event a valuable lesson:—that no general scheme of education for the people can

ever hope to pass the ordeal of the public in this country, which is not founded upon the fullest recognition of the rights of conscience and the complete equality of all religious parties. If it be said, that the lesson could not have been taught but by refusing a Bill in which those principles were not fully recognised, we answer, that if the combined influence of the Dissenters had forced the recognition, the lesson would not have been needed. If they could not force it, their power of rejecting the Bill remained as before.

The next scheme which deserves our attention, as coming before the public in a distinct and defined shape, is that which was produced in 1847 under the title of a "Plan of Secular Education for the County of Lancaster," and which has since assumed the title of "National," being now intended to embrace the whole country. Its leading principles—namely, the entire separation of the secular from the religious instruction, and the maintenance of the schools by a local rate under local management, and the practical difficulty to which it owed its birth, having been stated in a former part of this article, need not be repeated. Indeed, it has been so widely circulated—so zealously advocated by its propounders—so strenuously combated by its opponents—that not only its principles but even its very details must be familiar to most of our readers. Yet it will be necessary to give them here a little further consideration. We have already vindicated the approvers of this scheme from the charge of irreligion. Indeed, express provision is made in it for the moral and religious instruction of the children, simply excluding from it all purely doctrinal and sectarian teaching. Still, if the principles we have laid down above, as the only conditions on which a system of popular education will be generally acceptable, are at all correct—namely, that the religious element must not only be not excluded, but must have room for its free development—then we think that this scheme will scarcely satisfy those conditions, or win for itself the adhesion of any very large portion of the community. In point of fact, though its supporters form numerically a large, an intelligent, a wealthy, and an influential association, we are yet compelled to regard them simply as a collection of individuals from every party

in the country, not as representing any one party in its totality. If it be said—"Is not this to the credit of the scheme?"—We reply—Yes, as regards its impartiality, its catholicity and its general merits, but not as to its practicability. For we are not aware, that their principle has been adopted by any one party as a party, or that it at all responds to the wants and feelings of a single religious denomination. One thing we feel pretty sure, that the banishment of the Bible in its entirety from the schools and the substitution and compulsory use of a mere selection of extracts, will never meet with the general acceptance of the religious bodies. But in addition to this fatal obstacle to the final success of their scheme, many objections we think will be taken to the organization of the plan:—the means proposed for carrying it out. It proposes to establish one or more schools in every parish, to be erected and maintained out of a special rate, and to be managed by a committee chosen by the ratepayers. All the parish schools within the hundred are to be grouped together and placed under the superintendence of another committee elected by the several parish committees. Perhaps we should rather say *were* to be placed:—for on extending the original county of Lancaster plan to the whole country, it would seem that the intermediate hundred-committee is to be dispensed with. Finally, the direction of the whole system is to be vested in a county-board, which is to be elected by the votes of the members of the school-committees within the county, and which is to prepare courses of instruction, sanction all books, appoint examiners and inspectors, establish normal schools, have power to levy rates, and be the trustees of all school property. This plan might answer well enough in some new country, in which no provision had as yet been made for any popular education, but we have considerable doubts whether it will be at all favourably received in one, in which thousands of schools are already in existence founded by societies and individuals who have their own particular objects in view, and their own particular opinions as to the modes in which those objects will be most effectively obtained. We cannot but think, that it is a serious defect in the plan, that not the slightest provision seems to be made in it for the future maintenance of the existing

schools, which must apparently be annihilated ; for we do not see how, supported merely by the school-fees and private contributions, they could possibly stand in the face of free-schools maintained by a public rate. The association has, indeed, issued a minute of their intention to insert a clause in their Bill empowering committees to purchase existing schools and endowments ; but it is clear that in very numerous instances trustees could not legally make such transfers, and it may be very much doubted whether even Parliament could give such power without a most arbitrary exertion of its authority. At all events we think we may safely say, that it *would not*, in the face of the powerful and legitimate opposition which would indubitably be raised against such a demand. It may be said that these schools will no longer be needed ; but if they cannot be transferred, what a sacrifice of valuable property ! And to look at the question in another point of view, may we not well doubt, whilst we have all our experience still to gain—whilst we are such tyros, as it were, in the whole business of education—it would be wise at once to preclude individual experiment—the advantage of comparing the conceptions of different minds on so difficult a subject—and to impose at once on the whole nation, in the room of this tentative method, a yet untried and necessarily immature uniform system ? These and perhaps other objections, presenting themselves of course to individual minds with different degrees of weight, but which will all probably be found united in opposition to the measure when brought into Parliament, will prove fatal, we surmise, to its ultimate reception. Yet let us not be unjust to the Association. It has done a good work : its labours will not have been all in vain. It has kept the question before the public. It has promoted discussion. It has lessened, if not entirely removed, many prejudices. It has advanced right principles. If it fails in carrying its own special plan in its integrity, it will certainly aid in originating some more practical one which Phoenix-like will spring out of its ashes.

We must next advert to the measure introduced into Parliament in the year 1850, by Mr. Fox and others, under the title of “A Bill to Promote the Secular Education of the People in England and Wales,” and ordered

by the House to be printed. Its main object, as its title imports, like the one last mentioned, was to provide for the people a better secular education, not absolutely leaving out of view the religious element—for provision is made that time shall be allowed for the religious instruction of the pupils under the direction of their parents—but, like the former, excluding it from the school. The details by which the plan was to be worked out, if not abstractedly superior, are we think more practical in the actual condition of the country. It did not, like the national plan, ignore the Council on Education and all that had been done by it. On the contrary, its agency is recognized in every department. No school is to be established under the Act, till the Inspectors of Schools shall have reported upon the state of secular education in any particular district, and signified its insufficiency with reference to the wants of the entire population. In such a case, the inhabitants are to elect an educational-committee, who are to prepare a plan to supply the deficiency for the approval of the Council; and no plan can be carried into execution till it has been so approved of. The management of the school is to be vested in the committee, and the school is to be supported by a local rate levied for the especial purpose. The Committee is to report annually to the Council on all such particulars as it may require; and the Council on the other hand is to make a full annual report on the state and progress of education in England and Wales, and to lay the same before Parliament. Other little matters, which do not involve principles, we need not here go into. On the whole, we think there is much of good in the measure, and that it contrasts favourably with the preceding one in two particulars. It does not interfere to establish new schools, if those already existing are performing their duty, or will consent to do so. And in those which are to be established, it allows more freedom of action:—not tying down Committees to the adoption of one uniform unbending rule, but allowing fair room for conforming their plans to local wants and circumstances, for developing and testing the relative superiority of various schemes, and for obtaining the results of wider experiments. The defects of the measure are:—First, that it contains no very distinct provisions as

to the terms upon which existing schools, that are unwilling to alter their management, are to be admitted into union with the Local Committee, and to receive assistance; beyond a power given to the Council of Education to direct the Local Committee to pay to the master of any existing school a yearly sum, not exceeding ten shillings, to any pupil who may have been gratuitously taught for one year, and who shall be reported by the School-Inspector to have received sufficient secular education:—a premium, by-the-bye, in many cases, to the conductors of schools to change them into pauper schools instead of depending upon the fees of the pupils. Secondly, that it contains no intimation to determine, how the religious instruction of the children is to be secured, if neglected by the parents. Provisions of this nature might, we think, have been easily grafted on the measure without entrenching on its catholicity, and would have materially tended to enlist public opinion in its favour. To one party, indeed, it would have always continued to be obnoxious:—that party, we mean, which, upon principle, disapproves of the interference of government at all in the business of education, and looks with a jealous eye on the proceedings of the Council of Education, however liberal and guarded they may be. No amendments, however, so far as we are aware, were attempted or even proposed. The debate on the second reading was protracted to a second night, chiefly, we imagine, to honour the importance of the subject. One speaker urged the danger of its centralizing principle; another, amongst other reasons, its inapplicability to our existing school-system; but the greater number did not think it necessary to go beyond what was regarded as its irreligious character. The sense of the House was sufficiently marked by the division—58 for the second reading—287 against it. The Bill was accordingly thrown out.

We now come to the only other measure—and the last in the order of time—which, so far as we know, has been presented to the public in a definite and tangible form: that, namely, which is entitled the Manchester and Salford Boroughs' Education Bill. We will endeavour to indicate as briefly and clearly as we can its general principles, omitting—for the present at least—all minor details. The

other measures which we have been considering proceed more or less upon the principle of excluding from them every thing which might be offensive to the opinions and consciences of any party, retaining as their basis those points only upon which all parties are in the main agreed, or upon which it is supposed they might be brought to agree. The leading principle of this measure, on the contrary, is to attempt a general comprehension of all parties upon a basis of mutual toleration:—giving to all equal countenance and support, but allowing to all perfect freedom of action for the working out of their own particular scheme according to their own views and in their own way: so far at least as is consistent with a due regard to the rights and privileges of others. The particular means by which this is to be done—so far as principles are involved—are the following. The Municipal Council of each borough is to elect a School-Committee for each district out of its own members, which shall have a general charge of all matters appertaining to education within its own district. The School-Committee may require the Municipal Council to lay a rate not exceeding a given amount, on the same assessment as the borough rate, for the special purpose of maintaining or assisting all schools within the district, which are willing to comply with certain specified conditions. These conditions are:—either, that they shall put themselves into connection with the Committee of Council on Education, and submit to the inspection and all the other regulations which it requires:—or that they shall admit the inspection of local inspectors who are to be appointed under the Act by the district School-Committee, and in that case it is required as a condition of union, that the Scriptures in the authorized version, shall be a part of the daily instruction of the scholars. No child, however, in any school, is to be compelled to learn any creed or formulary, or to attend any Sunday-school or place of religious worship to which its parents or natural guardians may object. Every parent also may require a free education for his child, if he desires it, in any school of the union which he may select. Subject to these conditions, which may be properly termed general principles, and to some minor provisions of detail, every school is to retain, without any right of interference on the part of

the District Committee, an undisputed control over its own internal management, discipline and instruction; and may demand an assignment out of the rate, of a fixed sum per head, for every child whom it educates. These principles, it can hardly be denied, are large and comprehensive; and the general favour with which the measure founded upon them has been received by influential men of all parties, and by the acknowledged leaders of most of the great religious denominations, show them to be so. They mark indeed an immense advance in the recognition of liberal and enlightened views, not simply on the subject of education, but of religious equality and freedom generally. For we are unwilling to suppose—nor do we suppose—that they are looked upon by those who have brought them forward, or those who have espoused them, as a surrender of principle to expediency or compulsion. We may, perhaps, be allowed to feel a little astonishment at finding the quarter from which this scheme has emanated—the collegiate body. Remembering how the clergy of the Establishment have been undeniably the great bar to any plan of popular education on a basis of perfect equality, we may wonder somewhat by what magic the scales have so suddenly fallen from their eyes—their mental vision become so much clearer. We may have our suspicions, that their discernment has been quickened by perceiving the growing inclination to join the ranks of the secular party, in the utter despair of obtaining any other measure, and the danger that by a prolonged opposition the education of the people might pass out of their hands altogether. But we will not too curiously inquire into their motives. Of many of the most thoughtful and intelligent of them, we are disposed to believe, that the conversion is sincere, and we hail it with pleasure. We will not say to them—“Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.” We wish to receive them as unsuspected allies; and we welcome their adhesion with a double satisfaction—first, for their own sakes—and secondly, because we are well aware, that no really good measure could ever be carried in the face of their powerful opposition, or without their concurrence. But those who are really interested in carrying the Bill, in which the above principles are embodied, must look well to the conduct and expressions of their adherents,

and beware what language they use themselves. The old heaven is not, we fear, entirely worked out: the old pretensions not altogether abandoned. Speeches have been made—one we deeply regret to say, by that wise and generally liberal prelate, the Lord Bishop of Manchester, at the recent important meeting of the friends of the measure—in a spirit scarcely in accordance with the spirit of the Bill. We read too, with surprise and concern, in the letter of the Chairman of the Committee, in answer to Archdeacon Denison, the following words, calculated to excite great apprehension:—"In the case of a Church of England School, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the master from imparting to *all* the pupils, all the articles of the Christian faith; though he is prohibited from compelling any child to learn any creed or formulary." The *all* in Italics, is in the author's printed letter, but we would fain hope that the Chairman means only—*all the Church of England pupils*. We solemnly warn the promoters of the Bill, however, and their followers, to be cautious in what they do and say, and to afford no reasonable ground to believe, that it is intended to be fair and liberal to the sense, but is to be departed from in practice. A single spark is all that is wanted to set the inflammable materials of which our community is composed in a blaze; and the Dissenters will again—as they have done before—rise in mass to defeat the measure, on the slightest suspicion that their religious equality is to be denied, or their religious freedom tampered with. But we should deeply deplore such a result. We hope for better things. We trust that with these important admissions, we are not too sanguine in anticipating that a way is at length opening before us, which will conduct us finally to the desired result. We are willing to believe that the problem which has so long perplexed us, is about to receive a satisfactory solution. We do not say—we do not think—that the measure which we have been last considering is a perfect one. We are far from saying that it contains no principle which is questionable—no provision which is not susceptible of emendation. Some things which we consider defects, we shall have to notice hereafter. But we must candidly avow that, in our opinion, it contains a fuller recognition of those principles which we have in a former part of this

paper endeavoured to shew, from the actual state of parties and opinions, to be necessary to the cordial reception of any general measure than any other which has as yet been presented to the public in a definite shape.

1st. It recognizes the desirability of a better secular education, and contains provisions for it.

2nd. It does not discard the religious element, but on the contrary, leaves room for its free development, by permitting the managers of every school to introduce it in any form they please into the instruction given to scholars of their own denomination.

3rd. It guarantees as far as possible the rights of conscience, by forbidding the enforcement of any purely dogmatic teaching—so far at least as it is embodied in any specific form in creeds, catechisms or other formularies—without excluding any child, on that account, from the general instruction of the school.

4th. It recognizes the perfect equality of all sects and parties, by allowing to all the same power of founding their own schools, conducting them on their own principles, and maintaining them out of the same general fund, subject only to certain conditions common to all.

5th. By permitting every school to adopt its own system of instruction, it gives free scope for the trial of various plans, for the comparison of one with another, for a friendly competition in the business of education, and so affords many additional chances for its rapid advancement and final completeness.

6th. It provides for the maintenance of the existing schools in a state of efficiency, by securing the necessary funds, instead of leaving them to the precarious tenure of voluntary or uncertain support.

7th. It gives power to the Educational Committee of the Municipal Councils to establish schools out of the borough rate in neglected districts, if, after a six months' notice of the deficiency, no religious denomination undertakes to establish one; and in schools so established by the Council, no distinctive religious doctrine is to be introduced at all, and no religious instruction beyond the reading of the Bible.

These are large admissions, and must be felt to be so. They ought not to be wantonly or wilfully thrown away.

If any solid objections can be urged against them, let them be submitted to a fair discussion. We trust that all parties will meet in a generous spirit of mutual respect for conscientious differences of opinion, and with a sincere desire to adjust them. Where so much has been yielded, they, we think, will incur a grave responsibility who should combine to overthrow the Bill instead of uniting their efforts to amend it, if amendments be still necessary. For ourselves, we must candidly confess, that a compliance with its provisions does not appear to us to involve practically any compromise of principles.

We say practically :—for we must honestly avow, at the risk of being misunderstood or misrepresented, that the Bill does not quite attain to the full recognition of those principles which many—ourselves amongst the rest—should be disposed to regard as theoretically correct. There are conscientious differences of opinion as to what extent the Scriptures themselves are absolutely and completely, in every word and line—in every sentiment or circumstance—the inspired word of God, though they may be held to contain a communication of great moral and religious truths. Nor can we see that any thing is gained to religion by holding out temptations to men to use them lightly or irreverently, as the only means by which they can obtain other rights. It must be obvious at once, that under this very Bill assistance could not be denied to schools which, attaching no authority to the Bible, and treating it even with disrespect, should not refuse to use it—degrading it into a mere reading-book. Again, we see the convenience better than the propriety of requiring from all schools the use of the *authorized* version. That version is admitted by all sound scholars—beautiful and venerable as it is—to have been made from a much less correct text than that which has been formed by modern critics, and to contain many obscurities and mistranslations, and even some interpolations. A revision of it, by authority, is very much needed ; and we have never been able to understand how those who regard the Bible as the revealed word of God, do not at once feel and acknowledge how imperiously they are called upon to exhibit it in its very purest form, both as to text and translation. We have taken for granted, that means will be found to

admit the Catholics into union upon terms satisfactory to themselves. They do not recognize our authorized version: they will be permitted, we presume, to use their own. We might ask, why is an obligation to be imposed upon other denominations which is not imposed upon them?—The Jews too, we take for granted, will not be excluded from union, because they reject the New Testament. The use of the Old Testament will, we suppose, in their case be deemed sufficient. Whether our version is acknowledged by them, we are not informed. If means are not provided in the Bill to admit both these bodies on terms that they can conscientiously accept, we say unreservedly, that they ought to be specially exempted from paying the rate, or that the Bill should never be allowed to pass the Legislature. Delighted were we to see the very significant hint which the Premier is reported to have given to the recent deputation of the promoters of the Bill on this subject. But suppose any other large and wealthy body of individuals of some other religion, were attracted to establish themselves amongst us, might we not ask, whether we should have a right to tax them for the support of schools, if we were to debar them from the power of possessing their own by terms which they could not comply with? Or, to come home again to ourselves, if any large body of ratepayers should be found who really desire to establish a merely secular school, conscientiously deeming it better that the religious instruction should be imparted to the pupils in another place by their own friends and ministers, have we a right to take their money and refuse them this privilege? We ask these questions not in a spirit of hyper-criticism—not as deeming them of so much practical consequence in the actual circumstances of the country as to make it worth the pains of attempting any extensive alterations in the Bill in this respect—far less as reasons for opposing it. We put them, simply in order to caution the friends of the measure from too confidently assuming that the provisions embodied in it are proof against all objection, and to lead inquiring minds to further and deeper investigation of principles.

The objection which we have heard the most strongly urged against this scheme, is the injustice of taxing any individual for the purpose of teaching what he deems to

be error. We must, at the risk of our character for liberality, frankly declare, that we have little sympathy with this objection. We pass over the presumptuous feeling implied in the assumption, that any one sect is in possession of the whole truth, and that all others are in error. We pass over the germ of bigotry which lies, scarcely concealed, within it; for from the belief that we alone are in possession of the truth to the belief that it is our right and our duty to enforce it upon others is but a step. Unquestionably, to tax an individual for the propagation of another's opinions would be the height of injustice; but to give free scope to each and to support all alike from a common fund is hardly a course which can be reasonably complained of. But even for this complaint in the present case there is little room; for with a liberality which merits all praise, there is a provision in the Bill by which any rate-payer may designate the class of schools to which he desires his own particular rate to be applied, so far as it is needed. We observe that the National Public School Association has so far modified its scheme as to allow of the introduction of doctrinal religion into the school under certain conditions. So far is well:—for there is surely almost as much intolerance in forbidding a man to teach what he believes to be truth as in compelling him to profess what he believes to be falsehood. But the conditions themselves—"That the inculcation of doctrinal religion shall not take place between such and such hours"—and that "No part of the rate shall, directly or indirectly, be applied to the inculcation of doctrinal religion"—are, we think, vexatious and unnecessary. The first case would, we think, be far better provided for by a separate registration of the scholars who belong to the denomination which supports the school, and their religious instruction in a separate room. The second provision appears to us somewhat puerile; for if the rate is confined to the secular instruction, more is left of any private fund for the religious. And in every case it is surely the nature of the doctrine imparted which is of importance rather than that of the fund out of which it is paid.

We have heard it alleged as a possible case under the Bill, that in a place where the rate-payers were chiefly of one denomination the District Educational Committee

might be almost entirely composed of one party, and, notwithstanding the guarantees in the Bill, might use their power without due regard to the rights and wants of minorities. We have also heard an apprehension expressed, that when the denominations are very numerous and each one of them establishes its own schools, the portion of the fund, if limited, which falls to each school, may scarcely suffice to maintain it in a due state of efficiency. We can easily conceive that in small towns in which the population is divided into sects and parties in very unequal proportions, such results might not improbably follow ; but we see little danger that such will be the case in the large communities for which alone the measure is intended, and in which the population is so immense, the schools that will be required so numerous, and the denominations who will be interested in their management so extensive, intelligent, and influential.

There is, however, one clause of the Local Bill to which we entertain a decided objection : that, namely, which provides for schools in the neglected districts. As that clause now stands, it invites the religious denominations to supply the deficiency, giving, after six months' notice, power to the Educational Committee, if this is not done, to build the necessary schools out of the rate and to keep them under its own management. Such schools we observe with regret that the Bishop of Manchester, in his recently published Charge, claims to be considered and managed as Church of England schools—a claim totally at variance not only with the express provisions of the Bill and its whole spirit, but with any regard, as we conceive, to reason and justice—and which will, if adopted and persisted in, not improbably end in swamping it entirely. On the other hand, the invitation to the religious denominations to supply the deficiency will most probably lead to a general scramble of the most unseemly and injurious character, and a multiplication of schools beyond any necessity and to their great deterioration. Such a competition the Rev. Canon Clifton, we observe, in his speech at the recent meeting, seems to contemplate, but apparently without anticipating its prejudicial consequences. We, on the contrary, deprecate such a competition as fraught with the most lamentable evils. The plan which suggests itself

to our minds as the most equitable and the most desirable would be something of this kind.—We would make ample provision out of the rate for all existing schools—perhaps for some to be hereafter established, when the ground is quite unoccupied and the act perfectly spontaneous—on the principles contained in the Bill. But instead of inviting competition we would propose that it should be an instruction to the Education Committee to report upon the educational wants of every district, and that where additional schools were needed, it should be empowered to erect and maintain them at the public expense, keeping them strictly under its own management. We would further suggest, that to give to such schools the religious character the want of which the Bishop so much deplures, the denomination to which the parents or guardians attach themselves, or wish the child to belong, should be registered, and the religious instruction be given to the children of each denomination, if sufficiently numerous, by their own authorized teacher separately, at hours and in rooms specially set apart for the purpose. We venture to throw out these suggestions for the consideration of the friends of the measure and the public.

It is to our mind a great recommendation of the measure we are considering, that it has merely a local application. The sphere of its operation thus narrowed, it will be the more easy to ascertain the wants, the feelings, and the wishes of the several parties whose views and interests will be affected by it. At the same time no ground for trying such an experiment would be better chosen than a community so active, so intelligent, so divided; in which each party is so zealous in maintaining its own opinions, and possesses so much power to defend them. If it fails there, it would probably fail everywhere and be ill-adapted to the country at large, which would thus enjoy the benefit of the experiment without the evil attendant upon its failure. If it succeeds, it could be gradually extended to other places, with such ameliorations as time and experience might suggest, and with such modifications as the diverse wants of different localities might require.

On the whole we have a prevailing feeling, that it is desirable for the interests of education that this scheme, so limited, should be fairly tried. We are not ignorant

that there is a considerable number of thoughtful men who disapprove of all forced plans of education ; who think that the people are quite able to provide for their own instruction whenever they feel its necessity, and that, till they do feel its necessity, they will neither value the means, nor make use of them. We are disposed to allow all just weight to their opinion, but we cannot altogether assent to it. We believe that if we had once an educated generation of parents, there is no sacrifice which they would not be willing to submit to in order to obtain the blessing for their children. But how are we to get an educated generation ?—Besides, right or wrong, we cannot but perceive by unmistakeable signs, that the country is impatient that something should be done for education on a more extended and comprehensive plan than has yet been attempted ; and we know of none which has a fairer chance of public approbation and eventual success than the one now before us. At all events, if it wins the suffrages of the people of Manchester and Salford, we think that others have hardly the right to interfere and mar the experiment ; unless they can shew, that it contains principles so unsound and dangerous in themselves, that, if once admitted, they might ultimately become fatal to the freedom and happiness of the nation.

A question remains of very great importance, and highly deserving of deep consideration. Both the national and the local measure recognizes the principle that the instruction given in the public schools shall be free or gratuitous. Is this principle a correct one ? We dare not pronounce a positive decision. We know as a general fact, that we are little disposed to value what we do not obtain at some cost or by some sacrifice. We are told as a particular fact, that in schools in which some of the scholars pay and some do not, the attendance is the most slack and the most irregular on the part of those who do not pay. We have been informed that in four adjoining parish schools in a district of Scotland, well known to our informant, in two of which the instruction is free, and in two not altogether so, the attendance and the scholarship are the lowest in the two in which the instruction is free. We believe also that there is a disposition on the part of the people to look with a degree of contempt on schools in which the school-

fee is low, and to suspect that the instruction must be equally so. On these points let us hear the Rev. Mr. Hoare, the incumbent of St. Paul's, Stalybridge, Cheshire. We quote from a valuable letter appended to the Rev. Mr. Norris's Report in the Minutes of Council for 1850—51, page 630:—

"I am convinced that free-schools would have an injurious effect upon the people, for they would destroy their independence, while the education received would not be valued; and, unless attendance was made compulsory, it would be so irregular that in most instances very little education would be received. I have no doubt that schools where moderate weekly payments are required, will best promote the education of the people; but because there will be some who cannot pay even the small sum required, the poor law officers might be given power to pay for such. If, besides, there were passed a law, that no child should be admitted to work in a mill who had not attended a school under inspection for one or two years, this would secure the complete education of the children in the manufacturing districts. So anxious are both parents and children for the latter to get into the mills, that I am sure this simple addition to the law relating to children working in mills, would have the most beneficial effect. The masters would not object to it, for it would secure to them a better set than the ignorant lads and girls who now often go to the mills. It would remove the greatest obstacle to the efficiency of schools receiving factory children, which is, new children entering the mill, who never have learned even their letters, and have never been under any discipline. Such as these continually entering the school are a constant drawback to it. Were they always young persons who had already been at school for a year or two, the case would be very different."

The last suggestion, which was advocated ten years ago by a factory proprietor, we deem most valuable, and we trust that in any future Factory legislation it will not be overlooked or neglected.

We have seen it objected by an individual, whose opinions deserve the most careful consideration, that—

"In many towns the class whose children are found in the elementary schools pays in general no rates, and would not fall under the school-tax. To give them free the education for which they now pay would have a very demoralizing effect. Every assumption by the community of the parents' private obligations ought surely to be regarded as a great evil, and to be admitted only at the lowest end of society, as a matter of necessity and an indication of pau-

perism. In Prussia, notwithstanding the public education tax, no parent is exempted from the payment of the school-fee for his child, unless he demands, and, after investigation, can obtain, a 'testimonium paupertatis.' All the recent tendency to improvement in Day-schools is connected with the principle of self-support, to which a nearer and nearer approach is constantly made. A law which in its bearing on parents should turn schools into charities again would be a retrograde step. Inspection, administration, equable diffusion, first-building of schools, and not, except at the bottom of society, their current support, appear to me the proper objects of legal provision, together with the training of masters, &c. &c."

There is most undoubtedly great weight in the above observations. On the other hand it ought not to be forgotten, that education administered as a public duty, provided for out of public funds to which many of the recipients will themselves have contributed in the form of rates, and efficiently carried out by trained masters under inspection and with every appliance and means to boot, will present itself to the people in a very different light from education imperfectly conducted or doled out as a charity, and will not be attended with the same deteriorating consequences. To charity schools, indeed, in every form we have a most decided objection. Only a large experience can fully determine what on such points as these are the true principles which must finally be adopted; and it is for the purpose of testing principles, that we are desirous of seeing some merely local measure fairly tried on a limited scale before they are rashly extended to the country at large.

Another question of considerable importance is the following:—Will the children of the higher divisions of the lower class and the lower divisions of the middle class be willing to attend the same schools with the children of the poorest and pauper class? The same weighty authority whom we have quoted above, says—

"I fear that to the framers of school laws—I mean Bills for the creation of a Public School System—all the *Poor* appear in imagination as if constituting *one class*, for whom the same method will serve all through. But there are as many grades—as many *prides* (by no means dishonourable)—of class amongst those who live by wages as amongst those above them in the social scale; and they do not like their children to be thrown indiscriminately together in their

case any more than we do in ours. This fact I do not think any education will alter or *ought* to alter. But a system which sweeps away school-fees, equalizes schools, and groups children no longer by class but by locality or denomination, ignores this fact, and does not provide against swamping decent schools with pauper children."

Again, we must allow that there is much force in these observations. On the other hand, we also know as a fact that in Switzerland, in the Canton of Zurich at least, the same schools are attended, up to a certain point, by the children of *all* classes, and we have never heard that the practice was attended with perceptibly injurious effects. Might not the association of children of different ranks for a common purpose be even productive of some positive advantages, in the lessening of prejudices and the increasing of sympathies, and in the refining of the manners of the lowest class? We mean, of course, only in the *school-room* and in the *eye of the master*. This again is a result which can only be tested by experience. Since, however, the proposed schools under the Local Scheme will unquestionably destroy many existing decent ones, and, with all the resources which they may have at their command, will very possibly become the best to which a class considerably above the lowest can have easy access, it has occurred to our own minds—and we suggest it to the advocates of free-education—whether some of the larger schools might not be divided into two departments, in the lower of which an excellent elementary education might be given gratuitously to pauper children and to those whose parents pay rates—a small fee being charged for those children whose parents do not pay rates; and in the higher of which provision might be made for carrying the pupil forward, wherever it was found desirable, into the higher branches, and a corresponding fee be paid to cover the extra expense. Such an arrangement, if practicable, would not only tend, we think, to raise the character of the popular schools, but would in the end prove highly economical to a large majority of the middle class of the people.

But we must bring this paper to a close:—it has already exceeded the limits to which it would have been desirable, perhaps, to confine it; but we could not have treated it in a manner quite satisfactory to ourselves, or done any jus-

tice to the several parties whose principles we have passed in review, without going a little into detail. Several interesting topics connected with the subject offer themselves for consideration. The questions, "What constitutes a good education?—what ought to be its aims?—what are the best means of attaining them?"—have been, we suspect, very vaguely considered, and are very imperfectly understood, by very many of those who have the education of the people deeply at heart. We remember, however, that our particular object is to inquire into the means of procuring it at all; and to this we must bound ourselves. We will only add one or two observations in the shape of warnings.

First: There is a considerable number of ardent promoters of popular education, who appear to anticipate that every extension of education will be rapidly followed by a corresponding and visible improvement in the habits and feelings—the social condition—the virtue and happiness of the lower classes. We must warn them from indulging in Utopian dreams. The most frequent cause of the failure of philanthropic schemes is, that they are taken up by benevolent and enthusiastic men, who, disappointed that the immediate results do not answer their expectations, as quickly abandon them. Time must enter as an element into all human undertakings. A long interval must often intervene between the casting of the seed and the gathering in of the harvest. And even when education shall be generally diffused and shall have reached its utmost point of perfection, we must remember, that so long as human nature remains the same, so long will men be liable, through the influence of the passions, to fall into error, or be seduced into crime. But we may still reasonably hope that, at all events, they will acquire greater power to withstand their temptations by a clearer perception of the unavoidable connection of the present act with its distant consequences.

Secondly: The sanguine friends of education ought not to be startled and disturbed, or fancy that they have not taken the right course, if they should discover occasional traces of apparent or positive mischief in its early developments. No revolution was ever accomplished without the admixture of some positive evil in its progress, however beneficent and necessary may be its final results. The ex-

isting generation has often to endure some inconvenience and suffering, that a future generation may be wiser and happier. The change from a period of ignorance to one of knowledge is a great revolution, and we dare not venture to say that it will not be marked by similar consequences. But we must remember, that however long we defer the initiatory measures, we still have to pass through the transition state. We shall still have occasion to stand firm against the critiques and cavils of the enemies of education—for there are still such—who will be on the alert to spy out defects, and to exclaim,—“Where is the good?”

Thirdly: Let the zealous advocates of education beware how they exaggerate their case. We must allow with Mr. Baines and many of the friends of the voluntary principle, that there is too great a disposition to do this. We do not mean that it is done designedly, but in the strong feeling that more education is desirable and necessary, they overlook and under-estimate its actual condition. No cause is ever really subserved by overstating the facts. There can be no doubt amongst those who will inquire, that even in the absence of any large and visible machinery for the purpose a great extension of education is silently gaining ground amongst the working-classes—and of a very valuable kind—proceeding from the very compression of their numbers, and the keen interest with which every topic relating to their interests is freely discussed. Every person must be sensible of this fact, who has marked how much advancement they have made of late years in the recognition of sounder principles. Add to this, that a very considerable number of intelligent working-men are quite alive to their own improvement—read and reflect much—and are beacon-lights of knowledge to multitudes around them.

Lastly: We would warn our educators to eschew the notion—still we fear sadly too prevalent—that little knowledge is needful to the working-man beyond religious knowledge. If man is endowed with a spiritual nature—and let it be refined and exalted to the utmost,—we must not forget that he has a material one also: instincts and faculties which are palpably adapted to his earthly state of existence, and which are evidently not intended to be left in abeyance. The germs of them are found in all men

alike, and should in all men alike be carefully developed and brought into active exercise. Man is subjected to physical laws—physiological, economical, social—as determinate and unbending as the moral ones; disobedience to which alike entails upon him inconvenience and suffering. But how, if he is not taught, is he to obey them? His bodily health, his worldly condition, his external happiness and comfort are all intimately connected with the observance of them. But how is he to secure all these blessings, unless their nature and operation are clearly explained to him. The propriety of a better secular education for the lower classes is generally admitted; but we are afraid that the idea commonly entertained of what it should comprise stops far short of what we believe to be desirable, and even necessary, for the safety and welfare of the community. The physical power of the people appears to be on the increase:—what is to control and balance it, but the development of a counteracting moral power? And this necessity is the more urgent, because we see impatient reformers—beginning as we think at the wrong end—pushing forward organic changes before they have prepared the people, by the general diffusion of correct information and sound principles, for the exercise of new franchises and the performance of new duties.

To conclude: We have no longer much anxiety about the cause of popular education. The question has now clearly taken full possession of the public mind. We quite agree with Mr. Cobden, who, in the eloquent speech which he delivered at the recent meeting of the National Society, is reported to have said,—

“If there is one point more than another about which this great community has made up its mind, it is on adopting some scheme of combined action for obtaining a system of education, under the sanction of Government, and through local rates and local management, as far as possible.”—“There is no doubt that that is decided upon by the great mass of the community; and how any body in sincerity, and who are so involved in the question as the Dissenters are, can be moving about the country trying to advocate and plead for that impossible case—no education at all—passes my comprehension.”

We have great faith in the practical good sense and indomitable energy of the English nation, when it once

perceives that an object is desirable and sets itself fairly to grapple with the means of obtaining it. We have entered, it is true, late into the race, but we do not despair of reaching the goal amongst the foremost. We only ask all parties to meet one another in a spirit of mutual conciliation; with a determination not to let their prejudice in favour of some favourite scheme interfere with another that appears more practicable, and in a disposition to concede all minor differences where they do not involve compromise of principle: and we doubt not that the final issue of our long-protracted disputations on this intricate question will be a happy solution of the various difficulties which have hitherto perplexed it, and the securing to the mass of our population the large increase of blessings which we confidently anticipate will follow in the train of a wider-diffused and better education.

POSTSCRIPT.—Since the foregoing article was completed and the far largest portion of it sent to the press, we have had the opportunity of perusing the draft of the Bill which the National Society proposes to introduce into Parliament. It is essentially altered from the original plan in two material points; one of principle; the other of administration. Provision is now made for the religious element by the introduction of a clause enjoining the closing of the schools during certain hours in every week, in order to give the children the opportunity of receiving religious instruction. The clause, however, appears to us very vague as to the manner in which such instruction is to be given. By the other alteration, to which we have alluded, not only the Hundred Committees are to be done away, as we have mentioned before, but the County Committee also; and in the place of the last, a National Board is to be substituted, composed of three individuals, selected and appointed by the Crown. This alteration we think an improvement; but it admits the propriety of some extra-local supervision, and we do not perceive the superiority of the proposed Board over the existing Council on Education. On the whole, the National and the Local plans are now brought into such near approximation, that we cannot but think it a great pity that some effort should not be made to amalgamate them, and, as Mr. Cobden

seems to advise, concentrate them upon Manchester. From the first we have had our doubts, whether the supporters of the secular plan did not commit an error in not rather narrowing their scheme than extending it to the whole country. What we most need, in the present state of the question, is an experiment on a sufficiently large scale to warrant us in relying on the results, before we too rashly venture forward. These a merely local experiment would give us, without committing us to any positive course hereafter.

ART. III.—ETHICS OF THE VOLUNTARY SYSTEM.

Social Statics : or the Conditions essential to Human Happiness, specified, and the first of them Developed. By Herbert Spencer. London : John Chapman, 142, Strand. 1851.

THE voluntarism which is in the present day so widely diffused in Great Britain, is both in historical fact and moral characteristics, the offspring of that Protestant Puritanism, which in the sixteenth century broke the unity of the Roman Church, and scattered her previously unquestioned authority to the winds. The same phase of character which was then so jealous of the yoke of the moral law, now reappears in intense jealousy of political law ; the same spirit which rejected as self-righteous and formalist any Faith that could not identify itself with the personal impulses of the individual, and make good its authority by gusts of stormy fervour within the heart, produces now its natural fruit in the political system of men who will repudiate any duty however natural and sacred, if presented to them from without as a claim and obligation, and yet are willing to perform the same duties on a far greater scale, if they are quite self-originated, or come to them with the suppliant's gaze of entreaty, instead of the haughty gesture of command. The Ultra-Protestant character seems indeed to be the chosen instrument of Providence for resisting the tyrannic genius of organization, wherever the centre of organizing power is not in the springs of national life, but in the hungry ambition of imperial minds ;—a personified Saxonism, as it were, raised up like Samson of old, to resist with blind but dogged strength the encroachments of either civil or ecclesiastical Philistines, and destined, we may hope, in its most exaggerated form at least, to expire with its foe, like him, in one common destruction. Certain it is that the genius for government which heathen Rome developed, and papal Rome has continued, and which swallowed up all individual life in its iron system of mechanic

rule, sustained its first defeat, and confronted its only permanently successful foe, when it came into collision with the indomitable self-reliance, and passionate individualities of the Teutonic race. The long fifteen centuries from the time when the blood of Varus and his legions, spilt in the wild forests of Westphalia, warned Augustus of the limits Rome might not pass in forcing her hard rule on those fierce northern tribes, to the day when Luther at the head of German patriotism dared to defy the Nuncio of Leo in the diet of Worms, constitutes only a single period of development from the assertion of the right of physical to that of spiritual self-regulation in the career of that great race. Yet the strength needed to mature with permanent success the genius of national freedom has only been found in the fiery impulses of the Teutonic race when tempered by the dogged perseverance, the reserve which controls the ebullition of feeling and so hoards its power, the conservative habits which exclude changes till they have struck deep root in the national mind, and the wariness of thought which is shy of principles till it has seen their practical result, that characterize our Anglo-Saxon branch of the common stock.

And yet necessary as it was that the Roman (and to a less extent the French) genius for irresponsible organization, for inspiring reverence and winning adherents to a self-assumed authority, should be checked by the Saxon genius for individual self-assertion, for detailed resistance, for cool disregard of any authority it had not itself sanctioned or acknowledged, this latter form of character is liable to become as gross an extravagance, if not to produce so much wide-spread evil, as the former. If it be infinite evil, as assuredly it is, that men should almost instinctively obey the majesty of bare imperial force, and the mere generality of arbitrary law, asking no credentials beyond the consciousness of the presence of a mighty will, and the presumptive right implied in wide jurisdiction; if it be infinite evil, as assuredly it is, that men possessing this natural force of will should feel no scruple in giving to arbitrary volitions the sanction of constituted authority, and the solemn form of universal application; surely it is evil scarcely less, that men, from constant resistance to unauthorised claims, should grow at last to acknowledge

no possibility of obligations upon them at all, which do not take their origin in their own expressed permission; nothing more august in the purpose of every organization than its success in producing general satisfaction; no claim by its own nature of more universal validity than the accidental number of individuals who accede to its demand. The Saxon race have indeed gloriously maintained against both the civil and ecclesiastical spirit of Rome, that it is not magnitude of power, not universality of jurisdiction, which have any claim upon our obedience; but they have perhaps in the heat of the conflict too much missed the fact that has made arbitrary organizations so imposing; viz. that human nature does recognize laws of universal obligations and the power of natural authority, and that hence alone arises the moral tendency to bow before the majesty of Might and Law, as natural robes of a divinity, even though they sometimes conceal the reality of vulgar ambition and sacerdotal pride.—It was indeed necessary from the very nature of the domineering spirit which has given Rome her power, and from the very nature of the spirit of half-dogged self-assertion that has educated Saxons for freedom, that neither of them could have any keen and profound appreciation of the natural authority of universal obligations; the one too much regarding law as the tool of its ambition, the other too jealous of it, as the disguised weapon of a despot. Arrogant minds can have no tender feeling of responsibility, since the deep sense of responsible trusts must curb if not subdue the eagerness of ambition; and the spirit of intense pre-occupation with personal rights, wants it almost equally, since its presence gives too delicate a perception of others' difficulties and duties, to render the mind sufficiently inaccessible to the clever pleadings of encroaching men. Certainly in the hands of Providence this keen Saxon conviction of personal rights has been an instrument of wonderful power. Any faith more enlarged, delicate, and true, could never have brought the kind of sledge-hammer force to the great contest of Western Europe since the death of Augustus, which has beaten down the two vastest organizations that imperial instincts ever conceived, and crushed other fabrics of like nature in an earlier stage. But we ought not on this account to be blind to

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the fact, that in its original form, before the moral aspects of political freedom have chastened its spirit and elevated its aims, its tendency is to lead men into a selfish and essentially disorganizing view of society, and a temper ignorantly obstinate in its relation to the state. This indeed was not the spirit in which the great religious revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries was accomplished, because the spiritual impulses and personal faith, which animated the Puritan leaders, gave a dignity to their repudiation of authority, and substituted a profound sympathy in religious convictions as the vital spring of a new organization, which, while it lasted, quite redeemed the revolution from the charge of being either selfish in its causes, or anarchic in its results. But when the same struggle drops to a lower level, and no longer concerns the religious affections pleading for their freedom, but only injured property angry that it may not spend every farthing as it will, or theoretic self-importance indignant at being obliged to contribute to what it denounces as the gross mismanagement of the State; the selfishness, and narrowness, and consequent vulgarity of the ultra-voluntaryist party comes out in a strong light; and we are made to feel how our national character peculiarly needs a culture that shall early present to the mind the grander forms of abstract truth and the venerable lessons and story of antiquity, in order to save it from that individual isolation, that self-opinionated imprisonment in a petty circle of ideas, which at once render it so narrow in its own purposes, and so unwilling to defer in the smallest particulars to a larger wisdom, which it is too obtuse to apprehend.

We confess that we can see little of large and liberal theory, or, indeed, a moral theory of any sort, in the political party advocating the extreme voluntary system in England, and in defence of our view we can only appeal generally to the part played, and the motives displayed by the leaders of that party in the recent agitations on the questions of Government Education, involved in the celebrated Factory Bill of Sir James Graham, the Maynooth Grant, the existing educational scheme of the present Government, and the pending agitation on the justice of a State Church. In some of these

cases, we believe that the result of the voluntaryist agitation has been a good service to the cause of freedom; and we only refer to the spirit in which those agitations have been conducted by most of the leaders of that party (though with some remarkable exceptions*) as illustrative of the utterly selfish and disorganizing spirit which accompanies this negative political faith in the right to exercise our faculties as we please. It was therefore with considerable interest, though with but little expectation of new truth, that we read Mr. Spencer's exposition of the moral basis and logical relationships (some hitherto unsuspected) of this hard-worked theory of government, or rather of no-government; and our anticipations were not deceived. Mr. Spencer's book is one of incontestible, though, we think, narrow ability and great logical rigour, and is, we should say, an *ad absurdum* demonstration of the falsehood of his initial principle.

It might indeed have been taken for a contribution to political literature, similar in purpose and conception to those Historic Doubts in which Archbishop Whately tried to confirm the wavering faith of theologians by a parody on their opponents, were it not for the ceaseless vituperation which Mr. Spencer showers with such hearty good will on the institution of government, and the pleasure with which he dilates on the faith, that it is but an offspring of evil, and has a tenure of life no more permanent than the duration of material disease. A system which begins by proposing to develop a scientific morality as little disputable as the geometrical system of Euclid, and yet starts with the quiet assumption that man's nature is constructed not for social but predatory life, and that all evil arises from the non-adaptation of his old constitution to his new condition,† which goes on to assume as axiomatic truth that the highest law of right and wrong arises only from the limited conditions of the social state, and consists in the duty of dividing the whole amount of possible social freedom in equal fractions among all the members of society,‡ and from

* We most expressly include Mr. Miall, the able Editor of the Nonconformist in this exception: we have no sympathy with his political theory: but it is impossible not to admire the consistency, the integrity, and the fearlessness with which he has maintained his principles in a position of great difficulty.

† P. 63.

‡ P. 77.

beginnings thus indefinite and dubious (not to anticipate by saying radically false), goes on calmly to deduce the essentially temporary character of the lamentable necessities for Education* and Government;† the wickedness of allowing any function to the State except that of protecting its members from the violation of their property and freedom;‡ the duty of permitting men to renounce the State at will, and live a life of voluntary outlawry§ in physical vicinity to it; and the co-extensive rights of children of all ages with adults in social and political life,||—might well seem an intentional parody on the voluntary system, written with the purpose of developing its latent absurdity. But this is not the case. Mr. Spencer is possessed with a fixed idea, and is startled by none of the consequences it involves, but with heroic intrepidity whenever his theory comes into collision with the great admitted facts of human nature, exclaims with the dauntless Frenchman, “*Tant pis pour les faits.*” This is sober and literal truth, for Mr. Spencer has had the ingenuity in the construction of his theory to provide a permanent escape, like the unobserved postern gate in the castles of romance, by which he may always elude the necessity of practically accepting the terms which he has himself dictated. If a consequence of his theory is absurd, impracticable, unsupported by a shadow of argument moral or otherwise, he has a theory ready to account for the failure of his theory. His moral system has the unpleasant attribute (maintained moreover to be its greatest perfection) that it only states the rights and duties of perfect men, and has no word to offer on the actual duties which transgressions involve. To use Mr. Spencer’s own words—

“Treating therefore as it does on the abstract principles of right conduct, and the deductions to be made from these, a system of pure ethics cannot recognise evil, or any of those conditions which evil generates. It entirely ignores wrong, injustice, or crime, and gives no information as to what must be done when they have been committed. It knows no such thing as an infraction of the laws, for it is merely a statement of what the laws are. It simply says, such and such are the principles on which men should act; and when these are broken it can do nothing but say that they are

* Pp. 187, 188.

§ P. 206.

† P. 207.

|| P. 190.

‡ P. 274.

broken. If asked what ought any one to do when another has knocked him down, it will not tell; it can only answer that an assault is a trespass against the law, and gives rise to a wrong relationship. It is silent as to the manner in which we should behave to a thief; all the information it affords is, that theft is a disturbance of social equilibrium. We may learn from it that debt implies an infraction of the moral code; but whether the debtor should or should not be imprisoned, cannot be decided by it. To all questions which presuppose some antecedent unlawful action, such as—Should a barrister defend any one whom he believes to be guilty? Ought a man to break an oath which he has taken to do something wrong? Is it proper to publish the misconduct of our fellows? the perfect law can give no reply, because it does not recognise the premises. In seeking to settle such points on purely ethical principles, moralists have attempted impossibilities. As well might they have tried to solve mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked lines and broken-backed curves, or to deduce from the theorems of mechanics the proper method of setting to work a dislocated machine. No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as depend upon truths that are themselves absolute. Before there can be exactness in an inference, there must be exactness in the antecedent propositions. A geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight; and that his circles, and ellipses, and parabolas shall agree with precise definitions—shall perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations. If you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of the *straight* man. He determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself; shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a *crooked* man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him. He may state what he thinks about it—may give an approximate solution; but anything more is impossible. His decision is no longer scientific and authoritative, but is now merely an *opinion*."

The suicidal nature of this definition of a moral law for mankind, and its intimate moral connection with our author's political view, we shall find it necessary to notice hereafter. With a theory thus standing coldly aloof from the most painful perplexities and saddest responsibilities that ever trouble the consciences of men, it is easy enough

for Mr. Spencer to defy impracticability as a test of right, and refer us to imperfection as its source. Government too, as (in his estimation) the offspring and index of all moral inequalities, is the favourite scapegoat on which he visits the obloquy of all the difficulties that his theory involves, only finding it necessary for example to plead in extenuation of his paradox that children must have equal political rights with men,—that all political rights spring from evil; that where there is evil existing, impracticabilities in carrying out the moral law are to be expected, and must not therefore be regarded as a stumbling-block.*

Thus much is necessary and sufficient perhaps to give our readers some conception of Mr. Spencer's mode of thought, and ability of style, and also of the nature of the ethical problem which he has stated to himself for solution. We must now give briefly a statement of his theory, which we shall then examine with more special attention to the fundamental views which he shares with the bulk of the voluntaryist party, passing more briefly over the points which are peculiar to himself. We must content ourselves with examining his premises; the conclusions which he has so fully developed may sometimes be useful as illustrating the points in dispute, but are so rigidly deduced from the data he assumes, that they must be admitted on admission of his premises. After a preliminary chapter to indicate (*inter alia*) the uncertainty and falsity of the selfish system of morals, he lays it down that though happiness, as an aim for individual actions, is neither a clear principle of guidance, nor a right purpose, still that we cannot but conceive that complete happiness is the sure criterion of a fulfilled destiny; that this must be regarded as the Creator's purpose in giving us existence, and that to this, therefore, the moral faculty, whatever it shall prove to be, must ultimately lead us. By regarding then the happiness of all as the Creator's purpose for all, though not as the goal of individual endeavour, we may perhaps be led to some social law indicating necessary conditions for its equal attainment, which conditions may turn out to be fortified by a special moral faculty urging us to their observance *on its own account*, and without needing any sanction from the partial insight thus gained into the Creator's design, to which it is

* P. 190, section 9.

but instrumental. And this Mr. Spencer finds to be the case. Happiness is individually gained only in the due exercise of all the faculties, that is in exercise to the extent "proportioned to the importance of each faculty" in the "normally constituted man."* But "not being able to determine the ratios of the several faculties composing the constitution" of the "normally constituted man," "but being able simply to lay down certain laws which their action must conform to, we are quite incompetent to say of every particular deed whether it is or is not accordant with that constitution."† Here Mr. Spencer gives up really, though not statedly, as an untenable position, the existence of any strictly private conscience judging our inward life with searching severity, and contents himself with finding in its place a social conscience regulating men's actions to each other, but ignoring duties of self-regulation altogether except with regard to their subsequent effects as a "higher kind of expediency-philosophy." In other words, he surrenders here the claim of his book to be the basis of an ethical system altogether, as he openly avows that he can find no moral instinct for any except our social duties, and derives private obligations from utilitarian considerations only.

Our author being a rigid Necessarian, and therefore admitting no distinction between our 'possible' and our 'actual,' naturally asks how it is that man needs a moral law distinct from his actual life at all. In reply to this difficulty he argues thus: Happiness is the destiny of each man. Happiness consists in the due exercise of his faculties. But what is a due exercise of the faculties except that to which a man's own nature spontaneously tends? Every creature is fitted to fulfil its destiny without amendments introduced from without, and why not man? The answer is to be found in the fact that creatures created for certain conditions, do not adapt themselves to others, except through a painful process of gradual approximation, in which the law of their being is gradually changing to suit its new circumstances. Now man was created not for the social, but [as Hobbes long ago maintained] for a predatory state, and in that state, when left to himself, he

* Pp. 76, 77, 78.

† P. 84, § 5.

would attain happiness or a due exercise of his faculties.* But in the present state he is like a transplanted flower, and needs time and modification in his constitution to become acclimatized to social life. Hence the moral or rather social law of his present state is one as yet unattained, and only gradually to become the real law of his being. Still we can tell what this 'due exercise' will be, when attained, *as regards his fellow men*. Faculties cannot be exercised without scope, and as to exercise them is *equally* the duty of each, it is the *equal* duty of each, and hence each must have *equal* scope, and hence that is morally [socially] right only, which is an exercise of faculty not infringing on the scope of any one else to exercise the same faculty. Hence the law of equal freedom is the social law of our being here, to which we must ever approximate, disusing only such tendencies of our nature as would clash with the exercise of similar tendencies in others. Thus deducing the fundamental principle of his social theory, Mr. Spencer not only fortifies it by his personal assurance that there is no possibility of escaping from it, that it is not mere opinion, private conviction and the like, but absolute certainty, and that to doubt it is as absurd as to doubt the sixth book of Euclid or the Binomial Theorem, but appeals to the universal moral sense of humanity as everywhere betraying this ultimate faith. The so-called moral intuitions of men, do not, he thinks, *primarily* reveal anything about veracity, humility, purity of thought, courage, serenity, patience and faith, but simply this, that every man has absolute right and an equal right to cultivate his faculties (in what proportion the moral law does not state) in *any way* not interfering with another's similar right. This intuition Mr. Spencer supports as the moral tradition of ages, by a quotation from the writs of summons in the reign of Edward I., by the judicial principle that "all men are equal before the law," by the witness of Sir Robert Filmer and the testimonies he includes, by the maxim of the complete Suffrage movement, by Locke's opinion in his Essay on Civil Government, by Blackstone's and Hooker's political

* P. 63. From this it follows that this 'due' exercise does not in Mr. Spencer's mind imply any definite and divine law of relative moral importance in the human faculties, but varies according to the external circumstances in which man is placed.

axioms, by the meaning of Equity which is equivalent to equalness, and by the unconscious testimony of men who use phrases like the following: "How would you like it?" "What is that to you?" "I've as good a right as you," "Do as you would be done by," and so forth, in many of which cases we must remark that he puts a quite strained and false interpretation on words meant to express a totally different meaning from his own, not, namely, identity of privileges and immunities to all men in different social and moral relations of life, but the absence of respect to persons, of regard to accidental individualities, in whatever social or moral relations we may be placed. Mr. Spencer further argues that the progress of civilization has always tended to increase the force and universality of this belief. Psychologically he analyses conscience into two elements, one a faculty assertive of our liberty to exercise all other faculties at will, the other, Sympathy, by which we are led to attribute the same liberty to others that we claim for ourselves. This latter element of conscience we conclude that Mr. Spencer considers to have been absent in his "aboriginal man," and only now in process of development in order to fit man for the climate of society. However this may be, he considers that now, the sense of individual rights being supposed constant, conscience will vary directly as the strength of sympathy, and sympathy being supposed fixed, conscience will vary directly as the strength of self-assertion; and hence that practically of course it depends on the intensity of both.

Thus have we developed, we trust without misrepresentation, our author's social faith. How he expands it into a political system of absolute democracy, with the fundamental proviso that no political system could exist at all, did not man infringe the law of equal freedom, so that government is a mere mutual protection society amongst such as choose to join, in order to gain strength to resist any infringement of their rights, it is not necessary to explain. Clearly from such premises it is easy enough to deduce the absolute injustice of state interference in any but its appropriate function of affording mutual protection, since any attempt at such interference would be an assumption, on the part of the governing power, of rights not only that might be disapproved by some of the governed, but unattainable by

them; and it would be therefore an admission of unequal rights. And from the same principle equally follows that identical political rights must accrue to men, women, and children.—Is it not quite as deducible that, as infants cannot associate themselves for mutual protection, they will remain outside the pale of government, or, as Mr. Spencer calls it, will involuntarily “ignore the state” unless associated by their parents,* and that, in the former unpleasant position, any crimes committed against them will be without remedy, as non-members cannot have benefit of a voluntary association? And also will it not follow that even though they could be made members of the State, the desertion of children by their parents is without remedy, since no scope for exercising faculties which the parent claims for himself is so infringed? Will our author accept these addenda to his political code? We will not however attempt the *ex absurdo* mode of confutation, as we have gained from this book a very deep conviction of Mr. Spencer’s intrepidity in accepting all and any consequences of his theory, and have no doubt that while fortified in his fixed idea, cavered in the deep recesses of this *idolum speciei* of non-interference, he would calmly defy all the artillery of ridicule and remonstrance, and perhaps only regard it as so much new testimony to the strength of his position.

We had occasion in a previous Number† to point out that the radical error of the socialist party lies in treating individuals rather as fractions than as constituents of the social body; in looking at Society as the great unit, and man as the broken elements of that unit, so that the necessary moral conditions of individual life are quite lost sight of in seeking to perfect the organic action of society; and therefore it is that all such experiments necessarily fail. The primary assumptions of Mr. Spencer and the voluntaryist party offer an instructive contrast to this great error, by exhibiting one of an exactly opposite kind. The Socialists unconsciously calculate too much on the vitality of the social

* Would Mr. Spencer’s Utopian state admit of unconscious membership? Or is this one of the many difficulties that must be attributed to the radical immorality of government? If so, government turns out to be an Institution necessitated by immorality, to protect man from immorality, but paralyzed by its source, it fails of its aim.

† August, 1851.—Art. I.

element in man, implying, as they do, in all their schemes, that the natural organization of society might be taken to pieces and put together on a totally different system, on a plan, namely, which would absorb entirely the space now occupied, or, as they would consider, wasted, in allowing room for the free play of the special individualities of mankind, and this without weakening or destroying the organic unity of society in the process. They do not see that sphere for moral individualities must be left, and is left, in every natural social growth, or else, in the very effort forcibly to crush the molecular forces, as they may be considered, into closer combination, these forces will acquire a power so immense as to explode with a shock at once annihilating the society which they have taken such pains to draw into a more coherent mass. The individualists on the other hand drop out of view altogether the natural provisions in man for social combinations. They do not in terms indeed deny this, but they virtually ignore it in their theory of society. That theory obliges you to assume that individuals in combination are mainly under an external pressure, clipped of their natural freedom of motion from the necessity of co-existing within narrow limits, elbowing their way in a multitude where they have no natural affinities but mutually repel each other; and the only difficulty is to determine, since this social state must be permanent, to how much room each person has a right. And accordingly this is exactly the problem Mr. Spencer has set himself to determine. 'Given a certain expansive force in each individual atom,—required the limits of equal expansion in a given moral area.' And the resulting solution of this hard physical problem, is, he tells us, a *moral law*, the development of conscience, the standard by which sin is to be measured, the utterance of Religion, the whisper of God! As the socialists put implicit faith in the social attractions, and consider that these will hold society together however they may disregard the differing specialities of men, so the individualists see only the atomic repulsions caused by the variety of developments in human faculty, and, rather than interfere with the least of these, would sweep away all *organic expressions* of the sentiments that draw men into the numberless social relations of life. We say all '*organic expressions*' of these sentiments, because the sentiments themselves it is impossible for them to deny; and the only point they maintain

is, therefore, that these should not take any organic form that is likely to impose any possible restraint on those who, from some exceptional cause, are unable to enter into the spirit of these relations. For example, the common argument in favour of democracy is, that though all men admit that the rule of the best is the object of our institutions, yet that any direct aim to reach this is needless and wrong, because the best are sure to have their *natural* influence, to find their way to the surface by their own relative specific gravity, without the artificial effort to secure it, while any attempt to organize that influence perpetuates an injustice on those who do not admit that these are the best. And similarly Mr. Spencer, in advance of his school, asserts that the institution of government itself should be allowed no organized jurisdiction over society at large, but only over those voluntarily inviting that jurisdiction, lest, in organizing an influence that may not be universally admitted, you injure the freedom of those who would reject it. So also parental authority he would entirely abjure, on the ground that the natural influence of affection will influence most, and where it is absent you have no right to force the unwilling desires of an exceptional child. In other words, he attaches more moral authority, allows more sacred inviolability, to the repulsive or individual elements in men, than he does to those universal social affections, which, as we think, have both an irresistible and a natural right to a universal expression, we will not only say *at the risk* of injuring, but even *with the duty* of forcing into obedience those rebellious exceptional wills which, for the most part, really recognize the authority that they pretend to disregard. And even if they do not, but conscientiously believe themselves in advance of society, they have no right to complain of a martyrdom that is at once the price of their superiority, and the great instrument of promoting their cause.

We may state then, in general, that as the vice of the socialist philosophy lies in counting too much on the strength of social ties, and desiring to draw them too tight for the free moral action of individuals, the perhaps less dangerous, but certainly more shallow philosophy of our author's party, leads them into a theory which refuses to recognize the natural aptitudes of men for various

classes of organic social functions, which makes society to consist of a number of competing members, instead of being in itself an harmonious whole, and which turns the social law from the natural gravitation of supplementary minds, into a cold compromise, made by rivals for the sake of peace.

We suppose that Mr. Spencer would deny this charge, and quote in his defence the following sound and rational passage:—

“The very existence of society implies some natural affinity in its members for such a union. It is pretty clear, too, that without a certain fitness in mankind for ruling and being ruled, government would be an impossibility. * * * The characteristics exhibited by beings in an associated state cannot arise from the accident of combination, but must be the consequences of certain inherent properties of the beings themselves. True, the gathering together may call out these characteristics; it may make manifest what was before dormant; it may afford the opportunity for undeveloped peculiarities to appear; but it evidently does not create them.”—(P. 16, § 1.)

And yet this remarkable conclusion is drawn, that these considerations “warn us against adopting any fundamental doctrine which . . . cannot be expressed without presupposing a state of aggregation. On the other hand, it hints that the first principle of a code for the right ruling of humanity in its state of multitude, are to be found in humanity in its state of unitude.”—(P. 17, § 1.) In other words, the fact, that there are latent aptitudes in man first drawn out by the social state, warns us to construct our social state with careful disregard for the elements in man first developed by that state; if there be any human element only proper to a state of aggregation, that element we must ignore;—which certainly is the principle on which, for the most part, Mr. Spencer has constructed his theory, and the source of all its ostentatious paradox and wintry sterility.

There are, however, two principles in man, exclusively social, which Mr. Spencer has taken into account, really valuing the one, but vilifying the other as the root of idolatry and the measure of imperfect civilization—sympathy and the hero-worship of Mr. Carlyle, which Mr. Spencer seems to regard only as reverence for Power, a meaning which Carlyle himself far too often seems

to assign it. The former, as a sentiment that only unites men as *equals*, and as having therefore no tendency to upset his system, being indeed the only root of voluntary association, is the one social sentiment which our author would allow to relieve the naked monotony of his Utopian state. He has no objection to groups upon a flat, if all have perfect liberty to wander away at will. But natural pre-eminences or inferiorities, the uplifted eye of trust and the outstretched hand of compassion, the noble genius of command and the willing feet of obedience, only disturb the serenity of his vision, and rouse him to indignant prophecies of a civilization that shall level all the diversified scenery in human life, till, in quite other than Isaiah's meaning, "every valley shall be exalted and every hill laid low," not for the triumphant approach of a spiritual king, but for the permanent residence of a jealous democracy. Mr. Carlyle's theory of Hero-worship is assumed by Mr. Spencer as the true origin of government, but taken in its narrowest sense as the worship of power, and regarded as a principle necessarily varying in strength "inversely as the moral sense," as useful during the reign of "savage selfishness," but the bitterest antagonist of moral freedom. Our author, therefore, partly ignores and partly recognizes under protest, those peculiarly social sentiments which unite superiors with inferiors, to the power and reality of which the living organism of society so abundantly testifies.

But it is time to leave the delineation and criticism of the non-interference system as a whole, for some more detailed examination of the grounds on which our author builds it up, grounds which he considers to be "not matters of opinion but matters of unalterable fact. Denial of them is impossible, for nothing else can be stated but what is self-contradictory."—(P. 69.) These are twofold. Looking at the divine purpose, the completest happiness of each individual must be attained, which consists in the completest exercise of his faculties. Now the completest possible exercise of the faculties requires the completest moral freedom; hence every one must have all the freedom not incompatible with the similar freedom of others. And again, looking from the human side, the personal right of each to exercise the faculties, and of the

equal right of every one else to the same scope, is the revelation of every individual conscience, the ever-widening tradition of history, the obvious tendency of civilization. With regard to the first method of deducing the social law, although it be pure assumption to state what the Divine purposes are in creating man, as we have no clue to any other than those which He has proposed to us as ends worthy of our highest efforts, still it is reasonable to admit that faculties given are not meant to lie undeveloped, and hence the fullest energy of faculties, *in due proportion of rank*, may be admitted as at least the normal state of our existence. But here our author interpolates a principle which he does not deign to discuss, and which is really the suppressed premiss yielding all his peculiar conclusions,—viz., that all our faculties are only capable of *self-development*, that the absolute inviolability of self-will is necessary for the culture of all human capacities. This is not only an unproved assumption, but the very point in which his system differs from that of others, and yet it is passed over with a quiet assertion that so it is. "It is man's duty to exercise his faculties," says Mr. Spencer; "for duty means fulfilment of the divine will." And then he quietly assumes that man must exercise all his faculties for himself, and without assistance or even influence from without. How if there should be interference-faculties—viz., a faculty, in certain cases, prompting men to interfere with others, and a correlated faculty fitting them for such interference? Are these faculties to be carefully neglected and eradicated on Mr. Spencer's simple word of assurance that such faculties are tending to disappear with the progress of civilization and do not form part of a normal mind? Now, that there are such faculties Mr. Spencer himself does not deny; only with strange prejudice he omits them from the list of those which it is our duty to cultivate, and pursues his way, ignoring in his premises what he wishes to find absent from his conclusions. If reverence and compassion, gratitude and generosity, and the kindred sentiments naturally binding together the weak and the powerful, the needy and the wealthy, the ignorant and the learned, the young and the mature, the vacillating and the firm, and, in short, all those whose qualities and gifts are different, if these cannot be exercised except by inter-

ference, and in the very act of interference, what becomes of the principle of the absolute inviolability of freedom wherever the exercise of faculty does not abridge another's similar power? If any one desire to commit suicide, or an insane man to injure his own person, such acts would not interfere with the similar right of any one else; and yet we have instincts prompting us most imperiously to restrain their freedom of will in such cases, for their own benefit. All the human faculties that are essentially dependent on, that have their objects in, the moral acts of others, cannot be exercised at all, except by a partial surrender of freedom on the one side, and an assumption of larger right on the other; nor is it true that the affections of superiors, the educating capacity, the impulse of compassion, the condescension of power, the generosity of wisdom, recognize at all the *unwillingness* or protest of the ignorant, the suffering, the weak, and the wayward, as a sufficient reason for a self-imposed restraint. On the other hand, this very unwillingness often indicates the greater need of a compulsion, which no large mind will hesitate by any wholesome means to apply. The inferior cannot, by the very necessity of the case, comprehend the urgency of his own need; and if we are not to put down our impulse to restrain others' freedom in the case of moral or intellectual *derangement*, no case can be shown why we should be more scrupulous, when the *effect* of derangement is produced by the undeveloped or the morally evil state of the minds around us.

Mr. Spencer's theory is so thoroughly artificial, that it is difficult to grasp even the exact point where he supposes that the equal right of each to gain a developed mind, passes into his extraordinary interpretation of the law of equal freedom. But we apprehend that we may at least meet his reasoning thus.—It is not denied that men have various faculties, such as reverence and command, both soliciting and prompting to mutual interferences of many kinds. Now, on what grounds are these to be excluded from the capacities which it is our duty to cultivate? Is it, that if *unduly exercised* they tend to encroach upon other men's moral liberties and destroy the possibility of self-culture? But this is true of all our faculties, and is exactly the fact against

which Mr. Spencer is aiming to guard. Is it that, if exercised at all, they have the same tendency? Then why are they given us; and, if given, why is there no mark to distinguish them from those which it is our first duty to develop? Is it that their due exercise is to be limited by the principle of not arrogating any right inconsistent with the assertion of the same right in another? But this prohibits their exercise altogether; for the authoritative instincts have their *essence* in more or less guiding the wills, directing the thoughts, and assuming the responsibilities of those dependent upon us. Is it that our author is so utterly unphilosophical as to draw a distinction between physical and moral compulsion? Surely he will not maintain that we cannot by moral urgency, by the fear of displeasure, indeed by the mere dead force of volition, as effectually prevent the exercise of another's freedom as by the bars of a prison, or the dread of a whip. Nay, assuming Mr. Spencer's own basis, that the development of human faculties is the great end of existence, it is absolutely necessary, in many instances, to exercise large powers of swaying those below us, in order that this end be attained at all. Before the period of self-culture can begin at all, in children, for example, much impressed culture is a necessary preliminary condition that it shall *ever* begin. And again, the ignorant and perverted, intellectually or morally, often need to be saved from themselves, which can only be done by disturbing their freedom, if their faculties are to be developed at all. There is nothing, therefore, to place the instincts which relate superior and inferior minds on a different ground from other human faculties. Educating and governing instincts seem to have their proper objects in feeble, ignorant, and immature minds, and also in all minds incapable, from their different line of culture, of passing judgment for themselves in special spheres of thought or conduct. It is true that such instincts may become tyrannic and impose laws beyond the point where self-culture might safely be left to itself; but this is equally true of all our desires, that, if unchastened, they will invade the liberties of others. And unless Mr. Spencer can show that all development is necessarily self-development (which assuredly he cannot), that there is no initial state in the human mind, where

external authority must rouse or check, before any internal principle is in any way competent to develop and regulate; in other words, unless he can show that children must be left uninfluenced (by either moral or physical overbearing) to their own spontaneous tendencies, or at all events must be only tempted along by intellectual and moral sweetmeats; that drunkards and suicides would be best reformed and their faculties cultured by the eloquent suggestions of neutral spectators,—our author's own assumed purpose for human existence is all on the side of active interference with the sphere of others' freedom.

But we can suppose that Mr. Spencer would reply, that all these criticisms pre-suppose many kinds of existing inequalities, while he had been living in another sphere, and serenely registering the facts and duties of a perfect world. Though this unwarrantably assumes that superior ranks of mind will be wanting in such a state (an arrangement which would render perfection not a little fatiguing, and very unlike our ideal world of a perfect humanity), it does not establish the integrity of our author's moral law as a law binding on our present race. A law deduced from a state where certain faculties are supposed worn out or non-existent, is purely false for a state where these are not only active and imperative, but some of the very noblest we possess. Even granting that they are but temporary instincts, given as safeguards in a preliminary state, while they exist and are urgent within us, they must be assigned their due weight in a moral system, and not be absolutely refused a hearing, or treated as usurpers whose only right is might, because to Mr. Spencer, in prophetic trance, a time is revealed when they shall be swept away. In truth, there is no moral theory quite so ludicrous and self-destructive as one which imposes duties on a perfect man living among the erring and the weak, identical with those which ought to regulate his conduct amongst equals like himself. Mr. Spencer, indeed, dogmatically tells us, that "a morality which recognises existing defects . . . stands self-condemned," because the acts it recommends are not "the best conceivable," "not perfectly moral."* No confusion of thought could be greater than this. That a

* P. 55, § 2.

morality sanctioning existing moral defects in the moral agent stands self-condemned is an identical proposition; but that it ought to prescribe differently for external perfection and external imperfection, is almost equally obvious. Any other assertion is only consistent with the radically false assumption, that right and wrong are qualities attaching to indifferent outward actions, not to motives, purposes, and affections. These latter must necessarily vary in their expression according to the conditions around them. Circumstance, and that alone, can decide whether the same holiness of intention should take living form in assault, in peace, in persuasion, in protest, in sympathy, or in the anxious pause of meditation. Morality *must* recognize existing defects external to itself, even before it can remedy them. And to ignore ostentatiously the realities of social evil, is to ignore all the duty of expelling them. Mr. Spencer confuses the best conceivable moral agent with the best conceivable sphere of action, and finds any law of obligation self-convicted, not because it proceeds from defect within, but because it opens its eyes to deficiency without. His ideal man would stop his ears, like the princess in the Arabian tale, to the cries of transformed humanity around him, and save himself from a like enchantment only by obtuseness to their call. A law of action, which should take no account of "existing defects" would, if obeyed, fill our prisons, multiply vices, and push back civilization in a year more than the ordinary errors and sins of centuries. It is almost unjustifiable to waste our readers' time in pointing out error so transparent as this. Thales-like, our author walks the earth with his gazes on the heaven, and so steps unaware into the pitfalls he affects to despise.

Thus much in answer to the supposed deduction of the moral law from the divine duty and right of perfectly exercising our faculties. Now, with relation to our author's derivation of the same law from the human side, by its psychological detection as the root of our primary moral conditions (all duties not included in it being of "quite inferior authority," and not universally reducible to moral law at all*), by the one widening stream of historic testi-

* P. 82.

mony, and its tendency to colour the whole aspect of our civilization, our task is both more tangible and more easy. We can only say, that to us it does not seem to speak the language of the conscience at all, except so far as it says that good which we desire for ourselves we ought to be willing to bestow on others. But this is not the substantive part of Mr. Spencer's law, which asserts that what we should claim for ourselves is absolute irresponsibility to others for our actions, if they do not clash in any way with theirs, whilst releasing others from all similar accountability to us. The self-excusing question—"Am I my brother's keeper?" and the disdainful protest against interference—"Is my brother my keeper?" have never before been regarded as the expression of the tenderest language of the conscience; and yet, with all wish to be candid, this does seem to us to be the sum and substance of this instinctive social law. Take it as you will, it is only a ringing of the changes on the principle of vigilant guard against encroachment, and vigilant care not to encroach. "Bear your own burdens and let me bear mine,"—"Let us all keep out of each other's way;" these are its genuine forms of expression, even acknowledged as such by Mr. Spencer himself. A law which enters no protest against sin, except it happen to interfere with another's right of sin, which has indeed no objection to sin at all if conducted on the strictest principles of free trade, can recommend itself only to a very political conscience, which has more horror of protection than of the evil protected. We know that Mr. Spencer will reply, that private morality is not discussed in this book, and that by its rules purely personal rectitude must be judged. Yet he admits himself that such rules can only be founded on "a higher kind of expediency," and have nothing like the degree of moral obligations that belong to the laws of social morality. What is this but to say that conscience itself is concerned only with prohibiting interference, so as to be a mere social outwork of the mind? while the individual purposes which solicit us, if pliant enough to the wills of others, are determined, not by moral law, but by ulterior intellectual considerations? To make the principle of *laissez faire* the substance of the direct revelation of conscience, argues a wilfulness of theory only rivalled by

those moralists who consider that it directly endorses the statute-law of every land. If there is any principle which is intensely antagonistic to *laissez faire*, which is anxious to engrave upon others their infinite obligations, which has absolutely no respect at all for the vulgar right of disregarding a duty without molestation, and, where it cannot compel rectitude of action, has no hesitation in forcing a displeasure, often taking the severer form of punishment upon the mutineer, it is the principle of conscience. When unmingled, indeed, with wide human sympathies, and the quick insight that can appreciate the variety of difficulty in differing characters, and feel the extreme risk attaching to all the moral judgments of men, it is almost inevitably austere; and produces men like the Israelite Samuel, or the German Calvin, or the Scottish Knox, who will recognize no rights inconsistent with their own conceptions of duty, and never hesitate to sacrifice those related to them by the strongest ties of friendship or loyalty to the stern resentment of offended justice.

We do not, however, mean to deny that conscience is the real and true basis of political freedom, but only that it does not directly lay down any indefeasible rights that we have from others. Yet in laying private and paramount obligations on each of us, it does demand sufficient freedom to give the power of voluntarily observing them. But from this point of view, freedom is conceived only as the necessary condition, not as the essence of duty; and its claim to reverence is simply an honour *reflected* upon it from the glorious service in which it may be used. The tendency to demand the relaxation of the reins of government which the higher culture of the conscience always produces, is therefore indirect. It arises in the keen conviction, that the highest state in which a human being can live is that of conscious responsibility. And in proportion, therefore, as this becomes really possible in a state, in proportion as the guiding law is clearly understood by the individual, does the relaxation of external guidance become a duty, in order that this higher self-determination, this willing surrender to proper obligations, may take its place.

Thus conceived, a moral right to freedom must be regarded as a mere derivation from the idea of duty; and

instead of being absolute, while individual morality is only grounded in utilitarian considerations, as our author takes it, the personal and private conscience alone is absolute, while the freedom to be allowed to each is only relative to the moral culture and the degree of responsibility actually capable of being exercised in the various classes of the state. Instead of elevating the assertion of political and social freedom into the main function of the conscience, we believe that such assertion would never be made at all with any authority higher than that of the vulgar vehemence of self-will, were not a law of duty *first* perceived as obligatory, that requires, for its fulfilment, a commensurate freedom from restraint. Conscience demands freedom from authority only as instrumental to, and co-extensive with, the conscious growth of moral responsibility in man; and though, even beyond this limit, *laissez faire* may often be the *wisest* principle, because involving less complex relations and less danger of stereotyped abuse, yet in such cases it can only be recommended on special grounds of expediency, not demanded with the authority of a divine right. We are speaking here not only of political relations, but of all relations whether of class or domestic life. The degree of liberty to which a people or an individual is morally entitled, is not, we contend, an *à priori* question of pure moral science at all, but an *à posteriori* problem of practical morality, that depends for its solution on special social or personal circumstances of place and time. The larger skill and experience and higher culture of the parent or the governor ought to be, to a certain extent, a mere supplement to the natural deficiencies of childhood or ignorance, guiding them by a native instinct, and withdrawing the guidance in proportion to the interior moral development which it was requisite to supply.

This would make the power of both parental and political government a question of prudence and history, not of science; and such we really conceive it to be. We have no more belief in political theories that assume to be a standard by which to try all nations and all centuries, than we should have for parental maxims that took no note of the age or individuality of the child. The moral sin of slavery, for example, does not lie in the absorption of a power by others with which the slaves could not safely be

entrusted, but in an arrangement that makes no provision for, nay carefully checks, the moral growth by which the law of duty and the possibility of a responsible life would be cultivated in the mind of the slave. And we can feel no more sympathy with a cry for abrupt, unprepared-for emancipation, than we have with a theory that would have given to the serfs of feudalism and the terrorist mobs of the first French revolution, a power as large and responsible as that possessed by the English middle classes of the present day.*

It may be said, that a system which makes it a matter of special condition, not of pure and absolute right, what shall be the liberty of action allowed to others, gives an unlimited range to tyrannical pretence, which may at any time take its own view of the degree of responsibility allowable to inferiors. And so it undoubtedly is; but those who are wilfully blind to gross practical injustice, are not likely to yield to a mere theoretic condemnation. And as it must always be a question of time and circumstance who shall possess the governing power *de facto*, it is putting no new instrument for self-defence into the hands of an imperious government to admit that its *de jure* authority is a question of time and circumstance also. Of course, too, it might happen that the less of two evils would frequently lie in the possession by men or children of a liberty as yet quite blind and irresponsible, only because its restriction by others would be to place it at the disposal of a power worse than blind, keen-eyed for ill. But in such a case the justification of irresponsible rights only springs from a sure alternative of wrongs, and has no deeper authority than the principle that a probability of misuse is preferable to a certainty of abuse. Wherever any really high moral ground has been taken in defence of

* The same sort of reasoning has been lately used by the school of 'fast' Politicians to defend the detestable policy of the French Prince President in his *coup d'état*; quite unsuccessfully however. The flagrancy of that measure lies not in the mere illegal assumption of authority, of which Cromwell was also guilty, not without a true spirit of patriotic zeal; but in its undisguised purpose of destroying all hope of, all preparative training for, self-government in France; of blighting the growth of all national responsibility which would work out for itself in time a sphere of temperate political freedom. The arguments used in its defence seem to us as morally shameless as they are visibly incompetent.

laissez faire, it has been, as in the case of the Reformation and the Revolution, where liberty of action and thought were needful conditions for the performance of moral obligations already perceived and respected. This it is which distinguishes the English above the French revolution, that the former was a vindication of the liberty of duty, the latter only an insurrection against the loathsome tyranny of wrong. Hence, while the former was triumphant and noble and religious, the latter was merely a grand spectacle of temporary retribution; there was no solemn national feeling of responsibility for which the people could gain a sphere of inalienable freedom, only a national consciousness of tremendous and implacable injury, which, having rocked and scared the continent of Europe with the thunder and flame of its volcanic passion, passed in wide-spread misery away. Every conscience asserts that the only positive basis for the natural rights of man (as they are called) rests in the individual perception of duties that each must, for himself, discharge, so that such rights must vary with the progress of man's moral nature, and the intellectual culture necessary for its exercise. And it seems to us the merest moral confusion to class with such rights, as Mr. Spencer literally does, the supposed right of a baby to burn its fingers without opposition; or, still worse, the right of self-will to keep its ignorance and sin at pleasure, if not trenching on another's sphere.

And not only do natural rights rest upon the supposition that genuine private obligations are felt by men, for the responsible realization of which freedom is required; and not only do these necessarily depend on the moral culture and therefore historical antecedents of the people, so as to vary with the time and education, but inasmuch as the law of right *action* is indefinitely variable (according to external circumstances), although the principle of obligation is everywhere uniform, it follows that, even in the same nation and under the same conditions of moral and intellectual culture, there will be many rights which vary according to the individual nature, social class, and external relations of the subject. While the duties of an operative and a landed proprietor, of a merchant and a farmer, of man and woman, vary so widely as they do, of course their

rights cannot be entirely the same. And there may be no more injustice in denying to one class rights conceded to another, than in refusing a ten hours' Bill to the clergy, or a measure to protect men from woman's influence by provisions similar to the laws of mortmain. We may just guard ourselves here from any false inference that might have been drawn from the analogy so often used between the moral state of children and that of imperfectly developed men, by saying that we do not at all admit that analogy to be complete. We do not believe that even the most perfect development of society would result in an emancipation from the legislation of government at all parallel with that of the mature from parental authority. Unless there were an absolute equalization of all human powers, unless men were in the end to become mere monotonous repetitions of the same moral unit, so that variety in human faculties, functions and abilities were altogether abolished; the existence of a guiding power of government would remain, we fully believe, both a natural and noble organ of our social life. But to this subject we must briefly recur.

Mr. Spencer argues also from the increasing historical tendency towards the equal exemption of all from external control, that this is the natural expression of the human conscience, and that the principle will finally be incorporated, without modification, in the structure of civilization. The argument from historic tendencies is always liable to great abuse, and can only be safely used by those who accustom themselves to recollect that a harder task than to observe the tendency of the moment, is to ascertain whether there be or not any definite limits, within which its action is restrained. This is a task too fine and troublesome for the gentlemen with whom the cause of progress in this nineteenth century is the favourite watchword for promoting the exaggeration of all the most onesided and temporary tendencies of our day. Progressive Theology for instance cries out that the tendency has been to throw off all authority, and to believe less; and in the passionate desire to outstrip the age, denies all authority and believes nothing, assuming that the movement from more to less, implies the continuance of that movement from less to zero. Progressive science finds that the tendency has

been to detect fewer centres of causation and wider laws of classification, and in eager anticipation of the judgment of posterity embraces with equal blindness and confidence the belief that the existence of causes at all has been a mere mistake, a mischievous *ignis fatuus* to lead men away from the search after comprehensive formulæ, which it regards as the only real and legitimate object of the pursuit of Truth. And Progressive Politics seeing a tendency to equalization in the training and moral independence of large social masses, hastens to construct the state of the future on the principle of an absolutely dead social level, allowing no functions to any, that do not accrue equally to all. Now this kind of reasoning resembles that of an astronomer who, on the discovery that the earth was moving rapidly from the sun, should immediately infer that it would be soon quite beyond the range of solar light and heat, and proceed to calculate the amount of terrestrial fire necessary for our use, when that beneficent influence had been withdrawn. It does not require philosophy, but only common observation, to determine the present drift of tide or current; but it does require a philosophic eye to discover the law of its increase or diminution, continuance, period, and return. The limits which a tendency will reach, the causes that will arrest its subsequent progress, and the law of its future course, such questions are usually ignored by these rectilineal philosophers, who perceive only the tangential force of the instant, and forget the central attractions which restrain the erratic element in humanity within given bounds. Now we are willing to admit that the tendency to the equalization of human rights both in theory and practice is really apparent in history. The only question that affects the truth of Mr. Spencer's theory, is this however, whether it has any tendency to reach his ideal state, in which those rights and those only should be interdicted to each that could possibly interfere with the similar right of another to act likewise. History alone does not decide. At present there is no visible disposition to adopt a maxim that defines 'wrong' as meaning merely 'exclusive,' and 'right' as equivalent to "susceptible of indefinite repetition without mutual interference." But human nature herself, in teaching us that other relations besides that of

strict equality, are of *native* growth in human character, assists us to decide. It is natural enough that the diffusion of knowledge and education, by rendering more uniform the conditions under which men live, should pull down these distinctions which difference of external circumstance had alone created, and so render less vast the distances between the duties and rights both of classes and individuals, reducing social differences nearer to those lowest terms of natural variety, which are not the result of non-essential circumstances, but are elementary and innate. Men have more equal opportunities, and therefore more similar responsibilities, and more similar rights, than in the infancy of history. But this affords no presumption that men's relative positions will ever approximate beyond a certain limit, or that while their several capacities and duties essentially differ, their rights can ever be forced into a mere artificial identity.

We will conclude by shortly sketching how a truer theory of human nature than Mr. Spencer has, we think, attained, would lead to a truer appreciation of the authoritative element in moral life, and a less mean estimate of the value and functions of government. Of that theory the radical errors appear to us twofold; the absence of any perception of a constituted positive authority within the mind; and again the failure to discern any varied natural relations between the individual and those amongst whom he lives, such we mean as would fix his position within those graduated social ranks which both reach above and fall beneath him. To the former error it is due that he has furnished us with a merely negative moral principle, that only tells us what his normal man would abstain from, not what he would do; and that he regards the various human faculties as carrying with them a perfect natural authority to resist all restrictions imposed upon their exercise: and to the latter error (*viz.* his omission to notice that every one is intended, and fitted by his affections, to live amongst superiors and inferiors as well as equals) we owe it that his law has taken for its unit of privilege, that which is capable of equal distribution to all. Believing both these principles to be perfectly erroneous, we are prepared to assert that Conscience is an active commander enjoining positive action, not a mere sentinel challenging

trespass; and again that we have within us, from the first, visible moral preparations for social *inequality*, faculties which are only drawn out by being placed amongst those who have to some extent, rights over us, and those over whom we have rights. We can advance with Mr. Spencer no further than the very first step in his social ethics. That the various impulses, tendencies, or faculties of man (Bishop Butler's 'Propensions') carry with them their own claim to exercise, we willingly admit. But that the limits to such exercise are the mere compromises necessary to present social collisions, arising in external necessities, not from an internal law, we entirely deny. In the various conflicts of passions and affections within ourselves we are first made aware of a principle that determines their worth, as distinct from their vehemence, a principle revealing to us the difference between moral authority and impulsive force; and in the consciousness of that creative power of our own wills which is summoned by conscience to give effect to its decision by putting down the insurrection of the passions, we are made to feel that all natural authority must have a competent executive force at its disposal, if its decisions are to be anything more than piteous comments on inevitable ill. And thus from the mind itself rises the habit of looking above the tumult of desires and wants, to a higher authority which may finally judge their disputes, and which is supported by a might that can carry those judgments into effect. Hence too the true meaning of a moral *right*, as the due scope for any human tendency in those cases where conscience does not postpone its claim to higher considerations; in other words, the *prima facie* liberty to gratify any desire in bar of which no moral judgment has been issued. Thus moral rights properly include all our duties as well as those innocent pleasures, which there is no higher moral claim to forbid. Thus, for example, the love for information is both duty and right, when it struggles with our sluggish love of ease; a right alone, when it rises as a mere lonely impulse with no bar to its satisfaction; and neither duty nor right, but their infraction where its gratification would be a conquest over an impulse of public philanthropy or of private affection. Hence we have a moral 'right' to do anything not wrong, but it is not necessarily a

moral duty; inasmuch as between duty and sin there lies a considerable sphere of uncontested neutral actions, the performance of which is a natural right, but not a natural obligation. Thus the mere native urgency of our instincts or faculties which supplies Mr. Spencer with his only idea of natural authority, truly supplies, we conceive, only the least worthy element in that idea; furnishing in reality not even a presumption in favour of unrestricted scope for development, but only in favour of some more or less limited sphere for exercise. We might call perhaps this natural claim of all human faculties for fair hearing, and due exercise, 'presumptive authority' as distinguished not only from that actual obligation which can quote the direct command of conscience, but even from that permissive authority which has at least its passive sanction; so that this lowest kind of moral claim constitutes only an initial, by no means an absolute right, far less a positive duty (which is the title Mr. Spencer claims for it), being always liable to be overridden in any particular case by the express judgment of conscience in favour of any higher faculty.

Now carrying up these ideas derived from the individual moral life of man, into the wider sphere of society, it is not difficult to see how they disperse at once the ultra voluntarist views of government. The great purpose from which government arises is no longer supposed to be the division of theoretic liberty in equal grains among the various units of society: it is not (after assuming the 'presumptive rights' of all to be equal, because all men have the same faculties,) to proceed to give an exactly identical social sphere to all, without inquiry whether men's actual rights and duties in the least approximate; but it springs from the necessity for harmonizing as far as possible the actual arrangement of social forces with that which society would assume were the intellectual range, and social sympathies, and moral earnestness of all its members sufficient to prevent the rude shocks of selfish passion, and the jarring obstinacy of individual ignorance, and the inevitable one-sidedness of narrow duties from disturbing the natural organization of the social frame. In other words, the function of government springs from the natural habit of looking for an authority, competent both by position

and strength, to decide the conflict, and organize the otherwise inefficient, even when unanimous, desires, of the individuals constituting the social body. It arises from the necessity of leadership, as well to survey and give the boldest and best expression to the common desires of men, as to suppress the repulsive forces caused by conflicting desires which would otherwise explode and shatter the whole social frame. And for both these purposes a government must have not only the high moral position and wide intellectual survey that make its moral decisions worthy of respect, and its interpretation of social wants competent and discriminating, but the necessary disposable force to make them decisive. And now what becomes of the reasoning of our author? What limits are necessarily imposed on the use of this power? Clearly no principle which demands the least possible limitation of individual self-will; for we have seen that the absence of such limitation may be a moral evil, while there is no kind of moral conviction that forbids such a limitation. Where individual avarice or indolence prefers to leave children uneducated to the expense or labour of giving them moral training, does the conscience of the community revolt in horror from the infraction of the father's right to liberty, but smile complacently on his breach of duty towards his child? Clearly moreover no necessity for imposing the same limitation on all need fetter such a power; for we have seen that the rights and duties of various stations are themselves various; and the purpose of the State is to organize social rights, and prevent individual might from invading the sphere of others, not with ostentatious semblance of justice to equalize privileges, without any possibility of equalizing powers, and to overlook the most solemn duties of each class, because they do not happen to be the duties of all. The limitations by which the power of a State is bounded, are clearly only to be drawn out of its own nature. If it is to be the expression of the enlightened conscience of a nation, with regard to social duties, it must command respect or it will cease to command obedience. Its function is derived from the individual conscience, and its power from social consent, and it cannot outrage the one, without forfeiting the other. And as it does not originate but derives the law of its existence

from the private conscience, its function is clearly not to pilot men on the adventurous path of new and difficult duty (which is the office of a religious church), but to demand ready compliance with those principles of duty that are generally admitted, and capable of being enforced. But as no force can compel rectitude of purpose, it would usually interfere only where a breach of duty affects others than the transgressor, or where the indignation of society needs emphatic expression. Or again its function might often be to give clear expression to those floating aspirations and wants of society, which can be discerned and carried into effect only from a station that commands wide survey over it. But while keeping within such natural limits as these, our theory of government does not require us to take alarm at the constant hue and cry about injustice to private consciences, which it is maintained that government-interference always causes. The right of government to overrule individual opposition is clearly involved in the very purpose for which it arises. The question at issue in such cases is merely this: Is it not more desirable that a recognized moral authority should occasionally inflict penalties on those who imagine that they bear them in the cause of duty, than that individual oppression should be constantly doing the same thing without law or principle? The hardship to the private conscience *must* be caused by the non-interference of government, on a large scale; it *may* be caused by its interference, on a much smaller scale. The evil in both cases is of the same kind, but of very different magnitude. The Quaker may bear his self-inflicted imprisonment and come out with loss, it is true, but with no contamination. But the tax for which he bears it may save numberless consciences from guilt, or a whole invading nation from remorse for a successful crime.

We must add one word more. It is impossible not to concede to the defenders of the voluntary system, that the main function of government hitherto has been to suppress the results of evil, that its necessity has arisen in the mutiny of sin. And hence they have concluded that it is a mere offspring of evil, and that a millennial earth would have neither Parliament nor Exchequer. This we are not at all disposed to admit. Not only do we believe the

origin of government to be essentially noble, but its purposes to be as permanent as humanity, even after all wilfulness and sin had been eliminated from our nature. For though one function of the State would certainly decay with the increase of public virtue, viz. the administration of criminal justice; others we believe would arise. Leadership is requisite not merely to chain passionate desires, but to organize scattered power. And though no truly Protestant State will ever be prone to a centralization that would take duties out of their natural hands, and remove their discharge to scenes distant from the places of their birth, yet harmonious principles of organization are sadly wanted in many spheres of action, though the application and modification to special necessities ought always to be left to local authority. As public virtue and knowledge increase, the collective will and wish of the people become less divided, and new modes of organization become possible that were before excluded by the utter discord of consciences and wills. Just as the closeness of family union affords many modes of united action impossible to larger bodies, so if government becomes less and less needful for the decision of conflicts, there must arise for it vast possibilities of successful organization, now unknown. Though the awakening of individual responsibility may tend at first to cripple governments, yet as the moral powers are educated into greater harmony, and one-sided views combined into the fulness of truth, the influence once permitted to government from the ignorance and carelessness of society, and wrenched from its hands on the first intense divergence of opening thought and conscience, will be fully restored by their maturer wisdom and harmonized will.

And assuredly the mere banishment of moral evil could not abolish the purpose of government. For while diversities of gifts continue (and there is every sign that increasing culture does not assimilate but multiply varieties of character), men must continue to leave their social life very much in the hands of those whose noble duty it is to survey, organize and regulate the forces of society at large. For unless these social powers were tamed and guided by others, there would be neither room nor leisure for the men, who in various ways now push their efforts into the

infinite unconquered realms of art, science, and religion, while depending on the protection and help of those who will ascertain and define for them to some extent their social position, rights and duties.

It seems to us that the same inference may be drawn as to the *permanent* value of the institution of government, from the rapidly growing science of social *statistics*, which springs up, just when the wide influence of individuals is beginning palpably to decline, to give definite laws to social life, and so to elevate the art of government from the mere tact and skill of empiric observation, into the surer position of scientific knowledge. This remarkable science, which Quetelet has done so much to elaborate, gives us laws for social masses, which are not applicable to individual life, but from which the variations of strictly individual cases are entirely eliminated. Such laws which without reference to the separate moral causes, tell us social effects as a definite certainty,—which can estimate, for instance, the amount of crime, and death, and forgetfulness, in a nation without any reference to the individual centres of sin, and disease, and carelessness in which they originate—do they not seem meant specially to guide the conduct of the statesman by enabling him to trace the leading features and laws of society as a distinct whole? To the moralist or the religionist such laws can be of little use; for they must trace the moral effects to their *moral* source, and remove them little by little through individual influence. But to the statesman they are, what the known laws of life are to the physician; they tell him the symptoms, the constitution, the constant tendencies, with which he has to deal. We cannot believe that these accumulating laws of social life have no reference at all to any guiding power that may use and regulate them, no application wider than their use in the regulation of Insurance Offices, or a few institutions that equalize the risks of human life. A national life quite distinct from the mere aggregation of individual lives, clearly points to a sphere for a national purpose and will, that is no mere aggregate of the multiplied centres of individual will.

But we must conclude; not however without passing over many other criticisms and illustrations from Mr. Spencer's book, that we had wished to set down. This

able work is admirably adapted to exhibit as a logical whole, the principles and conclusions of his party. The coldness and barrenness of their view is due, we believe, to its original historical connection with a religious faith that had absorbed into itself all the energy and dignity to which the state usually lays claim. Severed from that connection, the impotence which this theory ascribes to the moral faculty, is doubly repulsive and dangerous. It makes it indeed into a mere political instrument, to ensure every man from the close pressure of his neighbours; and like the balls with which the street-juggler clears away the importunate crowd, when it has once gained for each a little space for unfettered movement, it is laid aside, while he plays what tricks his own fancy may suggest. And with so low a moral theory, it is impossible to keep politics from being both mean and dull. The whole moral interest is cut off, and it is turned into a poor mechanism for arriving at the wishes of the majority. There are few classes of thinkers who seem to us to maim so cruelly the most august ideas, and to surrender so gratuitously the most glorious moral opportunities of the future; to spend so much pains in blighting hope, and so much narrow enthusiasm on a few one-sided and obvious thoughts, as the extreme supporters of the voluntary system.

ART. IV.—VIOLENZIA: A TRAGEDY.

Violenzia: a Tragedy. London: John W. Parker and Son. 1851.

It is perhaps an admitted principle that the delineation of physical pain and horror is not a fit object of imitative Art. Unless the pain has high accompaniments, or high products, of a moral order, unless the horror connects itself with the imagination, the conscience, or the heart, no deep interest can be awakened, and the mind, unreached by any lofty sympathy, instinctively rejects the contemplation. Yet great painters, not indeed the greatest, have shown no respect for this canon. Rubens expends all his power and skill, all at least of power that can be enlisted when genius works at an unworthy theme, in representing a decapitated trunk with the blood bursting from the arteries. The knowledge displayed may be wonderful, the mastery over colouring almost miraculous, but the contemplation is one of pure disgust, for not one feature of the human frame is represented, that is capable of carrying the expression of a moral sentiment. Nor is Rubens, a flagrant offender in this way through the low temptation of exhibiting anatomical knowledge and coarse power, by any means a solitary example among great painters. The slaughter of the innocents, in forms and circumstances the most hideous and revolting, seems to have been a favourite subject with one so tender and ideal as Guido. It is true that in this case the horror of the blood, and anguish, and brutality, may be, not relieved, but contrasted by the loveliness and the trustingness of rosy childhood unsuspecting of harm, and by the awful beauty of maternal love, in its despair or its fury,—but these represent frames and states of human nature of quite too instinctive an order, too little connected with any thing spiritual in man, or providentially wrought out by God from woe and crime, to redeem the whole from abhorrence; nor is it possible without a strong sense of unworthiness to contemplate the creator of the Magdalene, of the Cenci, of the Archangel, occupied with the most life-like representations of savage soldiers stabbing and ripping young children, only that

they might be accompanied by thrilling pictures of the agony of mothers and the moral loveliness of babes. The subject is incapable of being connected with the moral conflicts of man, or the glorifying discipline of God, and therefore, being purely painful in itself, must be condemned by Art. No perfection of execution can justify a subject in which physical repulsiveness is relieved only by instinctive emotions. Apart from the difficulties of execution, which are foreign to the true province of Art, there can be no more of high emotion, and only a degree of less pain, in contemplating such a picture than in witnessing the actual scene. We once saw a great sculptor stand before the Laocoon lost in profound meditation; and at last to our unspeakable disappointment he broke silence in the following words; 'What can be the source of the delight we experience in contemplating a subject so terribly painful? I think it must be the difficulty of the execution.' It was a revelation that perfect taste and faultless execution may be found in one who has no deep insight into the true nature of his Art, no knowledge of its highest functions, or of the sources from which the delight it awakens springs. We should have previously thought it not possible for any one, least of all for an artist, to look upon the Laocoon with the sense of pain predominant, so noble in the face of the father is the expression of power, of mental endurance, of thoughtful, collected, superiority to all the natural signs of mere physical suffering. The Laocoon is not to be cited in proof that the expression of pain is a legitimate aim of Art. And if suffering and horror, not passing into vital union with the higher nature of man, are excluded from the imitative Arts, much less can they find any justification in Poetry. For Poetry is in reality more plastic than Sculpture or Painting, and can readily infuse or suggest higher sentiments, that cannot be addressed to the eye, or whose expression would be lost if introduced amid the predominance of revolting or violent forms. She is therefore less excusable, if she does not introduce them. In this respect Music is more akin to Poetry than either of her silent sisters; and how intolerable would be the Music that conveyed but the cries of pain, or the natural language of savage fierceness! Music may express sorrow but not suffering, passion but not evil or brutality.

At the same time it is wretched feebleness or affectation, a strange alienation of sympathy from the deep and searching ways of God, to shrink from the contemplation of Pain and Evil when they mingle in the spiritual history of man, when they reveal the saint, or make the battle-field of heroes. To say that we have too much of Pain and Evil in actual life, and therefore may shun them in fiction, is only to say that we would make Art an amusement, (that is, an *escape* from the Muse,) and looking upon the terrible realities of Life only as things to be endured, refuse to connect them with the ideals of God, with the visions and ambitions of the soul. Tragedy has its large domain in the mighty conflicts of the human heart, in the terrible war of spirit and will with circumstance, or in the more awful intestine struggles of a torn, distracted, unbalanced nature; and provided the emotions enlisted are sufficiently deep and lofty, and we are irresistibly compelled to gaze in trembling awe upon the conflict, as upon one into which we feel that every human heart might be drawn, it matters not what are the issues, where the victory lies, whether with the nobler or the lower elements. It is in the real power of the mighty antagonists at strife, and in the awful feeling of each heart that, if circumstances assisted, it might itself be flung on such a tempest, that the fearful interest lies. Whatever amount of evil, of horrible outrage, of revolting circumstance, may in actual life conduct to such tragic positions may surely legitimately be introduced into tragic fictions, whenever the vivid contemplation of them becomes indispensable before the nature of the *moral* conflict can be realized, and our shuddering sympathy engaged. This is conceded to all the great Dramatists even in cases where the feebler and sinning nature is dominant, as in modern Tragedy it almost invariably is, and when the deepest lesson that is taught is the intimate connection of our own hearts with the passions embodied, the knowledge that, if God so ordered the circumstances, there are elements in us that might be forced into the same conflicts, with the same doubtful or guilty issues. Macbeth's ambition, irresolution, exposure to temptation through the tauntings of a woman turned into a fiend by an inhuman lust of place, his murderous deeds, and lost hardihood in wrong when once the barriers of his better nature were broken down;

Iago's hellish villany, Othello's monstrous jealousy, the innocent Desdemona's foul murder and fouler aspersion; Hamlet's metaphysical weakness and hesitation, his vacillation between purpose and action—his father's murder, his mother's adulterous implication and guilt, Ophelia's desertion, madness, and suicide,—and to the whole no end but confusion and blood; the foolish, extravagant, outrageous Lear, respectable only for his sufferings' sake and his indomitable pride, with his kites of daughters,—here in the four greatest Tragedies that exist in any language are collected almost all of revolting evil and of agonizing suffering that it is possible to conceive, and with issues which can only be tolerated because they are the terrible liabilities of human nature. If where the catastrophe is as revolting as the plot, where the curtain falls upon irretrievable crime and misery, the introduction of such horrors is manifestly legitimate into high Tragedy as the necessary conditions of the conflict which it paints, what true principle can rightfully forbid their introduction into a plot which involves the very same struggles, but where the issues are different, and the victory is given to magnanimity of soul? If we are to endure these contemplations only because they are possible to human nature, and where there is no issue at all in which we can delight, are we to turn from them in disgust when out of these possibilities human nature emerges strong and holy, clothed indeed with an awful purity and majesty which no feebler trials could bestow? Is greatness of soul less interesting, less legitimate, than greatness of passion? Are we to admit the introduction of horrible guilt when it leads only to violence and ruin, and not admit it when it leads to spiritual mastery and command? Is any platform of Evil to be conceded when the struggles of the merely natural man are to be represented, and the very same platform to be pronounced too hideous for endurance when it is raised for the conflicts of a spiritual hero and saint? What is the reason that people will bear any amount of tragic carnality and horror when the nobler nature is defeated, and protest against them, as if all decency was outraged, when the nobler nature is set forth triumphant? Is it the hot-house imbecility which supposes that goodness is always fed on bread and milk, grows strong by suction, and never has to

gain its muscle by terrible struggles on burning ground at the very edge of the crater? Or is it the baby view of Providence, which we have seen advanced in one of our critical journals against this Tragedy of *Violenzia*, that Christian magnanimity cannot be born of such terrible circumstances, for the holy tenderness of God could never expose good men to such trials? In opposition to this feebleness we contend for the opening of a new School in Tragedy, in which the conflicts shall be not less terrible but the issues shall be more honourable to human nature,—and we contend for the legitimate introduction into tragic fiction of any amount of crime and woe indispensable to form the conditions and background from which a mighty spiritual portraiture comes forth. Great characters are not to be fashioned, are not to be exhibited, in common circumstances. Great strength is not to be shown but in great temptations, great nobleness but in great injuries, great serenity but in awful trials, and there are no awful trials where dire moral evil is not the root of the woe. Not to contemplate these is not to contemplate the conditions without which the highest spiritual greatness cannot be assured; whilst, at the same time, every one is willing to contemplate them when they are only the conditions for the exhibition of the violence and mastery of unchastened passions. We fully agree with the principle laid down by the author of *Violenzia* in his self-justifying preface, that “the contest of the higher and lower affections, not only the swaying of alternating impulses, and the efforts of the will (for these must be included in all delineations of character),—but the conscious and intensely anxious struggle of a religious spirit to conform the life, under difficult circumstances, to the ideal of duty, and the requisitions of the divine affections, may be a fit and a lofty subject for a dramatic poet, and not the less so if the nobler nature be represented victorious.” We grant the author all he here claims. We grant him the introduction into his “difficult circumstances” of whatever painful and revolting things are essential conditions of the mighty trial and “struggle” of his hero—but if he introduces any thing shocking and repulsive which is not necessary to this struggle, and without which the mighty conflict and its great issues might equally well have been exhibited, so far

his plot contains matter of needless offence. Let us try *Violenzia* by this test.

Ethel is the hero, lord of Felborg, and in love with *Violenzia*. *Violenzia* is as pure as *Desdemona*, but unlike *Desdemona*, with a vein of vanity that could on occasion lead to an access of innocent levity. She dwells with her two brothers, lords of Ingelwald, honourable men in their wild way, on the whole rude specimens of the natural man, with noticeable differences which are not however very important to the plot. An incursion of Swedes and Danes, with whom their country is at war, in the vicinity of the castle of Ingelwald, compels her removal for personal safety to the court, and brings her under the notice of the king. The king is a monster of lust; and he has a minister of his pleasures, who serves all his ends, and argues away all his scruples, Malgodin, who in fact acts the part of a familiar demon. The king pays his addresses to *Violenzia*, knowing that she is the betrothed of Ethel; and through fear of some violent encounter, *Violenzia* permits her brothers and Ethel to depart for the war, leaving her in these perils. Finding her inaccessible to his wishes the king resolves upon violence, and *Violenzia* though suspicious of his purpose fears to fly to Ethel and her brothers, because through a forged letter she is made to believe that they already deem her faithless and guilty. The horrible crime is perpetrated, and *Violenzia* in her unspeakable misery and despair escapes to cast herself a dishonoured wreck at the feet of Ethel, to speak before she dies the innocence of her soul, and to protest, but with the tenderness of dying and absolute love, against the distrust that wrought her involuntary ruin. Out of these circumstances arise the terrible conflicts of Ethel. In particulars of stormy suspicion, and against direct testimony, he puts from him the smallest distrust of the purity of *Violenzia*. Nothing can be nobler than this exhibition of faith in a heart that he had so known and loved, of which he felt that he could not doubt, if he was to retain any confidence in the honesty of his own soul. But though this is finely conceived and exquisitely expressed, we do not know whether the effect would not have been greater, and the trust shine forth as bright, if Ethel had lingered but for a moment to weigh the evidence, and strike the

balance with the force of the overwhelming proofs of her purity, and of the impossibility of guilt, that were harboured and recorded in his inmost soul. As it is, all the circumstances of suspicion do not produce even an image upon his mind. The sentiment is more perfect, but the position is passionless in its serenity. It seems like the reliance of infallible knowledge, rather than the noble confidence which is born only of mortal insight, which may therefore have seen amiss, yet burns bright and true through thick clouds of mystery which cannot darken the heart though they trouble the reason. It is this conflict of the heart with all the outwardly clear circumstances of evidence which we think might have brought victory out of struggle, without smirching Ethel's faith in *Violenzia*. But Ethel's great trial is with the impulse of revenge against the brutal king. And here too we must think that the natural man ought for a time to have had more way. The victory is too easy, the magnanimity too much within instant reach. Some time must be given for the mind to grow familiarized with such overwhelming injury and pollution, before clearness of moral judgment and greatness of soul can be attained. It would show that a man's thoughts must have already dwelt upon such unspeakable wrongs, and become prepared by their contemplation, if he could pass without more of disturbed faith, or agonized revenge, into the passionless presence of God. This is the frame to be finally reached, but hardly for the tempted, or afflicted, one to breathe almost spontaneously on the so recent announcement of such bitter woes, woes in which the suffering to himself is as nothing in comparison with the outrage which must make the earthly existence of another dearer to him than himself, one long sense of intolerable degradation and pining for death. Ethel reaches this elevation, this calm air of God's judgment seat, not indeed at a moment's warning, but too soon to carry the reader's full and satisfied sympathy, and all the abhorrence he expresses is too much the deliberate constancy of judicial sentiment without enough of the first natural outbreak of personal resentment. Will it be said that Ethel is nobler thus, than if more way had been given to the natural passions? Certainly, as a permanent frame,—but we doubt whether it is within nature

at all, we doubt especially whether it is possible to the purest minds, all whose thoughts are alien from such horrors, to recover serenity, or rather never to lose it, and to see through the unclouded judgment of God, unless time has been given to realize moral conditions so disgustingly abhorrent to all their natural states. Some of the tenderest spirits will tremble and faint at the sight of a reptile against which they entertain no unkind feeling or purpose; they cannot in its presence be assured and masterful at once. Such against hideous crimes and wrongs are our natural resentments—and we believe that even in the highest natures such strong sentiments do and ought to appear, unless the evil has been long present to the thought. We do not believe that it is any part of goodness not to be deeply moved by villany, or not to lose its equanimity for a moment when suddenly thrown into conditions so abnormal. The first instinct of all pure natures must be one, not of personal revenge indeed, but of deep hate, not the hate that would rejoice to inflict suffering, but the hate that would strike at the life of whatever is so abhorrent to God and man. It cannot for a moment be doubted that Ethel's permanent feeling and conduct are right, but only whether there might not have been transition processes of conflict that would have been more dramatic, more true also to human nature, and not less honourable to him. We do not deny that some very forcible expression is given to these processes of passion—but human nature might righteously have had more way.* It will be seen hereafter how he punishes, makes passion wait on judgment, and inflicts vengeance though he takes no revenge. For the present we have unfolded enough of the plot to enable us to introduce with effect some passages in which the characters speak for themselves.

In the first scene, which is the only one in which the lovers meet tranquilly, some knowledge is conveyed in a natural way of the inward moods and peculiarities of the principal characters, which are in very delicate harmony with all that follows. *Violenzia* confesses the woman's weakness, the miserable thought of her beauty, which for

* On another perusal of Ethel's transition processes we are compelled to speak less positively. We shall give the reader the means of judging for himself, and of correcting, if needs be, our criticism.

a moment makes her giddy to the king's flatteries, and so deprives her afterwards, in her need, of a refuge with her brothers, by producing their harsh and harshly spoken belief in her levity and frailty. She and Ethel, about to part, solemnly pledge their love to one another. He asks her if she has made sure of the quality of her love.

“ If it be love,
At the whisper of thy name, wherever heard,
To feel the life-blood stopping at my heart,
To know all things a blank, dearest friends' news
Trivial, all old distractions nothing worth,
But the empty time only impediment
That severs me from thee ; to feel me unworth,
Yet to believe under thy tutelage,
As I do know my utmost should not want,
Something of this light frame might yet be moulded
Worthy of Ethel's wife ; if it be love,
Which has so changed my vain, inconstant spirit,
That I beweeep frailties late gloried in,
And think this beauty, lately my life's idol,
And that I did believe outstarred all nature,
But worthy as the pleasure of thine eye—
If these be love—Alas ! I speak it coldly,
Violenzia loves, and dares avow it boldly.”

So also there are hints of a certain coldness of manner, and introspection, in Ethel, which may serve to connect his temperament with his after loftiness and self-possession in the extremity of trial.

“ Of a spirit proud,
Over constant, lost in thought, oft melancholy,
Unused in word or gesture to betray
Affections deepest felt ; therefore cold seeming,
But in my heart most true, most true indeed ;
I have more wants than I have wit to tell.
Bear with them, sweet.”

So again when the king's brother wishes to serve under him, Haveloc complains of the coldness of his reception, on which Robert, Violenzia's brother, exclaims :—

“ Who ? Ethel, cold !
When you have lived with him a little week,
He'll love you like a brother.”

It is by such fine hints as these that the dramatist, who cannot describe character, or tell his story, prepares his way.

There is one passage in the opening scene which contains a sentiment against which we must protest, that the fulness of earthly love cuts off by its satisfaction the heavenly aspiration. This is not the natural tendency or suggestion of blessedness or beauty. The exquisite passage in which Ion avows that he could be sure of immortality only when he saw it in the soul that looked from Clemanthe's face, is of a deeper truth. It is the presence of loveliness and bliss, not the absence of them, that excites thirst and creates faith. In an ordinary lover one would not question a compliment too curiously, but Ethel from his loftiness must be supposed to speak true feeling, and this is not true in itself, nor true to him :—

“ I in thee

See such a gift as when I first possessed it
Did recreate my soul ; yea, even yet
Doth make me sceptic of the heavenly shore.
For what needs paradise by poets feigned,
Or those celestial gardens past the grave,
If here on the condemned, slandered earth
Perfect felicity visiteth ? I, in thine eye,
Or the touch of that white hand, or thy low voice
Whispering thou lov'st me, have such full content,
As nothing more can add to 't.”

Violenzia betrays her dangerous sensibility to flattery in her first interview with the king, whose advances, by the way, are somewhat too strong for a first introduction ; and this applies to the whole of the king's wooing, both by himself, and through his agent Malgodin. The matter is precipitately managed. In the solitude of her chamber she repents herself thus :—

“ How much unworthy of my noble love
Have I this evening cast myself away,
And been the prey of idle vanity.
I have sucked the poison of sweet flattery,
And may digest the venom. O sad weakness,
That only doth repent, and not prevent.”

The second act opens with a passage of great beauty,

into which there have been wrought with fine skill both marks of character, and forecastings of destiny. Ethel is shown to be the man to wrestle with the fate that awaits him. He is in the camp on a hill-top with his captain Cornelius, at break of day.

COR. "Why are you so long silent?"

ETH. Stillness of morning,
And the ineffable serenity
And peace of young creation bind my lips.
O who would mar the season with dull speech,
That must tie up our visionary meanings
And subtle individual apprehensions
Into the common tongue of every man?
And of the swift and scarce detected visitants
Of our illusive thoughts seek to make prisoners,
And only grasp their garments. Well! let's talk.

COR. Indeed no language can express the hour.

ETH. It is the very time of contemplation,
More rich for being instinct with coming life.
Short breathing space between oblivion's sleep
And the world's tumult. Day's virginity,
Unmarried yet to action, nor made mother
Of all that brood of intricate consequents,
Quick progeny of her ephemeral womb,
That twining with their brothers of past birth
Weave the vast web of circumstance. O think of it!
We are creative gods, and whether we will or no,
Upon the present moment we beget
Shapes of the future time. Most awful present!
That swifter than the winged lightning flies,
And more irrevocable; subtly charged
With some small influence, some diminution,
Or fine accession to our immortal character,
Making a difference that shall never die,
In what we might have been. Have you heard of it?
To-day we try our edges on the Swede,
For the relief of Engelborg.

COR. The rumour

Got wind last night. Many a young starting blood
That never yet saw itself sluiced in battle,
Beats thick with expectation, and awaits
The trumpet's summons.

ETH. 'T will not be till noon.

O peaceful morning tide, with what rude deeds
Will they deface thy evening. Is it not heavenly?

The air is cool and still ; soft dawn shoots up
 Into the fleecy heaven, that, like a mother
 Uncovering her rosy naked babe,
 Looks down upon the tender new-born day.
 Strange prelude to a battle.

COR. True, it is piteous,
 And best not thought of.

ETH. Piteous it is indeed,
 And yet not best not thought of, so is nothing.
 We dare not faint at woe and violence,
 When we are sure our cause is with the right.
 And gaping wounds, and the red skeleton death,
 Painted in blood of many slaughtered men,
 Though they may stir our gorge more, are in themselves,
 And should be to our spirits, less abhorrent
 Than living men, walking like sepulchres
 Of their dead spiritual lives.

COR. I have seen such men.

ETH. So sick, I have seen many, and some dead.
 He is noble that can hang a shield of patience
 Between himself and injuries, but most base
 That sees injustices unremedied.

COR. That did you never.

ETH. No, nor you, Cornelius,
 Nor any man who doth believe in heaven,
 But when he sees a wrong must war with it—
 By sufferance, if sufferance best abates it ;
 But only then. And always in his spirit
 Eager antagonism, not passive spirits,
 Oppose the dangerous devil's mastery ;
 But sworded and aggressive warriors,
 Who with swift charge beat down his mustered ranks,
 And all day long maintain the weary war,
 And die in faith of unseen victory.

COR. Warriors of God. Servants of God. Great titles.

ETH. Oh, that we might be worthy to be such !
 Our youth is like this morning, and we stand
 Between the night of our unconscious childhood
 And the world's monstrous battle, whose loud roar
 Grows in our ears. Well, when we mix in it,
 God keep us in his hand !"

The following scene between *Violenzia* and the king is very powerful, but her taunts and plain speaking would be not unlikely to provoke the last violence of a brutal nature. We ought to say, however, that the whole style of senti-

ment and language removes the tragedy from the present day to the date of our earlier dramatists.

VIO. "Call it not love, for therein you blaspheme,
Like men that, from their own polluted thoughts,
Build up their worshipped deities. Love loves not
Self, but in the answering breast of the beloved
It consecrates a temple to its joy,
And therein ministering it finds true peace,
Though all be lost at home. Yours is not love,
But base self-liking, apeing love's fair guise.
Me you love not, but love yourself in me,
To use me for your passion and my shame.

KING. The folly of proud women! that love chastity,
That love their loss, or love to seem to do.
Some act, none think it. Seeming-sainted Dian
Best knew what coldness means. In heaven she showed
A virgin face; but stooping to green earth,
Couched often on the starlit Latmian hill,
Sucking the warm breath of Endymion.
The base boy blabbed—from me no breath shall move;
Trust me, I'll be as secret as the grave.

VIO. You speak of that you cannot comprehend,
As you have never known it, and confound
Things different—chastity and reputation.
My silver reputation that should be,
You that profess a secrecy after shame,
Have dared before hand tarnish. Shame on liars!

KING. Ha!

VIO. You are not angry. Why, I do but say
You *have* broken truth's law—do you no such wrong
As you do me, when, with an artful tongue
You would persuade me, being innocent,
To break the law of sacred chastity,
Which is the fostering air of the unstained soul;
And they that with foul thoughts dare cloud it over,
Shut out the light and intercourse of heaven.
Nay, beyond this you wrong me—you would have me
Break my sworn faith. What boots it you to swear
With these thick vows you love me, when the same breath
Persuades to perjury? Who shall believe you?
More; I must offer up a love that beats
In my heart's centre; and a man that loves me
As truly as you do falsely, sacrifice
To the depths of shame and grief; that rich affection
Given to my keeping pour on the wasteful ground.

You ask me for my virgin innocence,
 You ask me for my heaven registered oath,
 My deep implanted love, my all of virtue,
 What give you in return?—Have you no voice?
 And yet you call it love! You call it love!
 Great Heaven! upon what ill-deserving heads
 Hang'st thou thy crowns."

Cornelius is sent as a messenger from the camp to the court, and bears a letter from Ethel to Violenzia. This letter is accidentally dropped, and through Malgodin's villany a forgery is imitated from it, in which Ethel is made to believe her fallen, and to reproach her with her vileness. She suspects the king's purposes, but dares to trust herself to uncertain dangers, rather than fly to a lover or to brothers who have lost faith in her, and covered her with insult. At last nothing is left for her but to go to Ethel, speak her innocence, and die. Meanwhile Cornelius has brought to him the story of her infamy, to which he attaches not the lightest credit. We give large portions from this scene.

ETH. "Look, Cornelius.
 If I should say you lied in what you tell me,
 What would you put against it?
 COR. Your close friendship,
 And knowledge of my truth.
 ETH. Why, so I do.
 Therefore I say not, in your facts you lie,
 But in the consequents you idly draw,
 And base suspicions. Yet, if thus far I trust you,
 How much upon the faith of my beloved
 Shall I not more be bold, and to more knowledge
 Accord an answering confidence! Go, Cornelius!
 I never thought to find a cause to say
 You were so much unworthy. You that knew her,—
 Cornelius, whom she called her friend! Nay, go!
 And till your slanderous thoughts be burnt away,
 Look not upon my face to call me friend.
 COR. You do me wrong. I'll go, not to return.
 I seek no love of one who dares discredit me
 Even a hair's breadth.

[Exit Cornelius.

[A storm—heavy rain.

ETH. How the wind rushes, and the gusty rain
 Comes pattering in the pauses of the blast.

Cornelius will soon repent of this.
 Meanwhile Violenzia lives at ease in the court,
 And when these tardy footed wars are past
 I'll knit her mine for ever. What a spirit
 Of undisturbed peace makes visit here;
 And in my soul a calm delight keeps house,
 Ranging its chambers like a white-stoled babe:
 As if no jarring of the ill-fitting world,
 Or tyranny of petty circumstance,
 Could ever more invade me; and those thoughts
 Brooding imagination doth invent,
 Of perfect harmony and bliss unstained,
 Were real, and the dusty time-worn world
 Hidden in second spring-time. Can it be,
 That these soft spirits may make apes of us,
 And, while we nourish sweet content at home,
 Calamity strike abroad? As I have heard—
 What's that?—Is 't true that spirits ride the wind?
 Most melancholy ones then. Hark—again!—
 The sound of weeping—making awful pauses
 Of the short hushes of the storm.—Who sighs
 Against my threshold?—My warm blood runs cold,
 And gathers at my heart. What, am I mad?
 Let's see what may be seen. *[Goes out and returns.*

The empty dark,
 Wherein no star doth pierce the thick eclipse,
 But all is shrouded in a watery veil.
 Again! Again! That's human!—Who goes there?
*[Exit. Returns carrying Violenzia. She
 throws herself on her face before him.]*

ETH. Violenzia!

VIO. O, hide me! O, my misery!

ETH. What art thou, that thus bred of sudden night
 Shakest my knees with sobbing? Stand! stand up!

VIO. Lay not thy hand upon me.

ETH. In my breast

Strange thoughts take substance, and begin to shake
 My soul's foundation.—Thou—thou—art not?—Speak!

VIO. I am!—I am!—The king!

ETH. Away! Away!

Hell hath no words for it.

VIO. Alas! alas! alas!

ETH. By heaven, 't is midnight, and the lunatic moon
 Peeps through my tent-holes.

Art thou the thing that thou pretend'st to be,
 Or some accursed midnight wandering ghost,

Come to afflict me? With my bright sword's point
I'll try thy substance.

VIO. Mercy! O, have mercy!

ETH. Where's Mercy, since she hath forsook the heavens?
Who guides? who guides the terrible machine?
O, Violenzia, take back thy words,
And make me subject to a false alarm,
Or with my sword I'll break these gates of life
That shut in living death.

[*Pointing the sword against himself.*]

VIO. Alas!—alas!

ETH. I dream!—I dream! It is not yet near day.

VIO. Speak, speak to me!

ETH. Say'st thou? Stand up, I say!
Why beat'st thou with thy forehead on the ground?
This is no shame; This is our misery.
Lift up again that streaming face of thine
Wet with unutterable woe. Look up!

VIO. Touch me not, Ethel! Oh, your touch is fire!
And burns my abhorred miserable flesh.
How shall I break these walls, or how get free?
I am cased in such pollution as makes sick
My soul within me. O, that these my tears
Could quite dissolve my substance; and the ground
Soak up my detested being. Would I were dead!
Would I were dead! were dead!

ETH. Peace! shaken child!
Control the greatness of your agony.
Alas! I cannot. My perturbed soul,
Like an imprisoned mist, doth shake and wave,
And I perceive no light.

VIO. To doubt my truth!
Oh it was base in you! Nay! to make surety
So strong that you dare call me vile. Ay, now!
Now, call me vile,—it suits,—now call me stained!
Heap epithets upon me, none so foul
As can express my misery: but then—
I was as clear as daylight.

ETH. Alas! what mean you?

VIO. Your letter! Oh, your letter. Did you not write it?
O most egregious fool! He did not write it.

ETH. Nothing but love; what did you get from me?

VIO. O me, I nothing know; only I think
The heaven above's unroofed, and there's no bar
Against the powers of evil."

There is something very touching in Ethel's first meeting with his friends, and his submission to the unchanged face of nature, the dewy grass, and voice of birds, when all with him is changed and dark for ever. His two captains, Olave and Cornelius, spur him to revenge.

ETH. "O God! I know whom thou afflict'st with griefs
Thou look'st for great things from him. If my acts
Must grow up to the measure of my woe,
I shall amaze the world.

OL. Ay, with revenge!—

Whose fiery wing shall overtake your shame,
And blind the eyes of them that look on it.

ETH. Who plagues me with revenge? Am I not mad enough?
Have I no devil here? Cornelius!
Is it not said we must forgive our foes?

COR. So it is said.

OL. For priests! for priests! not men.

ETH. For mine own wrongs, I could as soon forgive them,
As dip my hand in water, but that she—
O most accursed monster! Why the sun
Would not too boldly look on her. Foul thoughts
Did from her presence and fair virgin eyes,
Like ghosts from daylight, fly ashamed. Alas!
Was there no way to strike me singly—none?
But for my sins must needs another soul,
And in myself a dearer, nobler self,
My life's life—my heart's blood—my air—my centre!
Must that for me be shattered?—Oh, yes! yes!

* * * * * What I shall do,

As yet I know not. This I will not do,—
Now, when my soul is mad, and I perceive not
The right from wrong,—let my blind rage take wing,
And the great tasks and terrible purposes,
With which Heaven sets my soul and martyrs me,
Mix in confusion irretrievable.
Yet not the less, for this my slow delay,
Will I be swift in execution,
Steadfast and frightful to the guilty soul
Of him that did this thing. Leave me, good friends.

* * * * *

I shall go mad if I do think of it.
What's to be done? Back, back, ye wandering thoughts,
That like whipt hounds hang with reverted eyes,
Back to the carcass of my grief. O villain!

Away. It is some devil whispers me.
 What! No revenge? Young, young too, and a soldier:
 No noble rage? Must we endure like clods,
 Under the heavy tread of tyranny?
 Whereto then, had we this quick fiery spirit,
 That starts at injury; the bruised worm turns,
 And man framed delicate and sensitive,
 On whose fine soul injustice drops like fire,
 Must he bear all? Stay there! Ethel of Felborg,
 Art thou so personal? Affects it thee?
 Such deeds strike deeper. This is not a thing
 The impulsive moods of angry men may mix in:
 No, nor admits a passionate remedy.
 But an occasion, when men standing amazed,
 The visible hand of awful judgment should
 Crush up iniquity, and retribution
 Divine walk on the earth. No! no revenge.
 Teach me, O terrible God!
 I do believe, witness these swift hot tears,
 I do believe thou lovest me, even in this.
 And therefore now thy sovran hand put forth,
 And my dejected, desultory soul
 Bind up to thy great meaning!"

Violenzia's brothers, impelled by their hatred to the king, though still believing in their sister's frailty, join their forces to those of the Swedes and Danes, and for revenge turn traitors to their country. Here is another terrible trial for Ethel. He, the most injured, has to stand fast for his country's sake, and turn his sword upon his friends. He wins a great battle, and in the unfaltering execution of duty consigns to execution the brothers who would sacrifice their country to their private wrongs. They escape from their prison through the weakness of Cornelius, whom they persuade that Ethel desires to be released from the fearful duty of their death. They are retaken in the act of killing the guilty Violenzia as they suppose, and immediately executed. Meanwhile Ethel has resolved upon his great act of justice, the solemn trial of the king for all the abuses of his place. Perhaps one of the finest passages in the play is the soliloquy in which he meditates this purpose.

"Does the Great King choose his vice-regents here
 So carelessly, that we weak atomies

May judge them and condemn? I tremble at it.
Shall power exempt? When ministerial kings
Handle iniquity, and stain their brows,
Which should be crystal, who shall punish them?
Heaven.

Ay, but by instruments. What influence is 't
That whispers me, thou art that instrument?
O sacred Justice, warrior of God,
Strong brother of the precious weanling, Mercy,
Evener of the Fates, thou passionless arbiter,
That with a forceful and unsparing hand
Knittest me up into thy purposes,
Make me not only a base instrument,
And sword of execution; enter me
Into thy secret counsels; clear these eyes,
That are so bitterly possessed with dark,
That only in the blindness of my night
I sometimes seem to touch thy guiding hand,
But see thee never."—*Act IV. Scene II.*

When the body of Violenzia lies before him murdered
by her brothers, he overhears one of the soldiers, misled
by his calmness, say that "he cared but little for her,"—
and then is left alone with the dead.

ETH. "He did not care for her! no not a whit!
I did not love thee, Violenzia!
Be it so!—Be it so!—I can bear it.
Being dead I now may kiss thee, may I not?
Cold angel, the last time I touched those lips—
Have done! Look down, you heavenly arbitrators,
Be not harsh with me, if my heart should burst
Because a girl is dead. Nay! I can bear it.
I do not fling myself upon the ground,
And drown the thirsty earth with rainy tears;
I do not tear my hair, or beat my breast,
Or heave my labouring heart from its foundations.
I can be patient. See, my God, she bleeds!
Is there no more to bear? O, no! not thus.
I do not tax, high Heaven, thy great designs,
No, nor abate my faith a single jot.
Why, this is mercy; do I cavil at it?
She is in heaven by this, where angels flatter her,
And soothe her with white hands; I would not have her
Alive for all the world. O, she is dead!
Her beauty was the rapture of my eye,

And her affection was the corner-stone
Of all my reared existence. That was long ago ;
Chaste marriage joys, the faces of young children,
And all the sweet felicities of home,
These are old dreams, and long since vanished.
Soul-softening memory—fly ! Take up, O heart !
Peace is for angels, and we mortal labourers
Must die in harness ; I am content, great Father,
And kiss thy tender hand.
Smil'st thou, pale innocent ? Was death so kind to thee,
That came in guise so barbarous ?"—*Act IV. Scene VII.*

The last drop in Ethel's bitter cup is the discovery that he is understood, confided in, seen with a single eye, by no one—that all the purer purposes of his soul find nor comprehension, nor sympathy,—that even Cornelius could insult his truth by believing that in giving their liberty to the traitor brothers he was only acting into his hand.

ETH. "Is it strange
That our diviner impulses, great thoughts,
And all the highest, holiest life of the soul,
Should yearn for mortal sympathy and not find it,
No, not in women ? Nay, not dare to ask for 't ?

OL. What is it you say, my lord ?

ETH. Do you not see
It is the exceeding goodness of our God ?
To bind our love unto His Father's breast,
And press our heads to His bosom. We are greater
As children than as brothers.

OL. Now he dreams again ;
But they are dreams which I begin to think
Nobler than all I know. Is it possible
A man should be both saint and soldier ?

ETH. What is it to me, then, that no eye that meets mine
Shines with a kindred light ; that should I speak
That which burns in me, O, no tongue so strange
As my unfeigned utterance ; that my acts even,
Beget bewilderment, and are construed
Clean from their purposes ! This should not trouble me,
Nor mortal solitude oppress my spirit :
It is for me to walk my single road,
There is in heaven a holy sympathizer
Shall smile to find me faithful. The time flies
Wherein I should be active ; what 's the hour ?"

The last Act of the Tragedy comprises the deposition of the King, his repentance (somewhat abrupt), the crowning of his brother, and Ethel's death in the moment when his great task is ended.

"He had of late been tortured with sharp spasms
And pains about the heart, which his physician
Looked grave upon; such pains bode sudden death."

We have now enabled the reader to understand the exact nature of the conflict which Ethel had to undergo, and the victory he gained. His noble faith in *Violenzia*; the honour and love he holds her in after her ineffable misery; his superiority to revenge with the satisfaction of justice in the execution of her brothers, and the deposition of the King—these are the great positions of the Tragedy. That these exact positions could have been produced along with any softening of the more revolting incidents of the plot, we believe not possible. If this form of greatness is worthy of being contemplated, then for its sake we must endure all the pain of erecting so terrible a stage. If only a false report of *Violenzia's* wretched fate had reached Ethel and he had proceeded upon this, the action would have lost its reality, many of the most trying situations would have been essentially altered, and though in actual life the gain to her would have been infinite, in the fiction exactly the same revolting contemplations would have to occupy the reader's imagination. One thing we are bound to say, granting the author the legitimacy of his subject and his plot, his execution of it is perfectly pure in feeling, and masterly in handling. The awful nature of the trials of *Violenzia* and of Ethel is the only matter that rests upon the mind, and out of the feeling through which this purity has been preserved has arisen perhaps something of the precipitancy we have noticed. Still it may well be questioned whether such a subject is not by its very nature excluded from all high Art—whether except to a very few the horror of the incidents must not overpower all admiration of the nobleness that grows out of them—and for the most part destroy all power of vivid sympathy with it. Certain it is that the author undertakes such a subject at an immense sacrifice to himself. He pains and revolts the inmost heart of his reader; he raises images from which

the eyes turn distractedly away ; and even the few who will bear so painful a gaze for the sake of the spiritual grandeur, must make a solitary study of his poem. It may be admired in the closet ; it cannot well be talked about. The author foregoes the rewards of sympathy—not of the sympathy that is directly offered to himself, but the far richer knowledge that pure souls interchange his thoughts, and strengthen their hearts together on the creations of his mind. We earnestly hope that he will undertake other subjects of the same order—where spiritual conflict is the prime interest—but free from the overshadowing horror which must leave so many minds without power to move, not capable of varied play and emotion, under the foul burden of such a plot. The Tragedy that remains to be written is the great Christian Drama, in which the whole struggle of the higher Life in its most awful circumstances shall be depicted in its fulness and intensity—but the victory shall fall with the soul. It is an infinite, and an untravelled field. The author has shown his power to walk in it ; and we trust for the sake of Literature, and of Religion, that the beautiful sonnet which closes his volume is, after the manner of young poets, his greeting and introduction, and not his farewell to Poetry.

ART. V.—THEORY OF REASONING.

The Theory of Reasoning. By Samuel Bailey. London, 1851.

WHEN a gentleman of Sheffield publishes a reply to the tutor of Alexander the Great, there is enough in the mere chronology of such a controversy to induce a spirit of caution and respect. It is no blind veneration for antiquity, but only a rational estimate of the forces operative in human culture, to feel, that a philosopher who, like Aristotle, has propagated an influence through upwards of two thousand years,—who has formed the scientific vocabulary of nations and languages foreign to his own,—whom neither the officiousness of idolatrous admiration nor the re-action of extravagant contempt have been able to displace,—and who still distributes to his commentators and interpreters the freshest palm of intellectual fame, must have possessed a marvellous depth and variety of endowment. No accidents of civilization, no fashion of academic pedantry, can account for an agency so powerful and prolonged; nor can any genius, capable of moulding and enriching such men as Hegel, Brandis, Trendelenburg, and Sir W. Hamilton, be other than comprehensive and penetrating. To such considerations however the critics of the Aristotelian logic are usually quite insensible. They are apt to look upon it with compassionate scorn, as a miserable child's-play, with whose profitless manœuvres no manly intellect will entangle itself. From the time of Bacon to the present day, it has been the accepted mark of a "sound" and "practical" understanding to despise the *Organon* and ridicule the "Schoolmen." For awhile, this feeling was more or less identified with the cause of the Reformation; which, in attacking the Dominican system, discredited the philosophy, no less than the theology, of the middle ages; and, in revising the doctrine of the Eucharist, disturbed the established Realism, and demanded a new theory of universals. But in the present day, the polemic against Aristotle proceeds mainly from the disciples of the "positive philosophy," and is identified

with no religious interest. It is conducted by the great expounders of the Inductive method; the exclusive dominance of which over the whole realm of human thought requires that syllogistic be degraded and deposed. Of recent attempts to reduce the laws of deduction and the principles of mathematical evidence to the same type with the logic of natural science, Mr. J. S. Mill is by far the most searching and ingenious. Mr. Bailey now brings to the illustration of the same doctrine his peculiar gifts of patient analysis and lucid exposition. He gives it the advantage of many felicitous statements, and relieves it of some paradoxical accessories with which his predecessor had burthened it: but its essential evidence receives, so far as we can discover, no accession at his hands: and notwithstanding a strong predisposition to follow in a track protected by such powerful authorities, we are constrained to confess that we rise from the "*Theory of Reasoning*," as from the second book of the "*System of Logic*," with a feeling quite unsatisfied as to the soundness of their fundamental position. The nature of that position and of the scruples which deter us from admitting it, we will endeavour to make clear.

When reasoning is employed to establish a particular fact, the reasoner's mind follows a certain method which it is the aim of logicians to define. Often at least the particular fact seems to be authenticated to us by a general law which includes it, and the preconception of which contains the secret of our assent to the conclusion. Thus we may accept the proposition, "The swallow is a warm-blooded animal," on the strength of a rule previously known, but hitherto not specially applied, that "All birds are warm-blooded." To bring "the swallow" within the scope of the rule, nothing more is needful than that it be recognized as a "bird." When this recognition has been embodied (in the minor premiss), and the rule expressed (in the major), the conditions of belief are completely stated. In explaining the principle of this example, the common treatises would pronounce "Bird" to be the name of a class intermediate in magnitude between the larger one denoted by "Warm-blooded," and the smaller by "Swallow:" and would resolve the mental process into the axiom that whatever lies within a contained sphere lies

within the containing. According to the prevalent doctrine, strenuously advocated by Archbishop Whately, this is the type of all reasoning whatsoever: and by no other method can any proposition, not a first truth, obtain credence. Mr. Bailey, on the other hand, while admitting it, under the name of "class-reasoning," to a real place among the methods of cogent proof, yet assigns to it a very insignificant range: and Mr. J. S. Mill denies to it the character of reasoning or inference at all; maintaining that it is absent from every acquisition of really new truth; and regarding it, when present, as a mere *interpretation* by the mind of its own past record as pertinent to an existing case. Neither writer would allow that, in the example just adduced, the general law, "All birds are warm-blooded" forms any essential element in the procedure. It is no part of the ground on which the conclusion actually rests: it probably may not come into thought at all: and only usurps the place, and disguises the aspect of the real evidence. That evidence will be found, not in the assumption about *all* birds, but in the observation of *other* birds, that they are warm-blooded. The universal rule itself is presumed only on the strength of a limited induction of instances: and if the examination of a few hawks and sparrows and ptarmigans, &c., suffices to establish a property for birds in general, it cannot be inadequate to prove it of swallows in particular. It is in the discretion of the naturalist whether from his past experience he shall frame a rule for all similar cases, or form a judgment restricted to the nearest instance that occurs. He may reason in direct course from particular to particular, from his limited store of known facts to the unknown one awaiting his inference,—without calling by the way at the station of any general law. Thus to the conclusion, "The swallow is a warm-blooded animal," the proper major premiss is, not the *universal rule*, "All birds are warm-blooded," but the *collective fact*, "The hawk, the sparrow, the ptarmigan, and other birds hitherto examined, have proved to be warm-blooded." The joint and co-ordinate dependance on this collective fact of both the universal law and the particular inference, at the same time that they are independent of each other, Mr. Bailey illustrates by disposing them in the following order:—

"COLLECTIVE FACT.

All men, as far as observation has extended, have been found fallible.

<i>Universal Law.</i>	<i>Particular Inference.</i>
Therefore all men are fallible.— [i. e. men of past times beyond the reach of observation, as well as those observed, <i>were</i> fallible; men of the present time, whether observed or unobserved, <i>are</i> fallible; and all future men <i>will be</i> fallible.]	Therefore the man Peter is fallible. ; <i>or,</i> The next generation of men will be fallible. <i>or,</i> Socrates, who lived more than two thousand years ago, was fallible.

"It is obvious," our author remarks, "that both these conclusions, both the universal law and the particular inference, are deduced from the same fact or collection of facts: they are, if I may so express it, abreast, or co-ordinate; one is not, or needs not be, logically subsequent to the other; or, to vary the language, both are probable inferences, for which the real evidence is the same. The mental process, too, is alike; it does not consist in the mind's discerning one thing to be implied in another, but in its being determined by known facts to believe unknown ones."—(P. 12.)

Not only does our author substitute in the major premiss the collective fact for the universal law, but he strikes out the minor premiss altogether; and regards the whole mental process as perfectly represented, when instead of a syllogism, we have an enthymeme drawing its conclusion from an incomplete enumeration. He says:—

"As a further illustration, let us examine a piece of reasoning often cited in logical treatises:

All horned quadrupeds are ruminant;

Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant.

Whether we take this enthymeme as it is, or make it, by the introduction of a minor premiss, into a regular syllogism, the conclusion drawn is irresistible. You cannot admit the premiss and deny the conclusion, without self-contradiction.

"But the form into which the reasoning is thrown by using the general law as a major premiss marks the real nature of the evidence for the conclusion. The real argument is,—

All *other* horned quadrupeds have been found to be ruminant;
Therefore this horned quadruped is ruminant.

It is because we have found horned quadrupeds to have been ruminant in all *other* cases, as far as our knowledge has extended, that we conclude that the horned animal before us is ruminant. The fact or collection of facts gathered from observation, without any contrary instance, is sufficient to determine the mind to believe the conclusion; but there would be no self-contradiction, although a want of sound sense, in admitting the premise and denying the inference. The reason is, not what is usually designated logical or demonstrative, but material or contingent. It is, nevertheless, all that we can possibly have in the case.

"Laying down the general law, that all horned quadrupeds are ruminant, has not the slightest power to change either the character of the facts of which it is the indication, or that of the conclusion to which it may lead. Material arguments cannot be converted into demonstrative proofs by any arrangement of propositions, or by any translation from one form into another."—(P. 46.)

The very language in which it is here contended that deduction is only induction in disguise, appears to us to betray a misapprehension of the purpose and pretensions of logical science. The author complains that the metamorphosis of a collective fact into a general law creates no new evidence, and that a syllogistic disposition of parts cannot turn probability into certainty. Who ever professed any such art of intellectual legerdemain? What logician has failed to explain that his business was not with the *matter* but the *form* of thought,—not to change or strengthen the grounds of conviction, but to trace the mode of their mental operation? There are two conditions of all derivative belief; first, certain data objectively presented to the mind; secondly, a certain subjective manner of dealing with these. The former is the *thing thought*; the latter, the *rule by which we think it*. The one is the *evidence*,—the *proof*; the other is that peculiarity in the constitution of our faculties which makes it to *be* evidence and proof. It is with the latter alone that the logician is concerned; he adverts to the former merely as the instrument of his exposition; the relations involved in thinking requiring for their display a reference to some matter given to be thought. What he proposes to exhibit, when he manœuvres the elements of an argument into strange forms, is not the facts or considerations which establish the conclusion to a mind like ours; but the natural moulds of the mind itself

into which the facts flow down, and without which they would not assume the shape of ratiocination. To tell him that the propositions which he offers, in order to lay bare the type of the reasoning process, never occur to you at all,—that you do not bring before you a general maxim every time you judge of the future by the past, but directly transmute your particular experience into particular expectation,—is altogether irrelevant. He does not aim at reporting *what* you think, but *how* you think it: and it is not surprising that a record of your subjective action should appear to you no true account of the objects upon which it was engaged. The test which Mr. Bailey applies in order to estimate the merits of the syllogistic procedure is, in this view, completely erroneous. He evidently asks himself; 'What statement will suffice to render a conclusion inevitable?' and limiting himself to the most frugal allowance that will put his hearers into condition to draw the inference, he charges everything beyond as a logical profuseness and impertinence. By this rule, however, he necessarily misses everything which logical investigation has any interest in discovering. For nothing requires *statement* to me except that which is absent from my mind and must be introduced in order to operate,—the external evidence *about* which I am to think:—this once given, the spontaneous action of the mind itself *silently* does the rest; the law of my own thought, being ever self-present, takes effect on the simple condition of having something delivered to its operation; it is secured to me in its latent reality, and dispenses, therefore, with all patent expression. It follows that when Mr. Bailey tries the experiment, how much can be spared from the statement of an argument without detaining the hearers from the conclusion, he incurs a logical blindness by his own act, and blocks out the whole sphere of knowledge professedly engaging his quest.

The effect of this error is simply, that the evidence which he calls in order to destroy the case of the logicians is precisely what they require for its establishment. 'We may score out,' he says, 'the minor premiss as a redundancy:—'certainly,' they reply, 'for, whether you speak or whether you suppress it, it lies provided for in the rules of intelligence itself.' 'The collective fact,' he insists,

'serves perfectly for major premiss, though a mere record of particular experience:—'assuredly,' they say, 'and for this very reason, that without your aid it will pick up its universality within the mind itself, which cannot be hindered by any checks of language from reading off the particular into the general.' That it is *competent* to us thus to generalise from partial experience, is of course admitted by Mr. Bailey, and is implied in all inductions whatsoever: the only question is, whether it is an invariable *essential* of all contingent reasoning. Our author contends that without any general conception of horned quadrupeds as ruminant, and, while as yet we are only on our way to such a conception, we may infer from past examples that "this horned quadruped is ruminant." We submit that the very language in which the reasoner is obliged to state the collective fact contradicts his doctrine. Does he describe it by simple enumeration of its component instances, left, as they occurred, in their crude individuality, and say, 'The ox, the ram, the stag, is ruminant; so, therefore, is the elk?' Had the single cases been not yet made up into a class, or thought of under the notion of a certain nature, he must have resorted to language like this, if not to names more purely denotative still. Instead of this, he first uses words which travel out indefinitely beyond the record of his experience, and which designate a type ("horned quadrupeds"); and then ties them down by limiting epithets ("other" or "hitherto observed") to the definite past. The collective fact itself is thus conceivable only as a sub-case under a general law, and bears witness in its enunciation that that law is already extant in the mind. No one who had not the generic notion of "horned quadruped," could understand the phrase "horned quadrupeds *hitherto observed*;" it is intelligible only by limitation superinduced on a prior universal. It will, perhaps, be granted that this genus is already constituted in thought, but denied that it has mentally been pronounced "*ruminant*." It is plain however,—for it is the very thing affirmed as the collective fact,—that the ruminant property has never been enabled hitherto to absent itself from the notion of the genus, but has invariably co-existed with it. Wherever the one goes the other attends; and as the idea of a class is always an open one,—not an enclosure of regis-

tered individuals, but a scheme potentially unlimited,—the concomitant ruminant attribute has been invested with similar universality. It is very possible, indeed, that it may never have been detached and made into a distinct predicate for “all horned quadrupeds:” it may have slept undisturbed till now within the notion of the genus, whose proper designation, therefore, would be that of “horned ruminant quadrupeds:” the present new case may happen to be first in which (from our having, for example, only the fossil remains) the attribute in question, suppressed from view, has parted company from its associates, and required to be separately supplied. But it never could be so supplied by the mind, did not the conception of the genus lay claim to it. It is the incompleteness of the type without it that necessitates the inference. The horns of the new animal would confer upon it no title to its ruminant character, but for the previous co-existence of hornedness and rumination in our conception of a certain indefinite class, exemplified in past instances, yet not restricted to them. It is evident, therefore, that the collective fact itself, used as a premiss, pre-supposes and represents the very generalisation which it is introduced to supersede.

A fallacy, in short, lurks in the assertion, that men constantly reason from particular to particular. It is true if understood of the objects of thought; false, if of the mode of thinking. From particulars, *quâ* particular, nothing whatsoever can be inferred: they cease to be sterile only when accepted as signs of a general law. Mr. J. S. Mill tells us that the proposition “The Duke of Wellington is mortal” is an inference not from the universal rule “All men are mortal,” but from the detailed observation that “John, Thomas and Company, who were once living, are now dead.”* It is plain however that, if John, Thomas and Company were taken merely as *individual objects* (which might be anything indifferently; e. g. one, a horse, another, a dog, &c.), they would yield no conclusion. Their power to do so depends on their being *men*, samples of the same general type to which the Duke of Wellington is referred. It is this apprehended community of nature which spreads over *him* the attribute discovered in *them*: and if so, it is to that nature, as repre-

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. iii. § 3.

sented in them, and not to them as "particulars," that the mind attaches the notion of mortality. It will not be denied that, unless we could say to ourselves, "Now the Duke of Wellington also is a man," we should be precluded from all inference. In this minor premiss however, the particularity is dropped, and the general word "man" is openly substituted for the individual names occurring in the major: the "humanity" is here picked out and confessedly put forward as the universal on which the conclusion hinges. Can there be a clearer proof that past dead men are available as evidence in this matter, only so far as they are translated out of their individual character into official specimens of a race? It is a matter of perfect indifference to this logical question, whether the words of the premiss proclaim the "collective fact" or the "general law," or even whether the imagination does or does not figure to itself actual past instances. Acts of special memory or conception do not exclude concurrent generalisations of thought: and can no more be construed into disproof of a deductive process, than the John Doe and Richard Roe of the lawyers can be regarded as private individuals. Indeed this doctrine cannot even describe itself without using language which virtually surrenders it. "From observed instances," it is said, "we reason to unobserved." "Instances" of what? Is it not of a general law? The word is relative, and expresses "particulars regarded as standing under a comprehending rule, and presenting that rule to the mind." Where facts are taken as "instances," it is the rule involved in them that yields the inference: and facts not taken as "instances" yield no inference at all.

Our author regards it as the distinguishing excellence of his inductive doctrine, that it relieves the reasoning process of the charge of *Petitio Principii* to which it is liable. So long as the premiss merely recites past facts, whose analogy the conclusion carries into a fresh case, the inference which arises really constitutes a new discovery. But if the premiss states a universal law, then the conclusion, in announcing a particular example of it, furnishes, it is said, nothing that was not already assumed at the commencement. Whoever has warrant for saying that "All birds are warm-blooded" must know that "Swallows are warm-

blooded:" if the fact is undetermined respecting the species, it is so far impossible to affirm it of the genus. We find it difficult to understand Mr. Bailey's exact position in reference to this well-worn objection to the syllogism. In more passages than one (pp. 39, 51) he pronounces it unanswerable, and stigmatises all deduction of a contained proposition from a containing one as a gratuitous begging of the question. This verdict certainly reads like a sentence of condemnation: yet within a few pages we find the author defending this very process against Mr. J. S. Mill, claiming for it the honourable titles of "inference," "reasoning," "demonstration," and pronouncing it "convenient" and "useful." It would seem to follow that the "*Petitio Principii*" is often, in our author's opinion, a "convenient and useful" form of "demonstrative reasoning"!

A thorough examination of this celebrated objection to the syllogism would carry us into metaphysical questions from which we must at present refrain. The first thing necessary for its correct appreciation is a precise answer to the inquiry, "What is, and what is not, a *petitio principii*, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν*?" Mr. Bailey admits that the mere implication of the conclusion in the premiss would afford no ground of objection against the syllogism; since this is a feature inseparable from all demonstration whatever. But he insists that there is here something more; "that the major premise not merely *implies* but *contains* the conclusion; that the conclusion is in reality a constituent or integrant part of the major premise, without which the latter would not be completely true" (p. 39). We will not dispute this distinction between "implying" and "containing;" we will allow that the latter is a mode of implication having special features of its own: but, we submit, it is not in these special features, but in the generic characters of all implication whatsoever, that the essence of the *petitio principii* is found. If the charge is good against the syllogism, it is good against all demonstration whatsoever. To render this apparent we have only to cast our eye over the series of implying and implied facts which Mr. Bailey introduces with the following remark:

* Aristot. Anal., pr. II. 16. Top. VIII. 13. Comp. Biese; Philosophie des Aristoteles, I. iii. 2 § 2.

"That all demonstrative reasoning consists in discerning, and, when expressed in words, in asserting, one fact or one proposition to be implied in another, is plain. If we call one the implying fact, the other will be of course the implied fact, as in the following examples.

IMPLYING FACTS.

1. All horned animals are ruminant.
2. The lines A & B are severally equal to C.
3. The three angles of every triangle are together equal to two right angles.
4. The culprit at the bar was in Edinburgh at One o'Clock on the day named.
5. The traveller had no money with him.
6. The portrait resembles two different persons.

IMPLIED FACTS.

- This horned animal is ruminant.
- The lines A & B are equal to each other.
- The three angles of the triangle A B C are together equal to two right angles.
- He could not be guilty of the offence committed at that time in London.
- He could not be robbed of a large sum.
- They must resemble each other."

It will be seen at a glance that Nos. '1 & 3, in this series, afford the only examples of "class-reasoning,"—the only ones therefore in which the conclusion is "contained" in the premiss. In the rest it is "implied" otherwise than by inclusion within the sphere of the "assumption." Yet in all the instances alike a person who should use the implying fact, without offering evidence for it, as a medium of proof, would be liable to the charge of a *petitio principii*. If I am not satisfied of the equality of A & B, it must be *shown* to me that they are severally equal to C: if you merely take this for granted, shall I not say that you do but trifle with me and beg the question? When, in order to prove the apple-tree exogenous, I say "all deciduous trees are exogenous," am I more guilty of *petitio principii*, than when I prove two apples to be in the same dish by saying that each is in the same dish with a certain peach? The attempt of our author to save other demonstrative reasoning from the imputation which he reserves for the syllogism appears to us altogether futile. His indictment applies to all or to none. Wherever such a relation subsists between premiss and conclusion that the denial of either is a contradiction of the other, there you

can never assume the ground yet leave the inference unassumed. There are several categories of thought, within whose sphere this necessary consecutiveness is possible. The notion of *substance and attribute*, with the relations of genera and species to which it introduces us, is but one of these. It is the basis of all class-reasoning, and supplies the common logical canon of necessity, that "what is true of the containing is true of the contained." The attempt to coerce all reasoning into this single type,—comprehensive as it is,—appears to us arbitrary in itself,—and precluded from success except on condition of much violent psychology. The ideas of Space and Time, of Cause and Effect, of Resemblance and Difference, seem to involve distinct laws of thought, to create for themselves special elements and functions of language, and to require separate canons of Logic. In all these spheres there is room for such a necessary nexus of conceptions as demonstration requires; yet the rules of class-reasoning have no natural application. Such maxims as that a body cannot be in two places at once,—that *Causa causæ causa causati*,—that two things of which the first is like and the second unlike a third are unlike each other,—are not less really the basis of frequent reasoning than the dictum that what is true of genus holds of the species. They furnish inferences which are "implied," but not "contained," in the premisses,—which are sequent upon them by another law of thought than that of classification. Still, however much we may enlarge the canons of demonstrative reasoning, they afford us no escape from the accusation brought against the syllogism. To the existence of the *petitio principii* it is indifferent whether the necessary connection of inference with assumption be due to this law of thought or that: it is the connection itself, whencesoever necessitated, that constitutes the alleged fallacy.

Not only does this celebrated objection prove too much, by importing a disqualification into all demonstrative reasoning, whether formally syllogistic or not; but it extends still further: it virtually condemns induction itself, and so leaves us without any access whatever to rational belief in universal propositions. For what does our objector say?—"if you have not yet ascertained that *swallows are warm-blooded*, you are not entitled to assert that *All birds*

are warm-blooded; and in announcing the general law, you unwarrantably take for granted the special case afterwards drawn out under the guise of a conclusion.' Is it then true that no general law can be legitimately affirmed, so long as a single instance comprehended under it remains unexamined? Is the "*enumeratio plena*" an indispensable condition of its rational acceptance? And is there no rule of thought provided for bridging over the chasms of our defective experience, and giving us an authorised passage from the particular to the universal? Then is all induction manifestly impossible: for it consists in nothing else than extending to the unknown the rules gathered from the known, and thus obtaining, through a general formula, a mediate intelligence of that which is immediately inaccessible. Mr. Bailey himself has defended the right of a mere "collective fact," (such as, "Men, so far as hitherto known, have died") to yield a "universal law" (such as, "All men are mortal"). With what consistency then can he now turn round and charge every such law with *petitio principii* on the ground that, while universal in itself, it can appeal only to an experience short of universal? With a singular confusion of thought, the avowed champion of induction, in urging this objection, places himself in direct revolt against the fundamental principle of his own philosophy. He proves all *deduction* to be fallacious, by assuming all *induction* to be fallacious too; and thus cutting off the approaches to truth altogether, simply "takes away the Key of Knowledge, neither going in himself, nor suffering them that were entering to go in."

From the embarrassment of this objection we may extricate ourselves at once by simply remembering that, in the nature of things, or in the sight of a perfect intellect, whose processes are unconscious of succession or delay, *all* reasoning must involve a *petitio principii*, the conclusion being already discerned on the first announcement of the premiss. Ratiocination itself becomes nugatory in presence of a mind seizing by intuition what others reach by sequence. As soon as we descend to a more tardy and limited intelligence, there will be *some* beliefs that are only mediately reached: the same truths which to one being are contained within their ἀρχή are seen by

another lying at some distance from it. The *petitio principii* is thus entirely relative to the state and range of the individual understanding; and cannot be established as a fault against an argument by merely showing that the inference *might* be thought already in the assumption; but only by showing that it *must* be. If Mr. Bailey can convince us that it is impossible to conceive the proposition, "Birds are warm-blooded," without simultaneously contemplating the particular case of the swallow, we will grant that the conclusion "Swallows are warm-blooded" is a mere inference of *idem per idem*. But if not,—if the general law can be formed, and as he allows, rationally formed, without the mind having ever encountered this special instance,—it is vain to pretend that the conclusion only repeats in part the thought contained in the premiss. This is true no doubt of the reasoner who, to bring conviction to others, invents the syllogism in question: he selects his general rule precisely *because* he foresees what it contains: but in using it he assumes in his hearers a different state of mind,—in which the law has been apprehended and the example has been missed. Wherever a teacher and a learner are engaged together, the arguments comprehended in the didactic process involve a *petitio principii* to the former, but not to the latter. Upon this difference, the consciousness in one man, the unconsciousness in another, of what, according to the laws of thought, a given proposition may imply, depends the whole business of reasoning as an instrument of persuasion. Mr. Mill, we are aware, treats this doctrine with no respect, and calls Archbishop Whately to severe account for sanctioning it. "When you admitted the major premiss," contends Mr. Mill, "you asserted the conclusion; but, says Archbishop Whately, you asserted it by implication merely: this, however, can here only mean that you asserted it unconsciously: that you did not know you were asserting it; but if so, the difficulty revives in this shape—Ought you not to have known? Were you warranted in asserting the general proposition without having satisfied yourself of the truth of everything which it fairly includes? And if not, what then is the syllogistic art but a contrivance for catching you in a trap, and holding you fast in it?"* This is clever scolding, no

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. iii. §. 2.

doubt ; but, as it seems to us indifferent logic. The phraseology itself is highly objectionable. In order to make out that the conclusion is anticipated in the premisses, though not foreseen by the reasoner, Mr. Mill resorts to a doctrine of "*unconscious assertion*," which we can only compare with the "hidden sense" of prophecy imagined by divines. "Assertion" not being an automatic articulation by the lips, but a mental act,—the intentional predication of a certain attribute present in thought respecting a certain subject also present in thought,—cannot be "unconscious ;" and the epithet does but evade the fact that the assertion in question is not there at all. To another mind, indeed, and to the same mind at a future time, the proposition may suggest the application which the sentence, as uttered, did not contemplate : but these are phenomena foreign to the immediate act of predication, and not entitled to be imported into its description. And as to Mr. Mill's demand, that no general proposition shall be uttered, till the speaker holds in his thought all the instances to which it may be applied, we know of nothing more simply impossible or more entirely destructive of all scientific method whatsoever. The foresight of its particular cases is *not* "fairly included" in the meaning or in the evidence of a general rule : and a person may reasonably assent to the law of refraction without any suspicion of the vast compass of facts over which its interpretation ranges. There are grounds,—whatever account we may give of them,—for ascribing attributes to certain *natures* or *kinds* of being, without going through the objects included under them or having any prescience of their actual contents. It is not necessary to know the natural history of all the varieties of mankind before we can venture to affirm mortality of human beings in general. To revert to our old syllogism ;

All birds are warm-blooded ;

Swallows are birds ;

Therefore Swallows are warm-blooded :

It is surely possible (1.) to think the attribute "warm blood" of the genus (bird) without thinking it of the species (swallow),—i. e. to have the *major* premiss without the conclusion ; (2.) to ascribe to the species (swallow) the nature of the genus (bird), without therewith ascribing to it all

the concomitants (as warm blood) of the genus,—i. e. to have the *minor* premiss without the conclusion. But it is *not* possible to do *both* these things, without at once recognising the conclusion. This is all that is required by the theory of the syllogism: and against this Mr. Mill can only urge, that *if* it be true,—why, it *ought not* to be true.

The celebrated *dictum de omni et de nullo*, which plays so important a part in many logical treatises, is a favourite topic of criticism and ridicule with the school of writers to which Mr. Bailey belongs, and does not escape from his hands without a stroke of fresh indignity. There is, however, a peculiarity in his mode of disparaging it. Mr. Mill, in order to deprive it of authority, had deposed it from the rank of an axiom and reduced it to an identical proposition. Mr. Bailey includes it among axioms, and makes this the very ground of his attack; pronouncing all such general maxims absolutely sterile and worthless. In his treatment of this topic, however, we not only find nothing new; but we are carried back to the position which it occupied in the time of Locke; and even Mr. Stewart's important investigations are used only so far as they corroborate the doctrine of his predecessor, to the neglect of all that is original in them. The allegations against axioms, whether in mathematical or any other demonstrative reasoning, are two; (1.) that by themselves they are barren of result, yielding no inference; (2.) that their *à priori* pretensions are false, as they are but generalisations of particular arguments, which pre-exist and take effect without their aid. Thus if the lines A and B are known to be severally equal to C, their equality to each other is instantly discerned; nor does the general maxim, "Things equal to the same are equal to each other," shape itself into expression till it is required to sum up the aggregate of many such particular instances. Both these allegations appear to us entirely to mistake the point at issue, and to contest a doctrine which no competent logician ever intends to maintain. They betray indeed the very same *ignoratio elenchi*, which has been already noticed as vitiating our author's preference of collective facts over universal propositions as the ground of reasoning. We do not claim for axioms any power to evolve a science from themselves: they are not *data* or *matter* of thought at all:

they do but express the *rule* according to which,—matter of thought being given,—the mind proceeds to think. They state the subjective side of the conditions under which knowledge is gained; and it is no more reproach to them that, without objective considerations, they can take no effect, than it is to the laws of digestion that they fill no larder and grow no crops. Nor again, in maintaining the *à priori* character of axioms, do we mean that, as objects of thought and assertion, they chronologically precede the particular arguments which exemplify them: they would incur no forfeiture of this character, though they were after-thoughts not embodied till rendered familiar by a thousand instances,—nay even though they never came before the thought at all. D'Alembert's remark, that there is no necessity even to enunciate them,—a remark quoted by our author in proof of their puerility,—is the most perfect vindication of their logical position: if the mind will go on without them exactly as if they were there, they must give an unimpeachable account of the laws of spontaneous thought. We deny then that the place of axioms in science is a question of mental chronology at all. Nevertheless, we are not disposed to allow, that they are posthumous generalisations of particular arguments. Generalisations are gathered from an extended survey of instances no one of which would of itself suffice to establish the rule, and which even collectively do not exclude its future modification. But to the axiom, "Things equal to the same are equal to each other," it is indifferent, whether it has been exemplified once or a thousand times,—nay, whether it be offered to the mind *before* or *after* its examples; it is equally sure of immediate assent. It depends for its recognition on nothing special, or which can be conceived to be special, to any particular instance; but wholly upon the notion of *equality* which repeats itself in each case and which is as well apprehended at first as it is at last. The presence of this notion is the only condition required: wherever two equalities are conceived with a common term, there, by a necessary law of thought, a third cannot but arise. Whatever be the actual order of date in which we acquire these maxims, they differ from inductive generalisations in this;—with an inductive rule, we do not know *till the end* of our experience, that the rule is

general and that nothing was contingent upon the particulars constituting each case; with an axiom, we know positively *from the first*, that nothing does or can depend on the particular things related, but every thing on the relation itself. This, and not any chronological antecedence, is what is meant, when an *à priori* character is attributed to any universal maxim. The rule of thought which it expresses is neither *before* the particular arguments, as their premiss; nor *after* them, as their generalisation; but *in* them, as their form.

So far then as the *dictum de omni et de nullo* shares the fate of all axioms, it is not endangered, we apprehend, by our author's disaffection towards its authority. His own attack upon it is indeed as good an example of conformity with it as we could desire to find: and it rules nowhere more completely than in the very camp of rebel argument assembled to destroy it. When Mr. Bailey reasons thus:

All axioms are worthless;

The *dictum* is an axiom;

Therefore The *dictum* is worthless,

he contends, we presume, that "what is true (worthlessness) of a class of things (axioms) is true in like manner of any thing comprehended (the *dictum*) in that class." Now this *is* the *dictum*; which our author therefore, instead of manfully annihilating by chivalrous blows *ab extra*, cruelly compels to commit suicide in his relentless presence.

But, besides this general argument, Mr. Bailey urges against the *dictum* the same objection which Mr. Mill and other writers had previously pressed, viz. that it is founded upon a false view of classification. If a "class" were a substantive existence, separate in some way from that of its constituent individuals, there would be no tautology in saying that what is true of the class is true of the individuals under it. But since "the class *is* nothing but the objects contained in it, the *dictum de omni* merely amounts to the identical proposition that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects:"* or, as Mr. Bailey expresses it, "What belongs to every individual of a class must belong to any individual of a class." (P. 65.) The *nonchalance* with which these critics assume, as if some philosophic "Rome had spoken" and heretics must hold their tongue,—that "a class *is* nothing but the

* Mill's System of Logic, Book II. ch. ii. § 2.

objects contained in it," cannot but amuse those who are cognizant of the history of Realism, and aware how little that doctrine has lost its hold upon the speculative intellect of Europe. Into so deep a question however it is not necessary to enter, in order to deal with the present criticism. Whether, *in the nature of things*, a class be or be not anything different from its constituent individuals, we will not discuss: but we submit that, *to our thought* (and with this alone is logic concerned) it certainly *is* something different. The act of the mind in making a *universal* affirmation is not the same as in making a *distributive* affirmation. If there were a Post-office Directory of all mankind, past, present and to come, and I were to read over all the names and say, "these are mortal," my mental act would not be identical with that of a person saying, "All men are mortal." Mr. Mill indeed would acknowledge this: but then he would dispute our account of the difference between the two cases: he would say, 'this is not the difference between the idea of the individuals and the idea of the class; when you read from the Directory, you no doubt enumerate the individuals; but when you enunciate the subject "All men," you do not suggest any class; you only refer me to certain *attributes*,—the attributes constituting *humanity*,—in virtue of which objects become entitled to the name *Man*.' We are thus compelled, — in completion of our notice of this controversy, — to advert to the nature of Predication, and to define, if possible, what precisely the mind does, when it makes a simple affirmation, such as 'Birds are warm-blooded.' To obviate possible misapprehension, we must premise that

(1.) All significant words are either *Names* or *Attributives*: of which, names *indicate* an object (as *London, Peter, Nile, &c.*); while *Attributives* *characterise* it (as *red, sleeps, struck, warm, &c.*).

(2.) A word which serves *merely* for a name or sign arbitrarily put upon it, that we may know it again and be able to point it out to others, is a *Denotative* word; and its force or marking function is its *Denotation*. All *Proper names* are of this kind.

(3.) A word which serves *merely* as an *Attributive*, to express some character (or attribute), as such, apart from any object having it, is a *Connotative* word; and its power

of suggesting such attribute to the mind is its *Connotation*. All *Adjectives* are of this kind.

(4.) A word which serves *both* these purposes, marking an object by giving its characters, is a *Connotative Name*; its power of indicating the object is its denotation; of suggesting the attributes, its connotation. All *Common Nouns* are of this kind.

(5.) A *Connotative name*, marking only by designation of characters, becomes applicable wherever those characters have been, are, or may be found; the list of *objects* on which it may be put is always an open one; while the number of *attributes* by which it indicates is fixed and definite. The range of objects in its denotation is called the term's *Extension*; of attributes in its connotation, the term's *Comprehension*. Thus, if the definition of '*Bird*' be '*Oviparous Biped*;' the notions of *birth from an egg* and of *having two legs* constitute the word's comprehension; while the species *Hawk, Dove, Swallow, &c.*, constitute its extension.

Now, taking as the type of all Predication what is usually (though questionably) regarded as its simplest form, viz., an affirmative sentence ('Birds are warm-blooded') in which the subject is a common noun and the Predicate contains but one word besides the copula, we find among logical writers two doctrines extant as to the nature of the predicative act. The great majority fix their eye exclusively on the *extension* of both the terms, and consider the subject as naming a *class*, the predicative word as naming *another* class; and the copula as expressing that the latter is capacious enough to contain the former. Thus the example just given states that within the class of "warm-blooded creatures" will be found the class "birds." Applying this explanation to a second proposition, "Swallows are birds," we find it affirmed that the class "birds," before contained, now in its turn contains the class "swallows;" and the inference, "swallows are warm-blooded," follows as a geometrical or numerical necessity. Were the *dictum* of Aristotle shaped into perfect conformity with this theory, it would be expressed thus:—Whatever is found in a contained class is in the containing. When instead of this, it is said—Whatever is *predicated of* a class, is predicated of the individuals or species within it; the expression is of a

mixed kind: it begins, in its description of the major premiss ('whatever is predicated of a class') without committing itself to any particular theory of predication; but immediately, in its description of the minor premiss (the individuals or species within it) it adopts the doctrine we are expounding, of subject within predicate, as class within class. Accordingly, the ablest critics of the *dictum* deal with it as if pledged to the *denotative* doctrine of predication, and regard its authority as destroyed when this doctrine is refuted. Thus Mr. Mill says:—"Those who considered the *dictum de omni* as the foundation of the syllogism, looked upon arguments in a manner corresponding to the erroneous view which Hobbes took of propositions. . . . If no further account than this could be given of the import of propositions, no theory could be given but the commonly received one, of the combination of propositions in a syllogism. If the minor premiss asserted nothing more than that something belongs to a class, and if, as consistency would require us to suppose, the major premiss asserted nothing of that class except that it is included in another class, the conclusion would only be, that what was included in the lower class is included in the higher; and the result, therefore, nothing except that the classification is consistent with itself. But we have seen that it is no sufficient account of the meaning of a proposition to say that it refers something to, or excludes something from, a class."* What then is Mr. Mill's own theory of predication, on whose appearance the *dictum* is deposed? It is the second of the two doctrines which we said had been advanced to explain the nature of a proposition. Reversing the procedure of the former theory, it looks exclusively to the *comprehension* of both terms; regarding the subject as the expression of a certain *attribute*, the predicative word of *another* attribute; and the copula as declaring the *co-existence* of the two. Thus in the syllogism:—

" All men are mortal;
 All kings are men;
 Therefore All kings are mortal,

the minor premiss asserts," says Mr. Mill, "that the attri-

* System of Logic, Book II. ch. ii. § 3.

butes denoted by kingship only exist in conjunction with those signified by the word man. The major premiss asserts as before, that the last mentioned attributes are never found without the attribute of mortality. The conclusion is, that wherever the attributes of kingship are found, that of mortality is found also."* In conformity with this *connotative* doctrine of predication Mr. Mill substitutes for "the unmeaning *dictum de omni et de nullo*," the maxim (limiting ourselves, for brevity's sake, to the *affirmative* form) that "things (attributes) which coexist with the same, coexist with one another." He gives also another resolution of the case, which he regards as an equivalent version of it. The syllogism just quoted may be understood as follows:—

"The attributes of man are a mark of the attribute mortality;

The attributes of a king are a mark of the attributes of man;

Therefore The attributes of a king are a mark of the attribute mortality."

Drawing out the general law of this construction, we obtain the maxim, which Mr. Mill appears to regard with greatest favour, "whatever is a mark of any mark, is a mark of that which this last is a mark of."†

All that is here achieved is, avowedly, the substitution of the maxim of comprehension for the maxim of extension: and the author imagines that by doing this he cancels the *dictum*. His own final and favourite rule is nothing but a translation of Kant's "Supreme Rule of the syllogism," "*Nota notæ est etiam nota rei ipsius; repugnans notæ repugnat rei ipsi.*"‡ Kant himself, after enunciating this rule, immediately proceeds to show how the *dictum* arises from it as a direct corollary. And subsequent writers have very properly given both the scholastic and the Kantian maxims as two representations of the same truth, whose equivalence is apparent the moment you reflect that the comprehension and extension of a term vary inversely as each other.§ Aristotle himself is not in

* System of Logic, Book II. chap. ii. § 3.

† Ibid. § 4.

‡ Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren. § 2. In the Rosenkranz and Schubert edition of Kant's works, vol. i. p. 59.

§ See, for instance, Twisten's Logik. § 105, and Drobisch's neue Dar-

the least pledged to the one form of the axiom more than to the other. His clearest and most concise expression of it is perfectly neutral; "whatever is said of the predicate is said of the subject."* Nay, the two modes of statement are adverted to by Aristotle, and are expressly declared to be equivalent: "To say that one thing is completely included in another, and to say that this other is universally a predicate of the one, amount to just the same thing."† The theory of predication therefore gains nothing at Mr. Mill's hands, except a reaction from the exclusive doctrine of comprehension to a doctrine of extension equally exclusive; both of which are provided for by Aristotle himself, and equally compatible with his much renowned and much abused *dictum*. We think it evident that the *dictum* is no more an identical proposition in the one form than in the other: and that to infer the inclusion of A within C from their relation to B as holding the smaller, and held by the larger, is not less positive a step of reasoning, than to infer the coexistence of A with C from their joint copresence with B. The former indeed, if there be a difference, is the richer inference of the two; inasmuch as inclusion carries coexistence with it, but not *vice versa*.

We must confess that neither of the two doctrines of predication which we have noticed appears to us psychologically true. In saying, "Birds are warm-blooded," we neither think of class within class, nor of attribute with attribute: The word "warm-blooded" presents to us no conception of a *genus*: it is not a Name, but a mere Attributive. The word "birds" expresses to us no *attribute*, as such: it is not a mere Attributive, but a Name. The term in the Predicate acts upon the mind by its connotation, or in its comprehension: the term in the Subject, by its denotation, or in its extension: and the foregoing sentence has its import in this,—that we refer the *attribute* 'warm

stellung der Logik. § 72, where the rule which Mr. Mill rejects as "unmeaning," and that which he adopts as the true base of all syllogistic reasoning, are both given, as the *dictum de omni et nullo*. "These fundamental propositions," says Drobisch, "the older logicians expressed in the following formulas, which bore the name of the *dictum de omni et nullo* :—in relation to the comprehension of the terms, *Nota notæ est etiam nota rei*, repugnans notæ repugnat etiam rei; in relation to the extension of the terms, *Quidquid de omnibus valet, valet etiam de quibusdam et singulis; quidquid de nullo valet, nec de quibusdam nec de singulis valet*."

* Arist. Cat. § 5.

† Arist. Anal., pr. I. 1.

blood' to the class of objects 'birds.' Hence it is, that, while a purely connotative word (an adjective) is all that is required in the predicate, a denotative term is indispensable in the subject. For 'The horse is a quadruped' you can substitute 'The horse is four-footed;' but the attempt to cut down the proposition to a coexistence of attributes does not succeed;—'Equine is four-footed.' The mind predicates nothing except about substantive objects of thought; and of them (in the class of propositions now under consideration) it predicates nothing but attributes. This obvious fact would have been less disregarded, had not logicians allowed their theory of the simple proposition to wait upon their analysis of the syllogism. When the three propositions (say of *Barbara*) are once before them, they see the middle term, now in the subject, then in the predicate; and the identity of word suppresses all suspicion of diversity of function. Yet when we say,

All birds are warm-blooded;

All swallows are birds;

Therefore All swallows are warm-blooded,

it is evident that in the major premiss the term 'birds' is wanted in its denotation; in the minor, in its connotation. No doubt also the syllogistic axioms admit of briefer expression, when propositions are forbidden to speak in the mixed dialect of nature, and forced, like French voters, to be all for extension, or all for its opposite. Conformed to the doctrine which we have laid down, the *dictum*, for instance, in its affirmative relations, would appear in some such form as this: "Where the same nature both has an attribute and is one, the attribute it has belongs to the substance in which it is." The law of the second figure would be: "If an attribute be present with one nature and absent from another, neither of these can be the attribute of the other." That of the third,—in its affirmative part,—would be: "Where two attributes are copresent in the same sphere, each is an attribute of something having the other." These rules are perhaps less easy to follow than those usually given: the reason is, that when you move exclusively within either comprehension or extension, you can obtain a purely quantitative conception of the syllogistic relations, and represent them to yourself by geometrical or numerical images. These images, however,

are psychologically false: and the logical systems founded on them supply an account, not of the real living acts of the mind in its use of language as an instrument of reasoning, but of a set of processes by which these might be replaced without altering the result. The principle of equivalent or substituted ratios, powerful in other sciences, is fatal to all truth in intellectual philosophy, and has been indeed the bane of psychology in every age. On this ground we cannot reconcile ourselves to the recently elaborated doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. In spite of the simplification of logical forms it produces in the hands of Sir W. Hamilton, and the enlargement of their range in those of Mr. De Morgan, its product appears to us but a *quasi-logic* after all; and its method, a development of precisely what is least true in the doctrine as Aristotle left it. So profound is our respect for both these writers, and especially our admiration for the philosophical judgment as well as the vast knowledge of the Edinburgh Professor, that we make this confession with the utmost reluctance, and with full consciousness of the imprudence of dissent from such authority. We can only say that, in this matter, we have not turned sceptic without trying our hardest to believe.

With this discussion of the *dictum* we must take our leave of Mr. Bailey's book. Other topics are treated in its pages, and especially the relation of language to reasoning, with much more ability and success, as it appears to us, than the doctrine of the syllogism. But we have thought it well to confine ourselves to the examination of the author's characteristic tenets; the more so, from their partial coincidence with tendencies impressed by other and more powerful causes on English philosophical opinion. In parting from the authors we have ventured to criticise, we do not forget that the subjects on which they fail to convince us are subtle and difficult. We look back with grateful memory to the rich debt we owe them for much past training of thought and opinion: and remember, with satisfaction, that our closest agreement with them has ever been in matters remotest from metaphysics and nearest to human life.

ART. VI.—NORICA.

Norica: or, Tales of Nürnberg from the Olden Time. Translated from the German of August Hagen. London: Chapman. 1851. 12mo., pp. 374.

WE can say with entire truth, what perhaps is the highest praise that could be given to this beautiful little book, that it is impossible to read it without feeling transported to Nuremberg. It breathes the very air of the place. The book is as quaint and as life-like as the old city itself. Any one who ever has wandered through Nuremberg, finding himself at home, as in a dream, amid the art and architectural forms of the sixteenth and many preceding centuries, will recall the old feelings with an affectionate yearning of the heart. Such a one will not be able to repress the impulse to close his eyes, and let the dear images, so separated from all the vulgar life of modern cities, once again take full possession of him. He will climb to the Burg, look at the aged lime, and gaze upon the far prospect from the walls; he will come down and stand with reverence before Albert Dürer's house, and thoughtfully descend the street to St. Sebaldus, casting wistful eyes at the beautiful window of the parsonage-house, thinking what a home it would make, for a meek, gentle, studious, order-loving man; he will be again in the Church (when Protestantism has stopped him for a little at the door) examining Peter Vischer's famous shrine of St. Sebaldus, or feeling in his heart the solemn beauty of the choir; he will go out at the East End, and pausing in admiration of the Rathhaus, proceed down the street to the Beautiful Fountain, and pass through the exquisite Frauen Kirche to the Goose Market with its humorous Fountain;—he will cross the bridge, and see the Yellow Pegnitz, and ascend through streets of the middle ages to the Church of St. Lawrence, and renew his wonder and tender sympathy for the religious feeling that produced them at the Sacrament shrine of Adam Kraft and the Salutation of the Virgin by Veit Stoss. We cannot say what impression the book may leave upon one who is quite a stranger to Nuremberg, but for ourselves we must

bear our testimony that it has brought back all the charmed feelings and musings, the loving and reverent sympathy with the antique, which the realities produced. It belongs to the same class of books as 'The Artist's Married Life,' is not inferior to it in minute delicacy, nor in general interest, and though of a more comprehensive survey treads partly upon the same ground. We have all the great Artists of Nuremberg brought before us in person; all its great monuments so described as to connect them with the life of the city; the beautiful union so characteristic of the times, of homeliness and simplicity with genius and refinement and a religious devotion to Art; and along with these some very touching love passages, marked by the same simplicity, between the narrator and a Nuremberg maiden. The Translators have justly described the character of the work:—

"The burgher life of Nürnberg; the taste and opulence of her patrician merchants; the character and works of her most eminent native Artists, especially Albert Dürer; the reverence and passion for art which pervaded all classes of her citizens; the poetical guild of the Master-singers with Hans Sachs at their head; the relations of the city with the empire; and the large amount of mental activity and refinement which it discloses in one of the great trading cities of Europe on the eve of the Reformation—are here very skilfully wrought into the incidents of a popular narrative, and set with remarkable vividness before the reader's eye."

It is not our intention to review a Book the principal interest of which consists, if we may so speak, in its flavour; we only wish to give one or two specimens of its manner. The narrator, a citizen of Frankfort, visits Nuremberg and forms the acquaintance with its celebrities which he chronicles in his journal. There is much of charm, and of the earnest life of genius in this sketch of the great Artists in brass and stone. He finds out the house of Vischer, and knocks for admission:—

"As no sound was heard in answer to my repeated knocking, I opened the door gently, and went into the room. Three persons were sitting there by a table in their shirtsleeves, and were drawing so diligently, that neither my knocking nor my footsteps were heard. I stood there embarrassed, and feared to break the solemn silence. At length I took heart, and stammered out a greeting. One of the

three looked round, and pushed up a little his small black cap. He was a man about fifty-five years of age, with a somewhat flattened nose, and a brown and beautifully-curled beard. 'What do you want?' he asked abruptly. After I had mentioned my name and position, I stated to him my wish to speak with Master Vischer, and to see his foundry, if it would not be an interruption to him. 'It is always an interruption to me, for I am never without some employment. There is nothing to see in my foundry, for nothing is doing there. Who knows whether a cast will ever be ordered again? Money is scarce, and Art little valued.' Thus spoke the old man, and I replied: 'To-day I am afraid that I disturb you even more than usual, as I perceive you are giving instruction in drawing.' He laughed, and I saw my mistake, when the two others, who till then had sat leaning over the table, at last looked up. One of them was not much younger than the person who spoke to me, and the other, with a snow-white beard and bald head, full twelve years older. 'Do people work so late in Nürnberg, and on a saint's day?' I asked, in order to begin a conversation; and Vischer replied that it was his custom at least, and that of the masters I saw before me, to practise themselves in drawing on the evening of festival-days, since the master who thought himself beyond the years of learning, was already beginning to unlearn. The young people—he meant his children—could never pass any saint's day, especially that of St. Sebaldus, at home, and it was therefore necessary for him to take care of the house. The simplicity of manners which showed itself in Vischer's words reconciled me to him immediately, although he had returned my first greeting so roughly. He stood up—a short, firm-built man, with the neck of a Hercules—and pressed my hand; for, as I answered the many questions he put to me, it prepossessed him in my favour, that I had already, during my short stay in Nürnberg, seen so much. With unfeigned enthusiasm I praised the tomb of St. Sebaldus, which I called the crown of modern art. Yet not so much the praise I gave, as some remarks I made on his work, seemed a reason with him for marking me out from the common class of travellers. He now became restless, and, as if disconcerted, pushed his cap up and down, and then broke out into a lamentation, that he had nothing to set before me, that no one was at home, and that larder and cellar were locked up. I quieted him with the assurance that I had just made a very good supper, and begged him to have the goodness to introduce me to the other masters.

"One of them was the ingenious Sebastian Lindenast, the artist of the admirable clockwork in the Church of our Lady. He was a grave, quiet man, with long yellow hair and a smooth chin. I extolled his work as incomparable; he, however, refused my praise with these words: 'I, worthy sir, have only made the copper

figures, only the images of the Emperor and the Elector; it was my friend Hans Hauss who gave them a soul.' This was in fact the name of the famous locksmith, who constructed the church clocks in a way that no one else could. The third master, a man of seventy years, looked at me with his dark eye, whose youthful fire strikingly contrasted with his silver beard, as kindly and confidently as though we had already often greeted each other before. And truly I had already seen him—not himself actually, but a true representation of him—at the Sacrament-shrine in the Church of St. Lorenz. It was Adam Krafft, the first worker in stone, not in Nürnberg only, but in the whole world. The old man stood up hale and hearty, placed a seat for me by his own, and did not conceal his satisfaction on hearing that I had already beheld his works with admiration, and hoped often to see them again. On my inquiring what they were drawing, Master Lindenast took up the word. 'We are in the habit of designing a common subject, each according to his own conception. To day it was my turn to choose a subject, and a piece of sculpture at the Town hall, which has long displeased me, occasioned me to propose St. Martin, on horse back, dividing his mantle with the beggar. In that work the saint holds his sword in such a way, that one might imagine he intended to stab either himself or the beggar, and least of all, that he meant only to cut off a piece of his mantle.'—P. 65.

Here is a pleasant picture of Adam Kraft and his wife Eve:—

"He begged me to enter the room which adjoined the workshop, and where in the midst of perfect simplicity, the greatest neatness was visible. The oaken wardrobe, carefully polished, shone as bright as the pewter cans which stood on its cornice; every fold of the curtain on the bed was arranged with care, and even the floor, which was strewn with sand, had acquired an ornamental character by the sweep of the broom still visible. 'Eva,' cried Master Adam, putting his head into the kitchen, and the name struck me. 'May the serpent,' said I, smiling, 'never creep into this paradise, where Adam and Eve dwell!' 'About our names,' replied he, 'we have had to bear many jokes, especially from our witty town-clerk, Herr Spengler; but I have revenged myself on him. That you shall hear about afterwards;' and again he cried 'Eva!' Just then entered the room an active little woman, in a small white cap and dark-red printed gown, and, if possible, beaming still more with kindness than the old man. The news that the long-expected guest had appeared in me, seemed for a moment to embarrass Frau Eva. But then she tripped backwards and forwards, placed a table before us, which she wiped down with her apron more than enough, took

a knife from the cupboard, which she knelt down and sharpened on the door-sill, then withdrew for a moment, and brought back a can of beer, a great loaf of bread, and butter. 'Wife!' asked the old man, 'is there no better fare than this to day?' 'Hush, father,' retorted she, jestingly, 'I bring the strange gentleman a piece of bread at least, while you think only of setting stones before him.' From the friendly hospitality of the entertainment, the fare tasted to me uncommonly good, and this mother Eva observed with no little pleasure. 'My wife,' began the old man, when he saw that I took a sincere interest in him and all dear to him, 'was christened Magdalena, and out of love for me she called herself Eva. In order that we might not grieve over any Cain, Heaven denied us the happiness of being parents. His favour we shall never cease to acknowledge, who has preserved us in such a remarkable manner.' With an amiable loquacity he then related to me, without being asked, all that he had lived through and experienced; and I was astonished to see how wonderful the Divine appointments had often been."—P. 178.

The following criticism of Albert Dürer upon himself expresses a profound truth, which every one, whatever be his Art, must have experienced as life advances :—

"'True,' said Dürer, 'I do now paint in a better style than formerly; but I no longer satisfy myself, as I once did. Now many pictures of my youth, which once brought me honour, displease me, and with reason; and in fact if I did not know them to be my own works, I should hardly recognise them as such. But with the improvement in my taste, the joy of creation is gone. You are still young, Herr Thomas; remember my words, that you also will in time taste this bitter experience. Formerly I liked gay colouring—I might even say a sharp contrast of colour—and I was an admirer of my own works.—When I grew older, I knew how to appreciate the beauty of statues, and I discovered that simplicity is the highest ornament of Art. Now I sigh, because I never can attain it. Each one of my works is a monument of my deficiency.'"—P. 325.

We can speak of the translation only as those may who have never seen the original; but the samples we have given will show that it is piquant, easy, and graceful, with a smack of antique homeliness about it that admirably qualifies it to convey the spirit of the work. The book is beautifully printed and got up, and we heartily recommend it to all simple lovers of Art and Artist-life.